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oog
This study concerns three central aspects of multiculturalism, which are 
closely related to fundamental debates on citizenship and are 
described as the principal dimensions of multicultural citizenship. The 
first of these dimensions relates to national belonging: the recognition 
that citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds belong to the 
national group. The second dimension bears upon social equality, on 
grounds such as ethnic origin, religion, gender and sexual orientation. 
The third dimension is the most defining aspect of multiculturalism: 
the recognition of cultural distinctiveness of the various groups in 
society, which is considered necessary (by proponents of 
multiculturalism) to achieve citizen equality. 
This study explores views in Dutch society on these potentially 
divisive issues. Essentially, this study provides insight into the question 
to which extent society attributes the quality ‘Dutch’ to Dutch citizens 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Background and purpose of this study 
Since the end of World War II, Western societies have grown increasingly diverse 
ethnically and culturally as a result of international migration. This growing 
diversity has given rise to issues that Kymlicka (1995: 1) calls ‘potentially divisive’. 
Generally, these issues concern the rights and identities of ethnic and cultural 
minorities in immigrant-receiving societies. The contents of and responses to 
public, political and scientific debates reflect the disagreements about the content 
of various concepts central to inter-ethnic relations, such as citizenship, 
multiculturalism, national identity and immigrants’ integration and loyalty to the 
nation-state. In particular, these debates concentrate on aspects of social equality, 
including government policies and regulations to achieve equality for citizens of 
different ethnic backgrounds. Concerns have been expressed about the need and 
effectiveness of these policies, and about the impact of social inequality on 
disadvantaged groups as well (Joppke 2007; Vermeulen 2010). Other debates 
concern aspects of immigrants’ cultural and ethnic identity. Volatile public and 
political discussions have flared up in various European countries, for example, on 
whether Muslim immigrants should be allowed to wear a headscarf in school or at 
work (Lettinga 2011), and whether the multiple citizenship status or transnational 
ties of immigrants and their descendants could undermine their loyalty to the 
nation-state (Faist 1999). In the last two decades, these debates have increasingly 
tended to focus on the practices, norms and values of Muslim immigrants in 
particular (Ogan, Willnat, Pennington & Bashir 2014; Vermeulen 2010). More 
generally, the increased ethnic and cultural diversity has been challenging the old 
concept of national identity in Western European societies, which is based on 
ethnic descent (cf. Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak 2014: 53; Fenton 2011).  
2 Chapter 1 
 
This study explores the views on these issues prevalent in Dutch society. As in 
other Western societies, ethnic and cultural diversity has increased in Dutch society 
since the 1950s as the result of decolonization, the recruitment of labour migrants 
and their subsequent family reunification in the 1970s and 1980s, and, mostly 
since the 1980s, asylum migration (Castles & Miller 2009; Lucassen & Lucassen 
2011).1 In 1972, 9% of the Dutch population consisted of allochthons, a term used 
by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) to designate individuals of whom at least one 
parent has been born outside the Netherlands.2 This percentage increased to 21% 
in 2013. The largest increase, from 1.2% in 1972 to 11.7% in 2013, is seen in the 
number of non-Western allochthons: persons of whom at least one parent was born 
in Africa, South America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan) or Turkey.3 Part of 
these non-Western immigrants are Muslims, mainly originating from Turkey and 
Morocco, who constituted around 5% of the Dutch population in 2012 
(Maliepaard & Gijsberts 2012). 
These debates have been accompanied by a growing number of scientific 
studies of how Western societies have responded to immigration and the resultant 
ethnic and cultural diversity. A central issue in these studies is whether and to what 
extent these responses have been ‘multicultural’, an adjective which generally 
means that the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants is being taken into account. 
However, a distinction has to be made between two uses of this adjective (cf. 
Shadid 2009; Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 5-8). In the first, the adjective 
‘multicultural’ is used as a demographic variable to describe a society which is 
culturally diverse. In this sense, Dutch society, as are most other societies, can be 
described as multicultural, as it consists of various ethno-cultural groups. In the 
second, it is used to describe specific normative responses to the (cultural) diversity 
in society, often referred to as policies of multiculturalism. Although many varieties 
of multiculturalism exist, most proponents agree on the importance of three central 
aspects: national unity and the social cohesion in society, the recognition of 
cultural distinctiveness of the various groups in society, and non-discrimination 
principles which not only concern social equality on grounds such as gender and 
sexual orientation but also the social equality of ethnic minorities (Vermeulen & 
                                                     
1 However, Dutch society has always been culturally diverse. In past centuries, groups of various 
ethnic origins have settled in the Netherlands, including labour immigrants and refugees who fled 
other European countries for political or religious reasons. The Netherlands received a relatively large 
number of immigrants in the 17th century. Between 1850 and 1950 the number of immigrants 
settling in the Netherlands was low (Lucassen & Lucassen 2011). 
2 This definition is in use since 1999 (CBS 1999). 
3 CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl; CBS (2003). The term allochthon 
was not used by the CBS before 1989. However, in the publication Allochtonen in Nederland 2003, 
the CBS uses the term to describe statistics concerning 1972 (CBS 2003). 
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Slijper 2003: 8-11; cf. Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth & Breugelmans 
2006: 104).4 
These three aspects are closely related to fundamental debates on citizenship, 
and therefore Shadid (2009) describes these aspects as the central dimensions of 
multicultural citizenship (see also Castles 1994; Modood 2010). The relationship 
between citizenship and the equality of citizens is clear, as legal citizenship in 
Western countries invariably entails the right to equality, as well as other rights and 
obligations including the right to participate in the country’s political institutions 
and the obligation to obey the country’s laws (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 
2008).  
The dimension of social cohesion relates to the recognition that individuals of 
various ethnic and cultural backgrounds who have legal citizenship belong to the 
national group. This recognition is fundamental to debates on citizenship as well, 
as the latter concept ‘entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion’ of 
individuals (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008: 155). Despite the clear legal 
boundaries circumscribing citizenship, citizens’ views about who fully belongs to 
their national group are socially constructed, and consequently the nation itself is a 
social construct (Anderson 1991; Pehrson & Green 2010). In some studies, a 
distinction has been made between concepts of the nation in which either exclusive 
or inclusive criteria are considered important to belonging to the national group. 
Exclusive criteria, also referred to as ‘ethnic’, include common descent and religion, 
while inclusive criteria, often referred to as ‘civic’, include respect for institutions 
and laws and a sense of national belonging (for references see Bakke 2000).  
Nevertheless, the most defining aspect of multiculturalism is the recognition of 
cultural distinctiveness. Several authors argue that it is necessary to give formal 
recognition to such group distinctions as gender, culture and religion, in order to 
achieve citizen equality (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2000; Shadid 2009). When 
these distinctions are not recognized, these authors argue, policies are often biased 
towards the interests of the majority group and consequently can cause inequalities 
or perpetuate existing inequalities (Leydet 2011; Modood 2010). 
In these above-mentioned studies of how Western countries have responded to 
ethnic and cultural diversity resulting from immigration, the Netherlands is 
described by many authors – including opponents of multiculturalism – as a 
country which has represented or still represents a ‘multicultural model’, implying 
that its immigrant integration policies have been or still are multicultural (e.g. 
                                                     
4 In other words, diversity in society raises two general questions: (1) who belongs to which group and 
(2) how should diversity be dealt with. The recognition of belonging relates to national unity and 
social cohesion, while the issue of dealing with diversity relates to equal treatment and the recognition 
of distinctiveness (cf. Verkuyten 2006: 5). 
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Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005; Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007). 
However, this assertion has been criticized by other authors, who argue that 
opponents of ‘multicultural’ integration policies often fail to explain what they 
mean by a ‘multicultural’ policy or country (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 7), or that 
they have been describing policies as ‘multicultural’, when these policies obviously 
have not fitted the criterion. Indeed, an analysis of Dutch integration policies by 
Duyvendak and Scholten (2012) indicates that these policies ‘were not that 
multicultural at all’, especially when it came to dealing with the aspect of the 
formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness. 
Leaving aside this criticism for the moment, it has to be said that most studies 
of whether countries have adopted a ‘multicultural model’ are limited, as they focus 
narrowly on regulations, policies and the political discourse of the societies 
concerned. In this respect, Shadid (2009) argues that, in order to characterize a 
society as multicultural, the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship discussed 
above have to be publicly recognized as well (cf. Van de Vijver, Breugelmans & 
Schalk-Soekar 2008: 95). In other words, Shadid proposes using these three 
dimensions of the concept of multicultural citizenship to assess the normative 
responses of both a country’s institutions and its citizens to the (cultural) diversity 
of society. 
Despite the large number of studies on multiculturalism, few studies have yet 
been done of public views on the three said dimensions of multicultural 
citizenship. 5  Especially rare are studies about public views on the national 
belonging of (new) citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds (cf. Díez 
Medrano & Koenig 2005).6 To paraphrase the researchers Devos and Banaji 
(2005): there is surprisingly little research on a fundamental aspect of citizen 
equality, which in the Netherlands is the degree to which society attributes the 
quality ‘Dutch’ to Dutch citizens of varying ethnic origins. Consequently, studies 
in which relationships between public views of national belonging and the public 
recognition of the social equality and cultural distinctiveness of citizens from 
various ethnic and cultural backgrounds are explored are rare as well (cf. Hjerm 
1998).7  
                                                     
5 Notable exceptions are studies by Van de Vijver and his colleagues (e.g. Breugelmans & Van de 
Vijver 2004; Van de Vijver, Breugelmans & Schalk-Soekar 2008; Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & 
Schalk-Soekar 2009). However, these studies focus on attitudes towards cultural diversity and 
equality, and not on national belonging. 
6 Examples of research on national belonging in the United States are Devos & Banaji (2005) and 
Theiss-Morse (2009). 
7 A rare example is an ethnographic study of national identity in Denmark by Jenkins (2011). 
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Apart from these knowledge gaps, to date there has also been little empirical 
research on the relationship between immigrant’s ethnic identity or multiple 
citizenship status and their loyalty to the nation-state, a specific aspect of the 
recognition of national belonging which has been increasingly debated and 
problematized in the last few decades. Both scientific and political debates on this 
issue were and still are largely theoretical and hypothetical, and lack empirical basis 
(Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).  
The purpose of this study is therefore to explore Dutch citizens’ views on all 
three of these dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including loyalty to the 
nation-state. By exploring these views, this study hopes to contribute to the 
understanding of how the social construction of national belonging is related to 
various aspects of attitudes towards cultural diversity, including views on equality, 
prejudice and cultural distinctiveness. By assessing these relationships, this study 
will also make an empirical exploration of whether the three dimensions of 
multicultural citizenship are indeed distinct, as theorized by Shadid (2009). 
Furthermore, by exploring the views expressed by both natives and first- and 
second-generation immigrants about loyalty to the nation-state, it is hoped that 
this study will strengthen the empirical basis for scientific and political discussions 
on this issue. More generally, the intention behind exploring these various aspects 
of multicultural citizenship in this study is to gain insight into factors which affect 
the incorporation of new citizens into society which can be used in the 
development of policies concerning immigrant integration. (Nota bene: the goal of 
this study is to explore public views on multicultural citizenship, and not to 
examine whether individuals would pass a civic integration test or are eligible for 
citizenship.) 
A word of caution, the reader should bear in mind that this study is 
exploratory in nature, and that its wide scope has limited the depth to which each 
of the issues could be researched. Furthermore, this study is synchronic and does 
not explore changes in public views over time, as the data were collected within a 
limited time frame (2012-2013). To put the findings of this study into a historical 
perspective, each chapter contains a brief review of the development of the political 
debates on the issue at hand. Finally, this study does not address the question how 
these public views are shaped in society or influenced by institutional processes 
such as education and the development of school curricula. This does not mean 
that such processes are not influential. On the contrary, see, for example, studies by 
Anderson (1991), Bakke (2000), Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano and Vertovec 
(2004), and Vertovec (2011). 
The wide scope of this study has also led to specific methodological choices. In 
order to facilitate the exploration of relationships between all these views and also 
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to be able to include such background variables as political preference, educational 
level and gender in the analysis, both quantitative and qualitative data were 
collected using a survey (n=710) and semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66). 
Both ‘native Dutch’ and first- and second-generation immigrants – holding Dutch 
citizenship – were interviewed. The design of the questionnaires was based on a 
study of the literature, including the literature on public and political debates.  
1.2 Structure of this study 
This study consists of 7 chapters, including this introductory chapter. In Chapter 
2, aspects of the research methods and techniques and the sample used in this 
study are described, including the composition of the sample, the development and 
conduct of the questionnaires, and the analysis of data. Furthermore, the 
limitations of the study are discussed in relation to possible directions for future 
research. In Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, the results of the analyses are presented. Each 
of these chapters consists of a concise review of the relevant literature, a brief 
overview of regulations and political debates on the issue at hand, and an analysis 
of the empirical data. 
The theme of Chapter 3 is public views about national belonging, one of the 
dimensions of multicultural citizenship as discussed above. More specifically, this 
chapter examines the strength of belonging felt by citizens of various cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds, and explores the criteria deemed important when considering 
which fellow-citizens of various backgrounds do belong to the national group. 
Another aspect of national belonging, namely loyalty to the nation-state, is the 
subject of Chapter 4. In this chapter, public views on loyalty to the nation-state are 
examined, as well as relationships between these views and such specific 
characteristics of citizens as multiple citizenship status, descent and political 
preference. 
Chapter 5 examines public views on another dimension of multicultural 
citizenship: the equality of citizens of various cultural and ethnic backgrounds. To 
this end, views on several topics will be explored, including immigrant integration, 
prejudice and discrimination, and positive action. Immigrant integration is 
examined in this chapter because ‘integration’ has been used by the Dutch 
government as a central concept in describing the relationship between equality on 
the one hand and ethnic and cultural diversity of society on the other. 
Public views on the third dimension of multicultural citizenship, the 
recognition of cultural distinctiveness, will be explored in Chapter 6. As mentioned 
above, in the last two decades political debates on this issue have increasingly 
focused on religious practices, norms and values of, in particular, Muslim 
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immigrants and their descendants. Therefore, the examination of public views on 
cultural distinctiveness in Dutch society will be mainly concerned with religious 
distinctiveness. 
Finally, Chapter 7 contains the general conclusions and theoretical 
considerations. In this chapter, the main results of the previous chapters will be 
integrated. Part of this integration concerns the questions of how the three 
dimensions of multicultural citizenship are related, and whether they are indeed 
empirically distinct. Finally, some recommendations for policy measures will be 
discussed. 
1.3 Some key terms: ‘natives’, ‘immigrants’ and ‘descent’ 
Various terms are (and were) used in the Netherlands to describe immigrants and 
Dutch citizens of different origins. In the period after World War II, the term 
‘guest workers’ was widely used to designate labour migrants. When it became clear 
in the 1970s and 1980s that many of these labour migrants were not guests but 
were settling in the Netherlands permanently, policy makers began using the term 
‘ethnic minorities’. This term was replaced in the 1990s by the term allochthons, 
which, as mentioned above, is defined by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).8 In this 
regard, a distinction is made between Western and non-Western allochthons, 
where, as mentioned above, the latter category includes persons of whom at least 
one parent was born in Africa, South America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and 
Japan) or Turkey.  
It is important to realize that this distinction is based not on analytical 
considerations but on the political view that the integration of one group (non-
Western) presents more challenges than integration of the other (Groenendijk 
2007: 103-104). Furthermore, the distinction between allochthon and autochthon 
has been politicized (cf. Geschiere 2009: 130-168). This became clear in recent 
discussions about the future use of the terms. According to the current definition, a 
person who is born of parents born in the Netherlands is an autochthon, even 
when his or her grandparents were born outside the Netherlands. To be able still to 
make a distinction between descendants of (relatively recent) immigrants, some 
have decided to replace the term allochthons with the term ‘immigrants and their 
descendants’.9 Others, notably members of Parliament for the PVV (right-wing 
                                                     
8 See CBS (1999). 
9 See for example some reports published by The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) 
since 2007 (available at http://www.scp.nl). 
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populist Party for Freedom), have argued that the children of second-generation 
immigrants have to be considered and defined as allochthons as well.10  
This indicates that the question of who is an autochthon and who is an 
allochthon is more than a matter of definition. It is an ongoing social construction, 
based on such criteria as origin and how long ago someone’s ancestors migrated to 
the Netherlands. 
To prevent confusion, in this study the terms ‘native Dutch’ and ‘immigrants’ 
(or ‘immigrants and their descendants’) will be used. Unless otherwise stated, the 
term immigrant in this study indicates no more and no less than that at least one 
parent was born outside the Netherlands. Similarly, the term native is only taken to 
mean that both parents have been born in the Netherlands. However, as this study 
will make clear, it takes more than that to be described as a fellow native by many 
Dutch citizens. Finally, the variable ‘descent’ will be used, containing the 




                                                     
10 See Snel (2011). 
 
 
Chapter 2  
Research methods 
2.1 Introduction 
The methodological aspects of this study will be discussed in this chapter. First of 
all, the research type will be described, followed by a discussion of the sampling 
method, sample characteristics, a description of the questionnaire development, a 
review of the data collection and a brief explanation of the employed techniques for 
data analysis. Finally, a number of limitations of this study as well as possible 
directions for future research on this topic will be discussed. 
2.2 Research type 
As mentioned, the main research question is focused on the views of Dutch citizens 
about the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship discussed in Chapter 1.1 
Using these dimensions as a point of departure, the main research question has 
been divided into the following sub-questions: 
 
 What views do Dutch citizens entertain about national belonging and its 
relationship with multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state? 
 What views do Dutch citizens have about the equality of citizens, both 
immigrants and natives, in society? 
 What views do Dutch citizens have about the cultural distinctiveness of 
the various cultural and religious groups in the country?  
                                                     
1 As said, the goal of this study is to explore public views on multicultural citizenship, and not to 
examine whether individuals would pass a civic integration test or are eligible for citizenship 
10 Chapter 2 
 
 How are these views interrelated, and how are they related to the 
background variables of respondents, including age, gender, descent, 
educational level, income and political preference? 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, few empirical studies on these public views exist, 
especially any which concern the dimension of national belonging and its 
relationship to national loyalty.  
The proposed exploratory character and wide scope of this study led to the 
choice of a mixed-method methodological design, including a survey (n=710) and 
semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66) in which both native Dutch and first- 
and second-generation immigrants – holding Dutch citizenship – were 
interviewed. The survey was meant to facilitate the exploration of relationships 
between views on all dimensions of multicultural citizenship and the inclusion of 
background variables in the analysis. Open-ended questions in the questionnaire 
and in the in-depth interviews allowed respondents to elaborate on their opinions, 
for instance, why and in what context do they hold certain views, in order to 
enrich the data and to improve the validity of the research findings (cf. Small 
2011).  
Given the size of the survey sample, it was not practicable to conduct the 
questionnaire by means of face-to-face interviews. Therefore, Computer Assisted 
Web Interviewing (CAWI) was carried out by the TNS NIPO survey agency 
(further explained below). Respondents received an email invitation requesting 
them to participate in this research and a web link to the online questionnaire. In 
contrast, the in-depth interviews were conducted in person or by telephone. 
2.3 Population, sample selection and sample characteristics 
2.3.1 Sample selection 
Decisions concerning the selection and composition of the sample were based both 
on two points, a review of the relevant literature and on practical considerations. 
The literature review indicated that such background variables as descent, religion, 
age, educational level and political preference are relevant in research on such 
topics as national belonging and loyalty to the nation-state (Devos & Banaji 2005; 
Huddy & Khatib 2007; Jones & Smith 2001a; Theiss-Morse 2009). Furthermore, 
in view of the scientific and political debates on multiculturalism (see Chapter 1), 
it was abundantly clear that the sample should include at least both native Dutch 
and first- and second-generation immigrants. 
The wide scope of this study required a relatively large sample. Given a desired 
confidence level of 95% and also a confidence interval of around 95%, the sample 
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size should ideally be at least 400 (cf. Israel 1992). However, considering the 
number of the background variables, the sample size should be even larger, to allow 
for describing and comparing sub-groups. Moreover, the planned multivariate 
analyses (see Section 2.6) would require a respondent to survey-item ratio of 
around 10:1 (Bijleveld & Commandeur 2008; Costello & Osborne 2005). The 
limited budget for the study allowed for a sample size of only around n=700. 
Therefore, it was decided to select a sample which would at least include a sub-
group of native Dutch and a sub-group of non-Western immigrants, each large 
enough to allow an analysis with, or close to, the desired confidence level and 
interval. 
One of the problems with this sort of research is that it is not always easy to 
obtain a representative sample which is of the desired size, mainly because it is 
difficult and time-consuming to establish a comprehensive sampling frame. 2 
Therefore it was decided to use the research panel TNS NIPObase, which contains 
around 216,000 respondents in 143,640 households (June 2012). It is mainly 
based on random respondent pre-recruitment (and therefore not on self-selection).3 
By referring to the information TNS NIPO has about the background 
characteristics of respondents in their panel, it was possible to obtain a sample 
which is, by and large, representative with respect to the variables mentioned 
above. Another advantage of this panel is that it includes respondents who have 
already agreed to participate in TNS NIPO online surveys, which improves the 
response rate. 
The panel included Dutch citizens who are 18 years of age or older. 
Consequently, it was decided to define the population for this study in the category 
of Dutch citizens who are 18 years of age or older. Studying children and young 
adolescents would require a different legal and theoretical approach (cf. French, 
Seidman, Allen & Aber 2006; Phinney 1990), which would make the scope of this 
study even wider, and would have limited its depth. 
Considering the relatively low percentage of immigrants in the Netherlands 
(see Chapter 1), simple random sampling would have resulted in a low absolute 
number of immigrant respondents, negatively affecting the reliability of the study. 
                                                     
2 Only Statistics Netherlands (CBS) has direct access to the Municipal Personal Records Database 
(Gemeentelijke Basis Administratie – GBA), which contains the requisite information for a sampling 
frame for studies on Dutch citizens. 
3 The pre-recruitment by TNS NIPO is done in face-to-face and telephonic interviews, for which 
respondents were selected through random sampling. To increase the proportion in the panel of 
groups which are difficult to reach or less represented in society such as minorities, TNS NIPO uses 
other recruitment methods, including snowball sampling. For an assessment of this panel and other 
panels in the Netherlands, see Van Ossenbruggen, Vonk & Willems (2006). See also: 
http://www.nopvo.nl. 
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Therefore, a disproportionate stratified sample was selected, which included two 
sub-samples. The first consisted of Dutch citizens excluding non-Western 
immigrants, the second included immigrants belonging to the four largest non-
Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands: persons of Turkish, Moroccan, 
Surinamese and Antillean descent. In total, 950 persons were approached, of 
whom 710 returned filled in questionnaires. Consequently, the first sub-sample 
consisted of 468 native Dutch, 33 Western immigrants and 7 persons whose 
descent is unknown, and the second sub-sample consisted of 202 non-Western 
immigrants. 4 The response rate varied between 67% (non-Western immigrants) 
and 84% (native Dutch and Western immigrants). 
For the semi-structured in-depth interviews, a sub-sample of respondents was 
taken from the survey sample. To this end, the survey included questions about 
whether respondents were willing to co-operate in a follow-up interview and 
whether this willingness depended on a potential reward of 25 Euros. Such an 
incentive was indeed provided, as experience with other studies indicates that the 
relatively low response for in-depth follow-up interviews in the Netherlands can be 
increased by offering a reward (cf. Stoop 2005). Of the 710 respondents who filled 
out the survey, 184 consented to a follow-up interview, of whom 143 were only 
prepared to be interviewed in return for a monetary reward. The prevalent 
recommendation for a minimum size of non-probability samples for qualitative 
interviews is between 30 and 50 (Bernard 2011: 154). Therefore, of the 184 
respondents who were prepared to participate, a random sample of 120 was 
selected and approached for an interview. In total, 66 persons responded (some 
after a reminder) and were interviewed, including 42 who expected a reward and 
24 who did not. All 66 participants, however, were rewarded with a gift voucher 
worth 25 Euros. 
2.3.2 Sample characteristics 
As mentioned above, the sample was disproportionally stratified and included two 
sub-samples. The first sub-sample, consisting of native Dutch (n=468) and 
Western immigrants (n=33), was representative (in 2012) with respect to the 
variables gender, age, educational level, family size, province of residence and 
political preference. Of the Western immigrants, 21% were not born in the 
Netherlands (i.e. are first generation), and 18% of them have multiple citizenship. 
The second sub-sample, consisting of immigrants of Turkish (n=59), Moroccan 
                                                     
4 As mentioned above, given the limited budget it was decided to select a sample which allowed for 
analysis with or close to the desired confidence level and interval of at least native Dutch and non-
Western immigrant respondents. This led to a sample that included a low number of Western 
immigrants. This limitation will be discussed in more depth in Section 2.7. 
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(n=45), Surinamese (n=73) and Antillean (n=25) descent, was representative with 
respect to gender, age and educational level. Of these respondents, 57% were not 
born in the Netherlands, and 38% do have multiple citizenship. 
The total sample consisted of 359 female and 351 male respondents who were 
between 18 and 93 years old. The average age of the native Dutch respondents was 
47.7 (SD = 17.3). The non-Western immigrants were younger (M = 37.2, SD = 
15.1) and the Western immigrants older (M = 52.0, SD = 17.2). The mean 
educational level, measured on a scale from 1 (no or primary education) to 7 (MA 
at university) of the native Dutch respondents was 4.0 (SD = 1.8), of the non-
Western immigrants 3.45 (SD = 1.8) and Western immigrants 4.4 (SD = 1.6). 
The sample for the in-depth interviews (n=66) consisted of 41 native Dutch 
and 25 non-Western immigrants, including 26 male and 40 female respondents. 
At the time of the study, they were between 20 and 77 years old (M = 45.2, SD = 
14.8). Their average educational level was clearly higher than that in the survey 
sample: 4.9 (SD = 1.3), which equalled higher general secondary education or pre-
university secondary education.6 
2.4 Development of the questionnaires 
As said, two questionnaires were developed for this study: one for the survey and 
the other for the in-depth follow-up interviews. To this end, the sub-research 
questions regarding the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship (see 2.2 
above) were operationalized on the basis of a study of the relevant literature.  
To answer the first sub-research question, regarding views on national 
belonging and its relationship to multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-
state, questions were formulated on: 
 
 cognitive aspects of national identification, that is, criteria for national 
belonging; 
 cognitive aspects of national self-identification; 
 affective aspects of national and ethnic self-identification, that is, sense of 
belonging; 
 views on multiple citizenship in relation to belonging and loyalty; 
                                                     
5 This average of 3.4 indicates a level between lower general secondary education (Dutch: VMBO) 
and vocational education (Dutch: MBO), consistent with the information of Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl). However, respondents of Antillean 
and Surinamese origin have a higher average educational level (3.8 and 3.7 respectively) than those of 
Turkish and Moroccan origin (3.2 and 2.8 respectively). 
6 In Dutch: HAVO/VWO. 
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 views on expressions of national loyalty, including aspects of national 
pride, shame and patriotism. 
 
To answer the second sub-research question about citizens’ equality, questions 
were formulated in order to investigate views on: 
 
 the principle of equal treatment; 
 anti-discrimination policy and positive action measures; 
 immigrant integration (policy and cultural retention); 
 aspects of the prejudicial view that immigrants are a cultural and economic 
threat; 
 frequency of social contact with, and social distance between, different 
groups. 
 
To answer the third sub-research question, on cultural distinctiveness, 
questions were formulated to investigate views on: 
 
 the value of cultural diversity; 
 cultural and religious distinctiveness; 
 the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness; 
 cultural diversity measures in the workplace and in healthcare 
organizations; 
 Islamic religious expressions; 
 the compatibility of Islamic and Dutch norms and values. 
 
These topics and the literature from which they were derived will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapters 3 to 6. Finally, questions were included to collect 
information about such background variables as gender, age, educational level, 
income and political preference. 
The survey questionnaire included both closed-ended and open-ended 
questions in order to understand the motivation of respondents in answering the 
questions and simultaneously to improve construct validity. This questionnaire also 
included scales for measuring views on various aspects of national (self-)identi-
fication, prejudice and social distance. These scales were derived from previous 
studies and adapted for the present study.  
The questionnaire for the follow-up in-depth interviews was semi-structured, 
focusing on why and in what context respondents hold certain views on the various 
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aspects. These questions did not just focus on respondents’ views, they also asked 
them to relate these views to their personal experiences.  
Pilot interviews were conducted among respondents from various (educational) 
backgrounds, to assess the expected duration of the interviews and the perceived 
difficulty and phrasing of the questions. The maximum duration of the survey, 
which was conducted online (as mentioned above), appeared to be around 25 
minutes. The comments of the pilot respondents indicated that a longer duration 
would probably have lowered the completion rate, with which researchers at TNS-
NIPO concurred. The maximum duration of the face- to-face interviews appeared 
to be around 60 minutes. Pilot respondents mentioned that they considered some 
questions to be quite difficult, and ‘therefore one hour is more than enough’. 
To improve intelligibility, when they had been deemed too complicated 
questions were rephrased and simplified. The questions which most needed some 
modification were those on the topics of loyalty and positive action measures. 
Furthermore, to reduce the risk of socially desirable responses, the order in which 
topics were addressed was adapted. In the survey questionnaire, for example, the 
question on positive action measures for ethnic minorities and questions about 
similar measures for women were addressed in different sections. In the 
questionnaire for the in-depth interviews, such questions were followed by a 
question in order to compare the respondent’s views on such issues. 
2.5 Data collection 
The survey was conducted in November 2012 and the in-depth follow-up 
interviews took place between March and August 2013.  
The in-depth interviews were conducted by the main researcher (n=31) and by 
three other interviewers (n=35). Respondents were asked to determine the location 
of the interview themselves. Most interviews were carried out face-to-face and in 
respondents’ homes. Other interviews took place in their offices, or in cafés and 
restaurants. Some interviews were carried out by telephone or Skype, for practical 
reasons or at the request of the respondent. The duration of these interviews varied 
from 45 to 70 minutes. Respondents were asked permission to record the interview 
and only 4 refused. Consequently, 62 interviews were recorded. Notes were taken 
during the interviews.  
In their introduction to the interview, interviewers stressed that this study 
concerned the respondents’ views and that they were not being judged, there were 
no wrong answers and that not having an opinion or considering a question 
difficult is normal, perfectly acceptable and at the same time important 
information.  
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By and large, respondents appeared to be at ease during the interviews. Some 
clearly enjoyed answering the questions, and said that they considered it refreshing 
to talk extensively about these topics and not ending up in a polarized discussion. 
A few reacted emotionally to questions which concerned cultural or religious 
distinctiveness, and had to be reminded by the interviewer that the questions were 
not meant to spark a debate. As one respondent said, ‘Why are you asking this? 
Why on earth would I consider it to be a problem if women choose to wear a 
headscarf?’ Interestingly, interviewers were often surprised by the frankness of 
respondents who appeared to consider immigration and the cultural distinctiveness 
of immigrants to be problematic. They talked frankly and without hesitation about 
their views. Other respondents appeared to be very tolerant of cultural and 
religious distinctiveness in the first part of the interview, but had to acknowledge 
later that they were not tolerant with respect to all forms of cultural distinctiveness. 
Some argued, for example, that they support the principle of equal treatment, but 
at the same time had more difficulty approving of preferential treatment measures 
for immigrants than of preferential treatment measures for women. As one 
respondent said, ‘After some heart searching, I would say yes to preferential 
treatment for women, and no to preferential treatment for ethnic minorities. But, 
with some hesitation, I approve of both, because you have to treat people equally.’ 
These doubts expressed by respondents underlined how important it is to approach 
issues of citizens’ equality and cultural distinctiveness in various ways, by 
addressing topics covering all three dimensions of multicultural citizenship. 
It turned out that there were several categories of questions which respondents 
considered difficult to answer. The most challenging were those questions 
concerning national belonging. Some explained that they do not, or only rarely, 
think about criteria which determine who belongs to the Dutch national group, 
and found it difficult to think of relevant criteria. In the same vein, those who 
argued that they consider a certain manifestation of cultural distinctiveness, such as 
an Islamic headscarf or a mosque, to be a problem, often admitted that they were 
at a loss to come up with an example of a personal experience in which they had 
experienced these manifestations as problematic. This is in line with research which 
has indicated that thoughts and feelings about social groups reflect both ‘controlled 
and conscious processes’ and ‘automatic and less conscious processes’ (Devos & 
Banaji 2005: 448). For this reason, this study focuses not only on specific criteria 
for defining national belonging and specific manifestations of cultural 
distinctiveness, but also on patterns of inclusion and exclusion of citizens of various 
ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Other possibilities to examine less conscious 
forms of social categorization in future studies will be discussed in Section 2.7.  
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Other questions which were considered difficult were those about aspects of 
multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state. While almost all respondents 
indicated that they were aware of the political debates on these issues, during the 
interview most of them said that they did not know of any actual cases of multiple 
citizenship or of any lack of loyalty which had presented a problem. Some began 
speculating, others simply said they did not know or did not understand why these 
issues were considered problematic by politicians. Similarly, most respondents did 
not know what the concept ‘neutrality of the state’ means, and considered it 
difficult to answer, for example, whether public officials and teachers should be 
allowed to wear an Islamic headscarf. Finally, many respondents did not know 
what the equality policies and regulations of the Dutch government, including 
measures for immigrant integration, anti-discrimination and positive action, entail. 
Thinking these issues over, many respondents admitted that they did not have any 
personal experiences to which they could refer to formulate an opinion. These 
responses illustrate the importance of researching the views on these issues of the 
political elite in future studies. Such directions for future studies will be discussed 
in Section 2.7. 
2.6 Data analysis 
After completion of the survey, TNS NIPO delivered the collected data in a file 
which could be processed by IBM SPSS Statistics. This file included factors in 
order to weight the total disproportional stratified sample to reflect the 
demographic profile of the Netherlands. Before commencing the statistical 
analysis, the data were cleaned and examined by calculating frequencies and 
creating contingency tables. 
The quantitative data, collected by means of closed-ended questions in the 
online survey, served to explore views on the dimensions of multicultural 
citizenship (see Chapter 1), and relationships between these views and such 
background variables as gender and educational level. To this end, techniques for 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis have been employed. The bulk of this 
data is of either the nominal or the ordinal type (most questions used Likert scales), 
which means that linear relationships cannot be assumed. For this reason, 
techniques have been used which are nonparametric and can reveal possible 
nonlinear relationships between variables with various levels of measurement. To 
explore patterns in respondents’ views, two such (related) techniques were used: 
Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) and Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (provided in the SPSS Categories module), 
which are alternatives to linear Principal Components Analysis (see also Linting & 
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Van der Kooij 2012). As mentioned above, such exploration is important, as this 
study focuses on patterns of inclusion and exclusion of citizens of various ethnic 
and cultural backgrounds, and not just on specific criteria for national belonging 
and specific manifestations of cultural distinctiveness (cf. Spruyt & Vanhoutte 
2009). Furthermore, such data reduction techniques allow the exploration of 
patterns in expressions of national attachment, including loyalty to the nation-
state. Consequently, the CATPCA technique was used to construct scales by which 
to explore relationships between these patterns (represented by scales) and other 
variables. These scales were constructed by summating items, and not by 
calculating component (factor) scores, as this study is exploratory and summated 
scales are generally more stable across samples and therefore easier to compare with 
results of future studies (cf. DiStefano, Zhu & Mîndrilă 2009). Importantly, it 
must be noted that the means that were calculated to compare scores on items are 
exploratory as well, as the items were measured using Likert-scales. 
These techniques and the related technique of Categorical Regression 
(CATREG) (also provided in the SPSS Categories module) were also used to 
explore profiles of respondents, that is, response patterns (see also Bijleveld & 
Commandeur 2008; Van der Kooij 2007). The latter technique allowed the 
exploration of relationships with background variables, while controlling for other 
variables. It bears repeating, however, that while p-values to assess significance 
(derived from the CATREG procedures) have been reported, this study is 
exploratory in nature. 
The qualitative data, collected by means of the open-ended questions in the 
survey and the in-depth interviews, served (as mentioned above) to explore why 
and in what context respondents hold certain views, in order to enrich the data and 
improve the validity of the research findings. The data collected by the in-depth 
interviews was transcribed, using the recordings and notes. These transcriptions 
and the data derived from the open-ended questions in the survey were coded, 
initially using a list of codes which was compiled on the basis of the interview 
topics, the literature study and notes made during the interviews. During the 
coding process, new codes were created to describe unforeseen topics in the data. 
Subsequently, relationships between codes were identified and described by 
categories (see also Strauss & Corbin 1998). In the next phase of the analysis, these 
categories were related to the results of the analysis of the quantitative data. 
2.7 Limitations and possible directions for future research 
In this section, the methodological and theoretical limitations of this study and 
possible directions for future research will be briefly discussed. 
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A general methodological limitation of this study is its exploratory nature (see 
Chapter 1). The reader has to bear in mind that the goal of this study is to provide 
insights into respondents’ views and the relationships between these views and 
other variables. Furthermore, views were explored within a relatively short period 
of time (8 months).  
Other limitations have to do with the sample selection. First of all, the survey 
sample contained a relatively small number of Western immigrants (n=33), 
whereas according to Statistics Netherlands their number (1.5 million) is close to 
the number of non-Western immigrants (1.9 million).7 The former group was also 
missing in the sample for the in-depth interviews. Both shortcomings limited the 
reliability of the results concerning this group. Similarly, the various groups of non-
Western immigrants included in the sample (Dutch citizens of Turkish, Moroccan, 
Surinamese and Antillean background) were relatively small, which limited the 
reliability of separate analyses of each group. 
An important point is that the survey and in-depth interviews were conducted 
in Dutch. This limited the study, as it was not (practically) possible to explore the 
views of Dutch citizens who do not have a relatively good command of the Dutch 
language. Other limits are attributable to the fact that the sample was selected from 
the access panel TNS NIPObase, and that the survey was conducted online. This 
might have resulted in a sampling bias, as the sample only contains individuals who 
are able to participate in online web interviewing. While 96% of Dutch citizens 
had access to the Internet in 2012 (Van Deursen & Van Dijk 2012), not everyone 
has the (technical) capability to fill in online questionnaires. Furthermore, 
although their panel is based on random pre-recruitment and not on self-selection 
(as mentioned above), obviously respondents have already agreed to participate in 
online surveys of TNS-NIPO. As is the case with all studies which require samples 
for interviewing, this results in a non-response bias. This means that, while the 
sample was representative with respect to the variables mentioned above, it is not 
known to what extent and how the response patterns of the respondents included 
differ from (potential) responses of individuals who did not want to participate in 
such surveys.  
This method of online interviewing has some other limitations as well. There 
was no interviewer present to explain questions which needed more clarification. 
This problem could only be partly dealt with by testing the phrasing and difficulty 
of the questions in pilot interviews, and by relating the results to those of the in-
depth interviews. There is also the possibility that respondents might have been less 
motivated, which can lead to non-differentiation between items on the same 
                                                     
7 Numbers in January 2013. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 2014, http://statline.cbs.nl. 
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response scale and to an acquiescence bias as well. The risk of the latter type of bias 
has been reduced (but cannot be eliminated) by including items which are 
neutrally worded, and by mixing negatively and positively worded items.  
A further limitation of this study concerns the question type used. Most 
questions in the survey were of the closed-ended type, possibly introducing 
researcher bias and reducing the level of spontaneity in respondents’ answers (cf. 
Bryman 2012: 250-252). However, this limitation was partly overcome by adding 
the response category ‘other’ to several questions, the inclusion of open questions 
to allow respondents to elaborate and by relating the results of the survey to those 
of the follow-up in-depth interviews. 
A final methodological limitation concerns the fact that the in-depth interviews 
were carried out by native Dutch interviewers. As relations between majority and 
minority groups are important factors in the construction of social boundaries (see 
Chapter 3), this might have influenced responses by non-native respondents, 
namely by introducing social desirability bias. 
The study also has theoretical limitations. First of all, the questions in the 
survey questionnaire were largely based on the relevant literature, and not on 
preliminary qualitative research to identify relevant topics (for example, regarding 
criteria for national belonging and expressions of loyalty) and to construct specific 
scales. In other words, this exploratory study did not include a preliminary 
exploratory phase. 
Furthermore, views on citizens’ equality, one of the dimensions of 
multicultural citizenship, were measured by a small number of items concerning 
the principle of equal treatment, anti-discrimination policies and positive action 
measures. Views on the above-mentioned topic of immigrant integration and the 
prejudice that immigrants present a threat appeared to be related not only to views 
on equality, but also to views on the other dimensions of multicultural citizenship, 
as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In future studies, more items should be 
included to explore public views concerning citizens’ equality in more depth.  
More generally, the wide scope of the study has limited the depth in which the 
views on multicultural citizenship could be researched. As mentioned in Section 
2.5, existing research indicates that thoughts and feelings concerning social groups 
reflect both ‘controlled and conscious processes’ and ‘automatic and less conscious 
processes’ (Devos & Banaji 2005: 448). Therefore, in future studies specific 
attention could be paid to less conscious associations, for example, using Implicit 
Association Testing (IAT) (e.g. Devos & Bajani 2005), and the views of the elite 
on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship could be explored. In this context, 
Brady and Kaplan (2009: 35) argue that ‘elites typically take the lead in 
constructing and elaborating ethnic identities, so that the dynamics of ethnicity 
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involve an interplay between elites and mass publics that cannot be understood 
without separate measures at the two levels’. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.5, 
the results of the present study indicate that the Dutch discourse on aspects of 
multicultural citizenship, for example, on the issue of national loyalty, is partly 
shaped by the political elite. While such studies might provide insights into the 
interplay between elites and mass publics, longitudinal studies could take 
diachronic factors into account, for example, the effects of changes in the political 
debate, economic developments and immigration patterns (cf. Scheepers, Coenders 
& Lubbers 2003). Finally, as mentioned in Chapter 1, this study does not address 
the question how these public views are shaped in society or influenced by 
institutional processes such as education and the development of school curricula. 
This does not mean that such processes are not influential. On the contrary, see, 
for example, studies by Anderson (1991), Bakke (2000), Schiffauer, Baumann, 
Kastoryano and Vertovec (2004), and Vertovec (2011). Obviously, future studies 
addressing this question should also pay attention to the aforementioned role of the 




Chapter 3  
Multicultural citizenship 
and national belonging 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to speak of a multicultural society the 
dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including their belonging to the national 
group of both natives and immigrants, their cultural distinctiveness and their 
equality, have to be formally and publicly recognized (Shadid 2009: 5-6). In this 
chapter, the recognition of one of these dimensions, namely national belonging in 
Dutch society, will be explored. 
The issue of belonging to the national group or nation is fundamental in 
debates on citizenship, as the concept of citizenship ‘entails a tension between 
inclusion and exclusion’ of individuals (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008: 
155). This tension is clearly manifest in the various aspects of citizenship discussed 
in the literature (e.g. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; Cohen 1999; 
Kymlicka and Norman 2000). One of these aspects is the legal status of 
immigrants – those who possess the legal status of a country’s citizenship legally 
belong to the national group. Another aspect of citizenship is the rights and 
obligations entailed by the legal status of citizenship. Among them are the 
obligation to obey the country’s laws and, on the rights side the right to equal 
treatment and the right to participate in the country’s political institutions. 
Nevertheless, despite the clearly circumscribed legal boundaries of citizenship and 
the formal rights and obligations bound up in the concept, citizens can still 
disagree about who fully belongs to their national group. Views on belonging to a 
national group are necessarily socially constructed (and therefore dynamic) and 
consequently the nation itself is a social construct (Anderson 1991; Pehrson & 
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Green 2010). One example is the frequent use of the term ‘foreigners’ to describe 
first- and even second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands, including those 
who have full legal citizenship. This lack of consensus about who fully belongs 
shows, for example, that people can differ in their views on to what extent the 
rights, such as equal treatment and freedom of religion of certain groups in their 
nation state, should be upheld – issues that will be more extensively discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
Despite the fact that in many countries this social construction of national 
belonging has long been determined by the dominant group, it has become 
‘increasingly difficult to simply conceive of national citizenship as strictly mono-
cultural because citizens of the same country have increasingly diverse cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds’ (Duyvendak 2011: 82). As discussed in Chapter 1, this is 
certainly the case in the Netherlands. To examine who is socially recognized as 
belonging to the Dutch national group, in this chapter Dutch government policies 
which relate to national belonging will be reviewed and empirical data collected in 
the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires conducted for this research will be 
analysed. However, before this is done, the scientific debates on, and the scientific 
usage of, the concept of belonging will be discussed. 
3.2 Perspectives on national belonging 
Issues of social belonging essentially concern relationships between individuals and 
groups. These relationships are generally investigated in social identity research 
which focuses on how individuals are socially defined, including to which groups 
they do and do not belong (Verkuyten 2005: 43; see also Abdelal, Herrera, 
Johnston & McDermott 2009; Jenkins 2008).  
However, besides the fact that there is no agreement on how social identity 
should be defined, Verkuyten (2005: 40) states that the concept of identity is 
overused, and the resultant familiarity leads to ‘confusion, misunderstanding and 
conceptual vagueness’. Brubaker and Cooper likewise state that, when the concept 
of identity is used in social science, it ‘tends to mean too much (when understood 
in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all 
(because of its sheer ambiguity)’ (2000: 1-2). 1 Therefore, Brubaker and Cooper 
propose ‘to go beyond “identity”’ (2000: 36), and to replace this concept with 
other concepts which offer more conceptual clarity. But, because conceptual clarity 
                                                     
1  Brubaker & Cooper state that a strong sense of identity implies ‘strong notions of group 
boundedness and homogeneity’, ‘a sharp distinctiveness from nonmembers, a clear boundary between 
inside and outside’ (2000: 10). In contrast, a weak sense of identity implies that ‘identity is multiple, 
unstable, in flux, contingent, fragmented, constructed, negotiated, and so on’ (2000: 11). 
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is the goal, this call to replace the concept of identity can also be interpreted as a 
plea for a more appropriate operationalizing of the concept. The latter position is 
taken in the present study, following in the footsteps of Verkuyten (2005; 2006) 
and Jenkins (2008).2  
In the exploration of the phenomenon of national belonging in this study, 
insights will be used which are derived from research in the tradition of social 
identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 1979; see also Druckman 1994; 
Huddy & Khatib 2007). In this tradition, social identity is generally defined as a 
cognitive awareness of group membership in combination with an affective 
commitment to that group (Tajfel 1981).  
Several aspects of national belonging will be discussed in this and the next 
chapter, including the strength of affective commitment to the national group, 
national pride, patriotism, and criteria deemed important when considering who 
belongs to the national group. The review of the scientific debates in this section 
will be structured on the following issues which have been distinguished in studies 
of social identity by Jenkins (2008), Theiss-Morse (2009) and Verkuyten (2005; 
2006): (1) the need of the individual to belong, (2) social categorization and its 
accompanying behavioural and normative expectations, and (3) social recognition.3  
3.2.1 The need to belong and the construction of group boundaries 
Research in various disciplines has shown that man, as a social animal, has the need 
to belong (Baumeister & Leary 1995). This individual need, which is defined by 
Baumeister and Leary as ‘a strong desire to form and maintain enduring 
interpersonal attachments’, cannot be dismissed as just any need, as research 
indicates that it is a ‘powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation’ 
(Baumeister & Leary 1995: 497). These interpersonal attachments are sought not 
only with family members and friends, but also with larger collectivities, such as 
national, ethnic and religious groups (Druckman 1994; Verkuyten 2006). 
Importantly, in their overview of empirical research on belonging, Gere and 
MacDonald (2010: 110) conclude that ‘it has become clear that the need to belong 
has strong effects on people’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors’ and that ‘a 
chronically unmet need has many negative consequences that can profoundly affect 
an individual’s life’. These negative consequences can include a lower performance 
in complex cognitive tasks, higher stress, poorer health and more health conditions 
(Gere & MacDonald 2010). 
                                                     
2 Also see: Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, McDermott (2009); Yuval-Davis (2010). 
3 Jenkins (2008) explores the concept of social identity. Theiss-Morse (2009) and Verkuyten (2005; 
2006) study national identity and ethnic identity respectively, considering these as specific forms of 
social identities. 
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However, belonging to a national group, or any other social group, is not just a 
matter of individual choice determined by this need to belong. Others in the social 
environment have to categorize and recognize the individual as part of the group as 
well. This process relates to social categorization, the second issue in the studies of 
social identity mentioned above. This means that individuals and groups categorize 
themselves and are categorized by others in groups. Scholars use various terms to 
distinguish between these internal and external processes, such as self-ascription 
and ascription (Verkuyten 2005), and internal and external identification (Jenkins 
2008). In these processes, many criteria for categorization are used in various 
combinations, among them cultural characteristics, ethnic background, gender and 
age (cf. Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005: 9-11). Importantly, this does not mean 
that a social group exists because it is objectively different from other groups with 
regard to certain criteria, but rather, as Barth (1969) realizes, because these criteria 
are used, in processes of ascription and self-ascription, to construct (imagined) 
group boundaries socially (cf. Anderson 1991). The very fact that every individual 
can be categorized according to various criteria means that every individual belongs 
to various groups at the same time.4 An individual can legally belong to the Dutch 
national group, and simultaneously be categorized as belonging to another ethnic 
group, a family or a political party. In other words, individuals have partial or 
multiple social identities and belongings.5 At the individual level, in a specific 
situation a certain identity, for instance, being a member of a family, can be 
emphasized, but in a different situation another identity, for instance, being a 
member of an ethnic or national group can be the most salient (Verkuyten 2005). 
There has been an extensive discussion about why group boundaries are 
constructed, and influential explanations have been proposed by Barth (1969) and 
Tajfel (1981). Barth has argued that this process is a ‘by-product of the transactions 
and negotiations of individuals pursuing their interests’ (Jenkins 2008: 7). In 
contrast, in his social identity theory, Tajfel has proposed that categorization is a 
basic human tendency which serves individuals to achieve positive self-esteem by 
differentiating their in-group positively from out-groups. This need for positive 
distinctiveness can be expressed in favourable behaviour towards members of one’s 
in-group – in-group favouritism and in-group loyalty – and discrimination against 
members of out-groups.6 The crux of the matter is that it is not easy to determine 
the direction of the relationship, which is a process of weighing up between the 
                                                     
4 See Jenkins (2008: 104) for a discussion of the distinction between categories and groups. 
5 See, for example, research on immigrants’ processes of self-identification in the Netherlands by 
Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover (2005). 
6 The need for positive distinctiveness, however, is not always expressed in these ways. See Shadid 
(2007:183); also see Jenkins (2008: 114-115); Theiss-Morse (2009: 41). 
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process of pursuing interests on the one hand and social categorization on the 
other, because striving for positive self-esteem can also be considered pursuing an 
interest (Jenkins 2008: 7-8).7  
Whatever the case might be, it is generally recognized that social categorization 
does happen, and that categorizations are not only nominal in that they provide 
labels for groups, but they also have cultural and emotional components which 
provide meaning (Brubaker 2009: 34; Druckman 1994; Jenkins 2008: 99; 
Verkuyten 2005: 46; 2006: 6). Consequently, the construction of boundaries not 
only sets in-group members apart nominally from out-group members, it 
simultaneously implies expectations of similarity among group members in the 
matters of specific behaviour and norms (cf. Jenkins 2008: 132-147). Examples are 
expectations of patriotism and group loyalty, which can be expressed by turning 
out to vote or being prepared to pay taxes, and also expectations of holding certain 
views about equality and cultural distinctiveness (Druckman 1994; Theiss-Morse 
2009: 13-14, 23-29, 67-70). However, this does not necessarily mean that there is 
behavioural conformity or consensus about norms within a group, but rather that 
group members as well as the outside world believe or want to believe this to be the 
case (Jenkins 2008: 140).8 As such, these expectations, held by members of both 
in-groups and out-groups, can be stereotypical (Verkuyten 2005: 46). Such in-
group stereotypes, in turn, help to distinguish in-groups from out-groups, which 
serves the need for (positive) distinctiveness (Theiss-Morse 2009: 70-72).  
In practice, in-group members can disagree on what the behavioural and 
normative expectations really mean, and their interpretations of these expectations 
are situationally contingent (Jenkins 2008: 136). Research shows, for example, that 
when the in-group stereotype includes support for the norm of equality, some 
group members support specific measures (like positive action) to achieve 
substantive equality, while other group members do not (Theiss-Morse 2009: 21-
22; see also Chapter 5). Cogently, an individual who does not meet (all) 
behavioural and normative group expectations can still identify with the group, 
and will not necessarily be considered as not belonging to the group by other group 
members. For example, a Dutch individual who has emigrated to another country 
might not express loyalty to the Dutch national group, but can still self-identify 
and be identified by others as Dutch (cf. Keller 2007: 164-166). 
                                                     
7 For a discussion of these and other perspectives, see Jenkins (2008: 1-15). 
8 Jenkins (2008: 134-140) discusses the work of Anthony Cohen (1985), who proposed that symbols 
shared within communities allow community members to believe that they behave in similar ways 
and that they have similar norms. 
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3.2.2 Social recognition 
The expectations of similarity within groups mean that the construction of group 
boundaries does more than differentiate between in-groups and out-groups, it also 
affects relations between in-group members. In this regard, Theiss-Morse (2010: 4, 
72-77) makes a distinction between typical9 group members, who exemplify the 
group stereotypes and are therefore fully recognized as belonging to the group, and 
marginalized group members, who do not meet (all) these expectations and are 
therefore not fully recognized. This differentiation between in-group members 
relates to social recognition, the third issue in the studies of social identity 
mentioned above. Verkuyten (2006: 5) argues that striving for social recognition is, 
as are the need to belong and finding meaning through social categorization, a 
basic human tendency. This includes recognition of who one is as an individual 
and also one’s recognition as member of a group, especially when belonging to this 
group is important to one’s self-esteem (Verkuyten 2005: 68-69; 2006: 9).  
This means that the issue of belonging to a certain group, which is reflected in 
debates on national identity, is not trivial, as it can lead to identity conflicts. For 
example, Huynh, Devos and Smalarz (2011) researched the ‘perpetual foreigner 
stereotype’: the idea that members of ethnic minorities will be seen as others in 
perpetuity. They conclude that, among ethnic minorities, ‘even after controlling 
for perceived discrimination, awareness of the perpetual foreigner stereotype was a 
significant predictor of identity conflict and lower sense of belonging to American 
culture’ (Huynh, Devos and Smalarz 2011: 133). In other words, immigrants who 
perceive that their ethnicity stands in the way of their being fully recognized as part 
of the national group can suffer from identity conflicts and a lowered sense of 
belonging to the national group.  
3.2.3 The importance of context and intergroup relations 
These issues just raised – the need to belong, the need for social recognition, and 
social categorization and its accompanying behavioural and normative expectations 
– clearly define that group boundaries, as Jenkins (2008: 44) puts it, are ‘the 
perpetual subject and object of negotiation’, which implies that they are dynamic 
and situationally contingent (see also Verkuyten 2005: 55). Examining this 
contingent character of group boundaries, scholars identify many factors which 
play a role in their construction. These factors relate to the situations in which the 
boundaries are constructed, the relations between and within the categorized 
groups, and the interpretations of these situations and relations by the individuals 
and groups concerned (Wentholt 1991; see also Verkuyten 2005: 53). These 
                                                     
9 Theiss-Morse uses the term ‘prototypical’. 
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factors include, inter alia, historical, economic and political circumstances 
(Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004), relations between majority and 
minority groups (Verkuyten 2010: 151), and power relations (Verkuyten 2005: 58; 
Brady & Kaplan 2009: 36).  
The importance of the interpretation of such factors, more specifically the 
interpretation of the historical circumstances pertinent to the construction of group 
boundaries, is shown in research by Smeekes, Verkuyten and Poppe (2012), which 
indicates that those who perceive Dutch national history to have been tolerant tend 
to be more tolerant of the cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslims in the 
Netherlands. In considering the relationship between group relations and power, it 
is of importance ‘who is able to construct socially relevant categorizations’ 
(Verkuyten 2005: 56). Members of majority groups tend to consider their own 
nominal characteristics and accompanying behaviour and norms – which, as 
discussed above, are stereotypical – to be self-evident (Verkuyten 2005: 59) and 
typical (Theiss-Morse 2009: 73). Those who deviate from these criteria or are 
perceived as deviating are not fully recognized as group members and can be 
marginalized to ‘protect the in-group stereotype’ (Theiss-Morse 2009: 74). 10 
Verkuyten (2005: 59) calls this process the ‘normalizing effect’ of the majority 
group identity. An example of this process, which includes historical and political 
factors as well, is the link between the history of colonialism and the present 
negative stereotypes of immigrant groups (Verkuyten 2005: 53), which as a result 
of these stereotypes are not considered to be fully part of the national group (cf. 
Theiss-Morse 2009: 67). Similarly, in their research Devos and Banaji (2005: 447) 
found that African Americans and Asian Americans were ‘less associated with the 
national category “American” than are White Americans’. 
The construction of boundaries can have negative consequences, among them 
discrimination and identity conflicts. Verkuyten (2005: 45) states that ‘[m]aking 
distinctions is not a problem, but it can become one if it occurs without adequate 
basis’ (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of discrimination). Both discrimination and 
identity conflicts can lead to a lowered sense of belonging to the national group 
(Jayaweera & Choudhury 2008; Rumbaut 2005; Smart Richman & Leary 2009). 
Identity conflicts can occur when individuals who were born in the Netherlands 
and who consider themselves to be Dutch are still categorized as, for example, 
Moroccans because their parents or grandparents were born in Morocco (Shadid 
2007: 192). In other words, the categorization of someone as belonging to a certain 
group can persist, even when personal characteristics change. Identity conflicts can 
                                                     
10 This relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), and the related process of sub-
typing (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001). 
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also occur when one of the multiple identities each individual has, for example, 
that of being a Muslim, is not considered to be part of the in-group characteristics 
(cf. Shadid 2009: 17). In some cases, specific social identities can become stigma 
identities, which ‘provide a chronically salient distinction or a master status that 
cannot be ignored and serves to define the essential character of those who are 
classified’ (Verkuyten 2005: 52). As an example of a stigma identity, Verkuyten 
refers to the ‘Gypsy’ identity of Roma and Sinti in Eastern Europe. 
This is not to say that majority groups or those in power are the only groups 
able to construct socially relevant categorizations. Various collectivities, among 
them women, homosexuals and religious and ethnic minorities, have been actively 
engaged in the negotiation of group boundaries, not only in order to be fully 
accepted as belonging to a national group (acceptance which includes, for example, 
equal treatment), but also for the recognition of their own cultural, historical or 
political distinctiveness (see also Chapter 6). Therefore, the construction of 
boundaries is also a political project, and terms such as the politics of belonging 
and identity politics are used to describe these negotiations (see, for example, 
Parekh 2000; Yuval-Davis 2006).  
3.2.4 Aspects of identification with the national group 
As mentioned above, the construction of group boundaries is an interplay of 
internal and external processes, that is, of self-identification and the identification 
by others. In the literature on national identity, various concepts have been 
discussed which relate to self-identification with the national group, such as 
national attachment or commitment, nationalism, national pride and patriotism 
(Huddy & Khatib 2007; Theiss-Morse 2009).  
In order to clarify the relationship between these concepts and self-
identification with the national group or nation, it is helpful to distinguish between 
various components of self-identification recognized in studies of social identities 
(for an overview, see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). First of all, 
individuals need to be cognitively aware that they are members of a certain 
(national) group. This cognitive awareness can include their assessment of to what 
extent they consider themselves a typical group member (Ashmore, Deaux & 
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004: 85; Theiss-Morse 2009: 73). Apart from this cognitive 
component, self-identification also has an affective component which relates to the 
need of human beings to belong, discussed earlier in this chapter, and an evaluative 
component which relates to the positive and negative attitudes individuals foster 
towards the social category to which they belong (Ellemers, Kortekaas & 
Ouwerkerk 1999). The distinction between these three components can be traced 
back to Tajfel’s definition of the social identity concept as the ‘part of an 
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individual’s self- concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a 
social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance 
attached to that membership’ (Tajfel 1978: 63).11 
Research in the tradition of Tajfel’s social identity theory indicates that there is 
a strong relationship between the affective component of self-identification – also 
referred to as the level of affective commitment or the strength of belonging to a 
group – and behaviour in terms of group membership. Generally speaking, group 
members who have a high affective commitment to the group are more likely to 
display in-group favouritism and in-group loyalty (Ashmore, Deaux & 
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). Especially 
when the distinctiveness of a group is cast into doubt, group members with a 
strong affective commitment to the group tend to defend this distinctiveness by 
exaggerating differences between their in-group and out-groups, a process which 
can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination of out-group 
members (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002).  
As might be expected, the level of affective commitment to the in-group varies, 
and it has been shown that it depends on the level of voluntariness of group 
membership (Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999). When individuals 
voluntarily choose to be a member of a group, their level of commitment to that 
group can generally be expected to be stronger than when their membership is 
involuntary. In the latter case, group members cannot leave the group, at least not 
easily (the voluntariness can be a matter of degree) and more variation in the level 
of affective group commitment can be expected. National group membership can 
be considered to be involuntary to a large extent. As Bakke (2000: 8) argues, 
‘[n]ations are not objects of choice the way e.g. political parties are’, and most 
people never change their national identity. Nevertheless, referring to Billig (1995), 
Theiss-Morse (2009: 10) argues that national identities have a relatively potent 
nature, as they are ‘constantly reinforced through symbols, culture, language, and 
politics’. Moreover, national identity is not only reinforced, it is also reproduced by 
such institutions as schools, in which national culture, history and norms are 
taught, and consequently, ‘for most people, being a part of the nation is a matter of 
upbringing and socialization rather than a matter of conscious choice’ (Bakke 
2000: 7; see also Schiffauer, Baumann, Kastoryano & Vertovec 2004). This 
explains the stability of these identities, and means that those who feel a sense of 
national belonging tend to ‘feel that commitment strongly’ (Theiss-Morse 2009: 
10). 
                                                     
11 Also see the distinction between the cognitive process of ‘identification as’ and the emotional 
process (including a combination of affection and evaluation) of ‘identification with’. See Verkuyten 
(2005: 65-67). 
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Despite the widely recognized relationship between the level of affective 
commitment to the group and behaviour in terms of group membership, there is 
no agreement among scholars about how to conceptualize and measure this level of 
commitment (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Ellemers, Kortekaas 
& Ouwerkerk 1999). Some authors include the cognitive, affective and evaluative 
components of self-identification in one uni-dimensional construct, in order to 
describe the level of commitment to the national group (e.g. Theiss-Morse 2009, 
who examines the strength of national identity). However, empirical research 
indicates that the various components of self-identification do not necessarily co-
vary in a predictable way (for an extensive discussion see Ashmore, Deaux & 
McLaughlin-Volpe 2004). In this respect, Ellemers, Kortekaas and Ouwerkerk 
found that it is the affective component of self-identification, and not the cognitive 
and evaluative components, which ‘appears to be the key aspect of social identity 
which drives the tendency for people to behave in terms of their group 
membership’ (1999: 386).  
With these insights, it is possible to clarify the relationships between the 
affective component of national self-identification and related concepts which have 
been discussed in the literature, including national attachment, national pride, 
patriotism and nationalism. First of all, the term national attachment is mostly 
used as a general concept, not only to refer to the affective component of national 
self-identification, but also to nationalism, national pride and patriotism (cf. 
Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007; Latcheva 2010). Some researchers have 
found that national pride correlates positively with the affective component of 
national self-identification (e.g. Theiss-Morse 2009: 133-138). Nevertheless, it is 
not clear if these two phenomena necessarily co-vary, as pride has both affective 
and evaluative components. While affection for a group can undoubtedly influence 
the evaluation of that group, individuals with a strong affective commitment to a 
certain group can evaluate certain characteristics of that group negatively (Ellemers, 
Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999: 373). In other words, national pride is a 
multidimensional concept (cf. Hjerm 1998: 343), and empirical study is necessary 
to explore how the dimensions of national pride are related to group commitment 
and other variables. 
Similarly, other studies suggest that patriotism is a multidimensional concept 
as well. The concept of patriotism is used not only to describe the affective 
component of national self-identification, but to illustrate the attitudes and 
behaviours in which this affection is expressed as well (cf. Herrmann, Isernia & 
Segatti 2009; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Various forms of these attitudes and 
behaviours are considered in the literature as various types of patriotism (for 
references, see Davidov 2010; Huddy & Khatib 2007). Constructive patriotism, 
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for example, has been defined as criticism and questioning motivated by ‘a desire 
for positive change’ (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999). Furthermore, empirical 
studies indicate that national self-identification is distinct from various forms of 
patriotism (Huddy and Khatib 2007). 
As are these aforementioned concepts, in the relevant literature the concept of 
nationalism is generally used to refer to a bias in favour of one’s own nation (cf. 
Calhoun 2002). However, the concept of nationalism is often used to describe 
views and behaviour stressing the distinction between one’s own national group 
and other national, ethnic or religious groups (cf. Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993; 
Latcheva 2010). In this regard, several authors suggest that nationalism refers to an 
idealization of one’s nation (e.g. Sumner 1906), which can be expressed by the 
sense that one’s own nation is superior to other nations (e.g. Davidov 2010; 
Huddy & Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). Furthermore, a distinction 
is often made between civic and ethnic nationalism. The former refers to the view 
that membership of a nation is first and foremost legal and political, implying that 
criteria for national belonging include respect for institutions and laws, and a sense 
of national belonging (Calhoun 2002). In contrast, ethnic nationalism refers to the 
view that membership of a nation is rooted in specific ethnic or cultural criteria. 
Below, this distinction will be discussed in more detail. 
Considering the discussion above, the relationships between the affective 
component and other components of self-identification are ‘an issue for theoretical 
elaboration and empirical test’ (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004: 91). 
In the present chapter, the cognitive and affective components of national self-
identification and identification will be examined separately. In this examination, 
the affective component of national self-identification will also be referred to as 
‘affective commitment’ or ‘the strength of belonging’ to the national group. The 
phenomena of national pride and patriotism will be discussed and examined in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
3.2.5 Inclusive and exclusive aspects of group boundaries 
The interplay of the individual, situational and relational factors discussed above 
produces various forms of boundary construction. In other words, depending on 
these factors, certain categorization criteria are deemed relevant and others not. 
With respect to recognition of national belonging, a distinction is often made 
between nations in which either ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ criteria are seen as essential. This 
distinction can be traced back to 1944 when Kohn (1944: 329) stated that the 
liberal and cosmopolitan values embodied in ‘Western civic nationalism’ in Europe 
were superior to the ‘ethnic nationalism’ in Eastern Europe. Since then, the 
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distinction has been made in various studies of nationalism and national identities 
(e.g. Geertz 1973; Jones & Smith 2001).  
Apart from the normative aspect of Kohn’s comparison between Western and 
Eastern European nations, Bakke (2000) describes empirical aspects of the 
distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity, or, in other 
words, ethnic and civic nationalism. These empirical aspects relate to the extent 
national identity can be acquired or changed or, in other words, to whether aspects 
of national group boundaries are inclusive or exclusive. Therefore, the criteria 
deemed relevant to a civic conception include respect for institutions and laws, 
civic culture, values, ideology and a sense of national belonging. Bakke says it is 
assumed that these criteria have voluntary characteristics and that therefore a 
nation with a civic conception of identity is inclusive, which means that national 
belonging can be acquired. In contrast, the ethnic conception of national identity 
includes criteria which are much more difficult to acquire or change, such as a 
common descent, religion, customs and traditions. Hence this conception is 
exclusive (Bakke 2000: 2; also see Jones & Smith 2001).12  
However, the difference between these conceptions is a matter of degree (cf. 
Bakke 2000; Hansen & Hesli 2009). Empirical research indicates that both ethnic 
and civic criteria are found in all conceptions of national identity (Jones & Smith 
2001; Smith 1991), and that certain civic membership criteria, such as values, ‘may 
be as difficult to acquire as the ‘ethnic’ criteria’ (Bakke 2000: 12). Moreover, 
certain criteria can indicate either an ethnic conception of national identity or a 
civic conception of national identity. For example, when someone holds the view 
that speaking Dutch is an important aspect of being Dutch, this can mean at least 
two things. It can mean that this individual considers speaking Dutch an 
important indicator of a common historical or cultural background, which 
indicates a more ethnic conception of national identity. It is also possible that this 
individual considers speaking Dutch as an attribute necessary to participate in 
Dutch society, and has a more civic conception of national identity (cf. Brubaker 
2004: 139). Cogently, Bakke (2000) shows that nations with a predominantly 
ethnic conception of national identity are not completely closed to outsiders.  
This discussion indicates that national identity, whether it has a civic or ethnic 
character, is a social identity and therefore dynamic and can be the subject and 
object of permanent negotiation (cf. Jenkins 2008; see also Hoving, Dibbits & 
Schrover 2005). At the same time national identities, which are being constantly 
reinforced and reproduced, are relatively potent and stable, which implies that the 
                                                     
12 Bakke (2000) criticizes the assumed distinction between the civic conception as voluntary and the 
ethnic conception as involuntary. As stated earlier, in this study it is recognized, in agreement with 
Bakke, that national belonging in existing nations is always quite involuntary. 
 Multicultural citizenship and national belonging 35 
 
change in the boundaries of national belonging is a slow process. Therefore, it is 
more difficult for immigrants to achieve recognition and to retain parts of their 
original culture in nations with a conception of national identity in which hard-to-
acquire criteria, whether they are called civic or ethnic, are deemed relevant (cf. 
Bakke 2000: 9; Shadid 2009: 16). In other words, a multicultural society (see 
Chapter 1) is a society whose members have a conception of national identity in 
which inclusive criteria are deemed the more relevant (cf. Hjerm 1998: 336). 
3.2.6 The increasing research interest in the issue of national identity 
In the last few decades, there has been an increased interest in the issue of national 
identity among researchers. Several possible reasons have been suggested for this 
increase (Fenton 2011). One suggestion is that in societies which become 
increasingly multicultural, multiculturalism requires a redefinition of the old 
concept of national identity which is based on ethnic descent (see also Chapters 1 
and 6). More specifically, this means that multiculturalism goes beyond demands 
for the promotion of tolerance of cultural distinctiveness and implementing 
measures against discrimination, it also insists on the inclusion of minorities in the 
national group (cf. Shadid 2009; see also Chapter 1). After all, the issue of national 
belonging relates to a fundamental aspect of citizen equality, which is, in the 
present research, the degree to which Dutch society attributes the quality ‘Dutch’ 
to Dutch citizens of varying ethnic origin (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005: 448).  
Another possible reason for the increased research interest in national identity 
is the disappearance of the traditional link between the disadvantaged members of 
the majority – the traditional working class – and left-wing social-democratic 
parties. Fenton (2011) has argued that this has created a space for racism, which 
has become apparent in the change in voting behaviour of the working-class 
members of the majority, who in various countries (such as Switzerland, Norway, 
Denmark, France and the Netherlands) have turned to populist and anti-
immigrant political parties. Weighing up the traditional working-class, Han (2013: 
3) suggests that rising inequality leads ‘poor people’ to identify less with their class, 
as people tend to prefer to identify with groups which have a high material status. 
Consequently, as these ‘poor people’ identify less with their class, their national 
self-identification tends to strengthen. Han’s study indicates that this tendency is 
strengthened by an inflow of immigrants who have a relatively low educational 
level and lack skills, because it increases the perceived social distance among people 
in the lower socio-economic classes.  
Finally, the increased interest in national identity might be explained by the 
globalized economy, which has reduced the capacity of nation-states to provide 
security for their citizens (Fenton 2011). Examining this situation, Bauman argues 
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that, in reaction to this increasing sense of insecurity, citizens search to strengthen 
their group attachments, which can result in conservatism (‘going back to the 
roots’) and an increase in the importance attached to exclusive criteria for group 
belonging (2001: 100-101). 
What has just been said serves to illustrate that the construction of group 
boundaries not only determines whether a person is accepted as a group member, 
but also to what extent that person is recognized as such. Aspects of group 
boundaries can be (more or less) inclusive or exclusive, and some of the multiple 
identities and characteristics individuals have or are perceived to have, can be 
recognized while others are not. Group members with a strong affective group 
commitment tend to view themselves as typical, and tend to construct clear and 
distinctive group boundaries and favour their in-group. At the same time, the 
construction of boundaries depends on such contextual factors as historical and 
political developments, group relations and power differences. The next section 
will shed some light on government policies that relate to national belonging in the 
Netherlands. 
3.3 National belonging in the Netherlands: policies and debates 
In the last few decades, debates about national belonging and immigrant 
integration in the Netherlands, like in other Western European countries (see 
Chapter 1), have become highly politicized (Duyvendak 2011; Kremer 2013; 
Shadid 2009). In these debates, the relevance of the cultural boundaries of national 
belonging has been increasingly stressed – a process which is referred to as the 
culturalization of Dutch citizenship ‘in which emotions, feelings, norms and 
values, symbols and traditions (including religion) come to play a pivotal role in 
defining what can be expected of a Dutch citizen’ (Duyvendak 2011: 81; also see 
Geschiere 2011; Shadid 2009). 13 The main arguments in these debates and the 
related changes in Dutch government policies will pass in review in this section.14  
In the 1970s and the 1980s, citizenship debates in the Netherlands were barely 
politicized (Penninx 2005). During the 1970s it became clear that most labour 
migrants who had been coming to the Netherlands since the 1950s had no plans to 
return to their countries of origin and wanted to stay in the Netherlands 
permanently. It then dawned on the government that structural measures had to be 
                                                     
13 Several scholars have explored possible explanations for this culturalization of citizenship. See for 
example Duyvendak (2011) and Prins (2004). 
14 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government 
policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of cultural boundaries 
of Dutch citizenship. 
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developed to encourage immigrant integration. 15  The report entitled Ethnic 
Minorities, published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) in 
1979, which provided the foundation for the new integration policies, refers to the 
possibility of identity conflicts among second generation migrants: 
 
Growing up in two worlds having different social status and divergent 
attitudes, and which display little understanding for one another and are 
indeed sometimes hostile towards each other, but which also both lay a claim 
on loyalty, confronts this generation with great problems of identity, and this 
can lead to a certain lack of standards of conduct (WRR 1979: XIII). 
 
Consequently, the integration policies which were developed were not only 
constructed with the goals of equality and participation of immigrants in mind, 
they were also designed to achieve socio-cultural emancipation which, in turn, was 
seen as a precondition for the improvement of their socio-economic position and 
could prevent future identity conflicts (Penninx 2005).16 
Ten years later, in a report published in 1989 in which the immigrant 
integration policies of the 1980s were evaluated, WRR stated that too much 
government attention paid to the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants could 
hinder their advancement in education and on the labour market. WRR 
recommended that the government should take account of the differences between 
and within immigrant groups and focus on socio-economic goals, leaving the 
responsibility for the development of their cultural identity to the immigrant 
groups themselves (WRR 1989: 19-24).  
These recommendations were reflected in the Contourennota (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken 1994), the government policy document on immigrant 
integration presented in 1994. One argument presented in this document states 
that citizenship entails both rights and obligations, therefore all citizens, including 
immigrants, have an individual responsibility or duty to participate in Dutch 
society. More specifically, it was stated that it is incumbent on all citizens to learn 
Dutch and to acquire a basic knowledge of Dutch society (Ministerie van 
                                                     
15 See Chapter 5 for a more extensive discussion of the concept of immigrant integration and Dutch 
national integration policies. 
16 In later criticisms of Dutch integration policies, it has been asserted that the policies of the 1980s 
emphasized the necessity allowing the preservation of the cultural identities of immigrants as well 
(Duyvendak & Scholten 2011). However, it must be stressed that this assertion is not correct 
(Duyvendak & Scholten 2012; Vink 2007). The WRR report of 1979 explicitly states that 
preservation of cultural identities should not be a goal of integration policies, as it could lead to 
‘cultural isolation of ethnic groups’ which could hinder the participation of immigrants in society. 
(See also Chapter 6.) 
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Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). The focus on socio-cultural emancipation in the 
integration policies was consequently abandoned and replaced by a focus on the 
individual responsibility of immigrants to integrate. In the heyday of these ideas, 
the early 1990s, local governments developed Dutch language courses and courses 
on Dutch society in general, but looking at the functioning of the labour market in 
particular. These civic integration measures were implemented nationally under the 
Newcomers Integration Act (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers) in 1998 (Bruquetas-
Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). At this point, the courses 
were made mandatory for new immigrants and those with a temporary residence 
permit. 
Another important shift in the debates about the citizenship of immigrants and 
their descendants occurred around the year 2000. Several authors (e.g. Scheffer, 
Bolkestein and Fortuyn17) have claimed that the integration policies had failed and 
postulated that social cohesion was being threatened because the integration 
policies focused too heavily on the immigrants’ socio-cultural emancipation and 
too little on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values (Penninx 2005; 
see also Geschiere 2009; Prins 2004). These authors went on to argue that certain 
norms and values embraced by immigrants and their descendants, especially those 
held by Muslims, are incompatible with Dutch norms and values (see Chapter 6 
for a more extensive discussion of cultural distinctiveness). In a newspaper article, 
Scheffer (2000) argued that it is important to take knowledge of ‘Dutch language, 
culture and history much more seriously’ if Dutch society were to be held together. 
These sorts of ideas about the problematic nature of Islamic norms and values were 
not new. As said, they had already been voiced in 1991 by Frits Bolkestein, one of 
the leaders of the VVD (right-wing liberal People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy). However, after 2000 a catalyst occurred when these ideas about 
integration failures, the threat of Islam and the importance of a consciousness of 
Dutch norms and values were married together by the politician Pim Fortuyn in 
one political discourse, important parts of which were appropriated by other 
political parties (Penninx 2005; see also Hoving 2011). 
                                                     
17 Paul Scheffer is a prominent member of the PvdA (left-wing Labour Party). In 2000 he published 
the essay, “The multicultural drama”, in the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad (Scheffer 2000), 
which has been influential in Dutch debates about immigrant integration. Frits Bolkestein was the 
leader of the VVD (right-wing liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) in the 1990s. He 
has been criticizing Dutch integration policies and declaring Islamic norms and values to be 
incompatible with Dutch culture since he published an article in the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant 
on these issues in 1991 (Bolkestein 1991). Pim Fortuyn was an author and politician, known for his 
criticism of Dutch integration policies. He qualified Islam as a ‘backward culture’. He was 
assassinated by an environmental activist during the national election campaign of 2002 in which he 
participated as the leader of the political party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Pim Fortuyn’s Party). 
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This political discourse elicited a number of policy responses which were 
related to changes in integration and immigration policies, but also served to 
strengthen the awareness of Dutch national identity. Among the ideas mooted to 
achieve the latter were founding a national museum and compiling a national 
canon of Dutch history. Although the national museum on Dutch history has 
never materialized, the canon was finished in 2006 and since 2010 primary and 
secondary schools have been obliged to use it as a guideline in their curricula. This 
obligation has been criticized, principally on the grounds that it limits discussion 
on interpretations of Dutch history and also debate on which aspects of Dutch 
history should be considered important and why (WRR 2007: 97). Despite the 
fact the authors of the canon have recognized that national identity is a dynamic 
social construction (WRR 2007: 97) ‘and evolves according to dominant ideas, the 
national canon just gives one story about what the Netherlands is’ (Kremer 2013: 
10; see also Geschiere 2011: 59).  
In a response to these debates about Dutch national identity, WRR (2007) 
stated that a static conception of Dutch identity with references to the past is 
inadequate and not future proof. It advised against adopting a perspective in which 
one national identity is considered fundamental, and proposed a focus on various 
ways in which individuals identify themselves with the Netherlands. Politicians on 
the right of the political spectrum especially (representing the VVD, the Christian 
Democratic Appeal – CDA and the populist Party for Freedom – PVV) were 
critical of these WRR conclusions. Some argued that there is one fundamental 
Dutch national identity, and that Dutch norms and values have to be maintained 
and protected. Others stressed that Dutch society is based on Christian, Jewish and 
humanist principles.18 
On the other hand, in 2004 several members of Parliament put forward a 
motion that the government should no longer use the term allochthon to describe 
Dutch citizens one or both of whose parents were born outside the Netherlands 
(see Chapter 1).19 Allochthon means ‘other’ or ‘not from here’, and is essentially an 
ethnic category as it is based on descent (cf. Geschiere 2009; Groenendijk 2007). 
In their motion, the members of Parliament argued that the term has negative 
connotations and that it suggests that those who are designated as such do not fully 
participate in and do not fully belong in Dutch society (Tweede Kamer 2004-
2005). Although the national government rejected their motion on the abolition of 
                                                     
18 NRC Handelsblad (August 20, 2008), Nederlandse identiteit is niet uniek in de wereld. 
19 This definition has been in use since 1999 (CBS 1999). 
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the use of the term in 2005, several municipalities, including The Hague (in 2004) 
and Amsterdam (in 2013), have decided to stop using the term.20  
Opposing this move as mentioned in Chapter 1, some politicians, notably 
members of Parliament for the PVV, proposed the definition of the term allochthon 
be extended. They stated that the children of second-generation immigrants, of 
whom both parents were born in the Netherlands, should also be considered and 
defined as allochthons.21 It would seem that these politicians are trying to establish 
even more exclusive criteria for national belonging by the expedient of increasing 
the number of citizens who can be handily defined as allochthon. These proposals 
are examples of the perpetual foreigner stereotype mentioned in Section 3.2; the 
idea that members of ethnic minorities will be perpetually seen as ‘others’. 
Obviously, awareness of this stereotype can lead to identity conflicts and a lower 
sense of national belonging among ethnic minorities (Huynh, Devos and Smalarz 
2011). 
Changes in integration and immigration policies came in 2003 with the 
publication of the government’s Integration Policy New Style. This policy document 
stressed the social and cultural distance between immigrants and Dutch natives, 
and announced new policies to safeguard the ‘continuity of society’ by promoting 
‘common citizenship’ by insisting on learning the Dutch language and abiding by 
‘basic Dutch norms’ (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004: 8). These norms included 
respecting the law, accepting anyone’s freedom of expression, the sexual preferences 
of others and the equality of men and women. Furthermore, the law on civic 
integration (the Wet inburgering), which applied to immigrants from outside the 
European Union and a group of residents who did not have Dutch citizenship, was 
amended. These immigrants could now obtain a residence permit only after they 
had passed an exam consisting of tests to assess language skills and knowledge of 
Dutch society.22  
                                                     
20 De Volkskrant (August 19, 2005), Verdonk houdt vast aan begrip allochtoon; De Volkskrant 
(February 14, 2013), In Amsterdam wonen geen allochtonen meer. 
21 See Snel (2011). 
22  The most recent law is the Wet inburgering (Law on Civic Integration) passed in 2006, 
implemented in 2007. In 2012 this law was slightly amended. Applicants in the Netherlands have to 
contact the municipality which works in conjunction with Regional Educational Centres (ROCs) 
which are qualified to run courses and set the requisite exams. Persons from outside the EU who want 
to migrate to the Netherlands have to pass a similar civic integration test at the Dutch embassy or 
consulate abroad (the Wet inburgering buitenland or Law on Civic Integration Abroad). Since 2013, 
applicants have to pay for the courses and exams themselves. Depending on their financial 
circumstances, applicants can apply for a loan to pay the tuition fees. In some cases, those who 
commenced their courses before 2013 can have their fees paid by the municipality. (See “Integration 
in the Netherlands”, accessed July 25, 2013, http://en.inburgeren.nl.) 
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Another change occurred in the political debates about citizens with multiple 
citizenship – more specifically immigrants and their descendants who had obtained 
Dutch citizenship but still retained their original citizenship (see Chapter 4 for a 
more extensive review of this debate). Before 2003, opponents of multiple 
citizenship argued that immigrants’ retention of their original citizenship would 
hinder them in developing an affective commitment to the Netherlands and would 
therefore be an obstacle to integration (De Hart 2005a). But, in the context of the 
debates about the perceived failure of integration and threats, putative or real, to 
social cohesion since 2000, this argument was extended to the idea that having 
multiple nationalities can cause or reveal possible conflicting loyalties, even 
disloyalty to the Dutch nation-state. The covert message was that immigrants 
should renounce their original citizenship to prove their loyalty – and by 
implication their affective commitment – to the Dutch nation-state (cf. 
Duyvendak 2011). Importantly, the latter idea principally concerned Muslim 
immigrants, which indicates that this debate was not just about the legal aspect of 
multiple citizenship but more about ethnic and cultural boundaries of Dutch 
national belonging (De Hart 2005a).  
The policy objective of ‘common citizenship’ introduced by the government in 
2003 was reiterated in the government policy document Integration, Belonging and 
Citizenship issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), in which it was argued that Dutch society is based on a 
‘fundamental continuity of values, views, institutions and customs which shape the 
predominant culture in Dutch society’.23 The government plainly states that these 
values and customs cannot be abandoned, and that immigrants have to adjust to: 
‘[t]he Dutch society, in all its diversity, is the society in which those who settle 
have to learn to live, to which they are required to adjust and fit into’. 24  
In sum, the views of successive Dutch governments and the political debates 
about cultural diversity have been subject to pronounced changes in the last few 
decades. Whereas in the 1980s the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants was 
seen to be a must to prevent identity conflicts and to support integration, since 
2003 the national government has considered the cultural distance between Dutch 
natives and immigrants and their descendants a problem. Opponents of multiple 
citizenship now openly expect immigrants to renounce their original citizenship to 
prove their affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. This 
stressing of culture in the debates about Dutch citizenship automatically raises 
                                                     
23 In the document the government uses the Dutch term ‘leidende cultuur’, possibly a reference to the 
German term Leitkultur. This can be translated as ‘guiding culture’, ‘leading culture’ or ‘predominant 
culture’. See Pautz (2005). 
24 Author’s translation. 
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questions about national belonging. Who is considered to be fully included in the 
Dutch national group? What factors are related to the level of affective 
commitment to the Dutch nation-state? These questions will be examined in the 
next section. 
3.4 Views in society on national belonging 
The discussion in the previous section has brought to light several themes which 
run through the debate about ethnic and cultural diversity in the Netherlands. 
These themes raise a fundamental question about national belonging in Dutch 
society: Who’s Dutch? To paraphrase Devos and Banaji (2005: 448), who asked 
the same question in the context of American society (‘Who’s American?’), this 
question relates to a fundamental aspect of citizen equality, which is, in the present 
research, the degree to which Dutch society attributes the quality ‘Dutch’ to Dutch 
citizens of varying ethnic origin. As explained earlier in this chapter, national 
belonging has more than a legal aspect (having legal citizenship), it also has social 
aspects. It is in respect to the latter that people can disagree about who can be fully 
included in the national group. In other words, who is considered to be ‘true’ or 
‘typically’ Dutch, and how inclusive or exclusive are the criteria which are used in 
the construction of national group boundaries? 
The exploration of aspects of national belonging in the Netherlands in this 
section has been inspired by similar research by Theiss-Morse (2009) and Devos 
and Banaji (2005), who investigated the boundaries of American national identity. 
In the first part of this section the affective component of national self-
identification, namely, the strength of national belonging or affective commitment 
to the national group will be examined. (In Chapter 4, commitment to the 
Netherlands will be explored in more detail, in an examination of the various types 
of loyalty to the Netherlands.) In the second part, cognitive aspects of the social 
construction of Dutch national group boundaries will be explored, including the 
reasons certain criteria used in this construction are deemed important. 
3.4.1 The affective component of national self-identification 
The affective component of national self-identification was measured by the item ‘I 
feel strong ties to the Netherlands’.25 To put this affective commitment into 
                                                     
25 Other items which could measure only the affective component of national self-identification were 
not included in the questionnaires. However, several items were included which measure the affective 
component and the evaluative component and/or behavioural expressions, such as expressions of 
loyalty. These will be analysed in Chapter 4. Importantly, the affective commitment to the Dutch 
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perspective, the affective commitment to place of residence, province and Europe 
as a union was also measured, as can be seen in Table 3.1 below.  
 
Table 3.1 
Level of affective commitment (means, scale from 1 = weak to 4 = strong). 
To: The Netherlands Place of residence Province Europe 
 3.1 3.0 2.5 2.3 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result the means can only be used for 
exploratory analysis.  
 
The findings indicate that the average level of Dutch citizens’ affective 
commitment to the Netherlands is moderate (M = 3.1). To explore relationships 
between this level of commitment and other variables, including age, gender, 
descent, religion, multiple citizenship status (whether or not a person is a legal 
citizen of more than one state), educational level, income and political preference, a 
Categorical Regression analysis was carried out. This analysis indicates that the 
affective commitment to the Netherlands is slightly and positively related to age 
(β26 = .15, p < .05) and voting behaviour (β = .17, p < .001).27 With respect to the 
latter, the level of affective commitment of those who did not vote in the 2012 
national elections appears to be slightly weaker.  
The level of affective commitment to the Netherlands of immigrants of both 
Western and non-Western origin and those with multiple citizenship does not 
appear to be significantly different to that of native Dutch people and those 
holding only Dutch citizenship (similar results were found by Vroome, Verkuyten 
and Martinovic 2014: 11-13). To explore these findings in more depth, the 
affective commitment of these respondents to other groups was also measured, as 
can be seen in Table 3.2 below. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
national group was not measured by the item ‘I feel strong ties to the Dutch’, as this statement can be 
interpreted as affective commitment to the Dutch ethnic group. 
26 Unless otherwise stated, the βs mentioned in this study are standardized. 
27 Relationships to gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, educational level and income 
were not significant. 
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Table 3.2 
Level of affective commitment to groups (means, scale from 1 = weak to 4 = strong). 
Respondents Ethnic group Political group Occupational group 
Native Dutch 2.9a 2.3 2.6
Non-Western immigrants 2.7 2.4 2.4
Western immigrants 2.4 2.2 2.6
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for 
exploratory analysis. 
a The native Dutch were asked to what extent they felt affective commitment to ‘the Dutch’, i.e. their 
ethnic group. 
 
The analysis indicates that both native Dutch and immigrants of non-Western and 
Western origin have a significant but slightly stronger affective commitment to the 
Netherlands (as presented in Table 3.1) than to their own ethnic group. 28 
Pertinently, these commitments are clearly not seen by these respondents as 
conflicting. On the contrary, the level of affective commitment to the own ethnic 
group is positively and strongly related to the level of affective commitment to the 
Netherlands, among both native Dutch and immigrants and their descendants (β = 
.51, p < .001). 29  Similarly, the analyses indicate a moderate and positive 
relationship between the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands of 
religious respondents (those who classify themselves as either a believing Christian 
or Muslim) and the level of commitment to their religious group, which was also 
measured (β = .28, p < .001).30 However, research by Martinovic and Verkuyten 
among Muslim Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and Germany has 
indicated that, while national identification and religious group identification are 
not always mutually exclusive, the relationship between these identities can depend 
                                                     
28 Wilcoxon signed-rank test for native Dutch: z = -7.58, p < .001, r = -.24; non-Western immigrants: 
z = -2.16, p < .05, r = -.11; Western immigrants: z = -4.40, p < .001, r = -.37. However, the 
respondents were not asked to rank these commitments. 
29 A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, 
educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if the level of affective commitment 
to the own ethnic group significantly predicts the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands.  
30 A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, multiple citizenship status, 
educational level and income as control variables, was used to test if, among religious respondents, the 
level of affective commitment to the own religious group significantly predicts the level of affective 
commitment to the Netherlands.  
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on conditions such as the extent to which ‘Western and Islamic ways of life’ are 
seen as compatible, and perceived discrimination (2012: 899-900). In particular, 
these authors found that, among their respondents, those who perceived ‘pressures 
from their ingroup to maintain an ethnoreligious lifestyle as well as those who 
perceived discrimination by natives identified more strongly with their religious 
group and, in turn, identified less with the host country’ (2012: 893) (see also 
Verkuyten & Martinovic 2012; Vroome, Verkuyten & Martinovic 2014: 17-18). 
The findings presented in Table 3.1 also indicate that, although the average 
affective commitments of Dutch citizens to the Netherlands and to their place of 
residence are neither significantly different, their affective commitments to their 
province and to Europe as a union are significantly lower.31 Furthermore, while 
educational level does not appear to be related to the affective commitment to the 
Netherlands, it is negatively related to affective commitment to place of residence 
and province, and positively related to commitment to Europe as a union (β = -.14, 
p < .001; β = -.18, p < .001 and β = .21, p < .001 respectively).32 Voters for the 
right-wing (populist) PVV, the left-wing SP (Socialist Party) and the Christian 
parties SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) and CU (the 
moderate Christian Union) feel significantly less committed to Europe as a union 
(M = 2.1 or less; β = .21, p < .001).33 
Interestingly, the levels of affective commitment to the Netherlands and to 
Europe as a union appear to be positively related (β = .34, p < .001).34 Duchesne 
and Frognier (2007), who also found this positive relationship, suggest that this 
can be explained by what they call ‘nested identities’. This is to say that the 
affective commitment to the nation relates positively to affective commitments to 
territories in which the nation is embedded. The same idea of nested identities 
could explain the finding that the levels of affective commitment to place of 
residence and province are also positively related to the level of affective 
                                                     
31 The affective commitment to the Netherlands appeared to be significantly stronger than either that 
to a province or Europe as a union. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for province: z = -12.38, p < .001, r = 
-.34; Europe as a union: z = -14.33, p < .001, r = -.40. 
32 Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income 
significantly predict the level of affective commitment to place of residence, province or Europe as a 
union. 
33 A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as 
control variables, was used to test if political preference significantly predicts the level of affective 
commitment to Europe as a union. 
34 A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as 
control variables, was used to test if affective commitment to the Netherlands significantly predicts 
the level of affective commitment to Europe as a union. 
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commitment to the Netherlands as a country (β = .56, p < .001 and β = .45, p < 
.001 respectively).35 
The fact that all the affective commitments discussed above relate positively to 
the affective commitment to the Netherlands suggests that these commitments 
reveal a more fundamental tendency to identify with a group – the need to belong 
discussed earlier in this chapter (cf. Duchesne & Frognier 2007: 9). To examine 
the tendency to identify with a group, a Categorical Principal Components 
Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out which included the above-mentioned items of 
affective commitments to the place of residence, province, the Netherlands, Europe 
and own ethnic group,36 and the items mentioned in Table 3.2 to do with affective 
commitments to political and occupational groups (i.e. the affective commitment 
to groups of people who share political preference or have a similar occupation). In 
this analysis, two components were extracted which suggests that the tendency to 
identify with a group has two, positively related dimensions.37 Items that cluster on 
the first component suggest that it represents a tendency to identify with 
territorially defined groups, including affective commitments to the Netherlands, 
place of residence, province and Europe as a union. Items that cluster on the 
second component suggest that it represents the tendency to identify with socially 
defined groups, including affective commitments to the ethnic, political and 
occupational groups. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the level of 
affective commitment to ‘the Dutch’, which is an ethnic group but can also be 
interpreted as a national and territorially defined group, correlates positively with 
all other mentioned affective commitments.38 
In order to explore these tendencies towards identification with a socially or 
territorially defined group, summated scales representing these two tendencies were 
constructed using the previously discussed items which cluster on the components 
                                                     
35 Categorical Regression analyses, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control 
variables, were used to test if affective commitment to either place of residence or province 
significantly predict the level of affective commitment to the Netherlands. 
36 With respect to the item measuring commitment to the own ethnic group: immigrants and their 
descendants were asked for their affective commitment to their own ethnic group, and the native 
Dutch were asked for their affective commitment to ‘the Dutch’. 
37 A CATPCA analysis with option ‘impute missing values with mode’ resulted in 2 components with 
eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 2 components could 
be extracted, which explained 55.37% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option 
‘exclude missing values’ gave similar results.) The resultant transformed variables were saved and used 
to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some 
technical background).  
38 Categorical Regression analyses, with age, gender, descent, educational level and income as control 
variables, were used to test if affective commitment to the Dutch significantly predicts the other 
affective commitments mentioned. All βs between .22 and .58, all ps < .001. 
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extracted in the aforementioned Categorical Principal Components Analysis.39 
Subsequently, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to examine whether 
these tendencies can be predicted by age, gender, descent, religion educational 
level, income and political preference. The analysis indicates that age is positively, 
but only slightly, related to the tendency to identify with territorial defined groups 
(β = .17, p < .05). Other significant relationships were not found, which is in line 
with the theory discussed in Section 3.2 postulating that the need to belong is a 
fundamental human motivation.40 
3.4.2 Cognitive aspects of the construction of national group boundaries 
Who compose the ‘typical’ and the ‘marginalized’ groups in Dutch society? What 
aspects of Dutch national boundaries are inclusive, and which are exclusive? In this 
section, these boundaries will be explored by examining the cognitive components 
of internal (self-identification) and external aspects of social categorization 
(inspired by a similar analysis in Theiss-Morse 2009: 65). The external aspect will 
be examined by analysing responses to questionnaire items which measured the 
perceived importance of criteria to be met before someone is be considered to be 
‘truly Dutch’. The internal aspect, or, in other words, the cognitive component of 
national self-identification will be examined by using items which measure the 
extent to which respondents consider themselves typically Dutch. The latter 
typicality measure, combined with the information about the level of affective 
commitment to the national group discussed above, predicts which group members 
tend to exhibit in-group favouritism. As discussed in Section 3.2, highly 
committed group members tend to favour members of their in-group, especially 
when they perceive threats to the distinctiveness of the group, and hence tend to 
set sharper group boundaries, which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping 
and discrimination of out-group members. Therefore, exploring which group 
members are characterized as typical can provide information about the boundaries 
between those members on the one hand and the marginalized on the other.  
3.4.2.1 Cognitive aspects of national self-identification: typicality 
To measure the extent respondents considered themselves typically Dutch, six 
statements were included in the questionnaires: ‘I feel like I belong to mainstream 
Dutch culture’, ‘I am what most people think of as a typical Dutch person’, ‘the 
                                                     
39 Cronbach’s Alpha for tendency to identify with territorially defined groups = .73; Cronbach’s 
Alpha for tendency to identify with socially defined groups = .53.  
40 Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, descent, religion, educational 
level, or political preference income significantly predict the tendencies to identify with a territorially 
or socially defined group. 
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term “Dutch” does not fit me’, ‘when I think of the Dutch people, I think of 
people who are a lot like me’, ‘in many respects, I am different from most Dutch 
people’ and ‘on the important issues, I often agree with Dutch people’.41 In order 
to examine the possibility of constructing a typicality scale, a Categorical Principal 
Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out including these six items. The 
analysis indicates that the items clearly cluster around one component, and that 
Cronbach’s Alpha for these items is .80.42 Therefore, all these items were used to 
create a summated scale to represent the level of typicality. 
To explore the characteristics of those who consider themselves typically 
Dutch, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out which included the 
aforementioned typicality scale as the outcome variable and the variables age, 
gender, descent, religion, educational level and income as predictors. It appears 
that native Dutch consider themselves significantly more typically Dutch than 
immigrants and their descendants of both Non-Western and Western origin (β = 
.26, p < .001). 43 The following Table 3.3 gives more insight into the percentages 
of native Dutch and immigrants who consider themselves typically Dutch. 
 
Table 3.3 
Dutch citizens who consider themselves typical or atypical Dutch (in percentages). 
Respondents Very typical Moderately typical Atypical 
Native Dutch 57 39 4 
Non-Western immigrants 10 73 17 
Western immigrants 28 55 17 
Total 50 43 7 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These percentages were calculated by averaging the scores on the 6 items used to construct the 
typicality scale, and grouping the averages into 3 categories. Because the percentages were calculated 
from averaged Likert items, these can only be used for exploratory analysis.  
 
                                                     
41 These items were derived from earlier research by Malcarne, Chavira, Fernandez & Liu (2006) and 
Theiss-Morse (2009). After testing pilot interviews, items were deleted, added and rephrased. For a 
discussion of typicality also see Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe (2004). 
42 The eigenvalues and a scree-plot clearly indicated that one component could be extracted. Variance 
Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 53%, total VAF was 61.81%. 
43 A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, religion, educational level and income as 
control variables, was used to test if descent significantly predicts the level of typicality. 
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This table indicates that a majority of the native Dutch consider themselves to be 
very typically Dutch, whereas a majority of both non-Western and Western 
immigrants consider themselves moderately typically Dutch. Furthermore, the 
Categorical Regression analysis of the typicality scale indicates that those with a 
minimum income consider themselves significantly less typically Dutch (β = .40, p 
< .05). The analysis also indicates a significant relationship between political 
preference and the typicality scale. Voters for the right-wing VVD and the right-
wing populist PVV consider themselves to be more typically Dutch than voters for 
all other parties and the non-voters (β = .20, p < .001).44  
Importantly, the analysis reveals a very strong positive relationship between the 
typicality scale and the affective commitment to the Netherlands (β = .68, p < 
.001).45 In other words, both native Dutch and immigrants and their descendants 
who are highly committed to the national group tend to consider themselves 
typical group members, as might be expected given the findings of research in the 
tradition of Tajfel’s social identity theory. Therefore, bearing in mind the findings 
of social identity theory research discussed in Section 3.2, the results indicate that 
native Dutch who voted for the VVD or PVV parties in the 2012 elections are 
more likely to exhibit in-group favouritism and to set sharper group boundaries, 
resulting in a relatively high degree of self-stereotyping and possibly discrimination 
of out-group members. 
Respondents who consider themselves typically Dutch stressed that they found 
it difficult to explain why. One explanation was that they were born and raised in 
the Netherlands, while others said they simply felt Dutch and could not explain 
that feeling. One respondent said, ‘I don’t know. Had I been born in another 
country, I would probably have felt at home there.’ Other respondents said they 
considered themselves typically Dutch because they held certain Dutch norms and 
values, but they could not explain what these norms and values were. When they 
could, they mentioned such stereotypes as hard-working, down-to-earth, tolerant 
and ‘constantly complaining’. Those who did not consider themselves typically 
Dutch either mentioned that the typically Dutch person does not exist, or 
explained that they regarded themselves more in the light of a European citizen, a 
world citizen or cosmopolitan. As one respondent said, ‘I don’t know what a 
typical Dutch person is. I do not think a German, Dane, Swede or Norwegian 
person is very different.’ Immigrants and their descendants who said they did not 
                                                     
44 A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income 
as control variables, was used to test if political preference significantly predicts the level of typicality. 
45 A Categorical Regression analysis, with age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income 
as control variables, was used to test if affective commitment to the Netherlands significantly predicts 
the level of typicality. 
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consider themselves typically Dutch even though they felt at home in the country 
explained that this was because they or their parents had not been born in the 
Netherlands. 
3.4.2.2 Cognitive aspects of national identification: group boundaries 
To explore which boundary aspects (see Section 3.2) are deemed important if 
someone is to be considered a ‘truly Dutch’ individual, the questionnaires included 
15 specific criteria (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005; Theiss-Morse 2009; ISSP 2005).46 
These criteria, sorted according to the means of their perceived importance, are 
presented in Table 3.4 below. 
The table shows that the most importance is attached to such relatively 
inclusive criteria as being able to speak Dutch and feeling Dutch. Importantly, by 
far the least importance is attached to clearly exclusive criteria: having Dutch 
ancestors, a Western European appearance, a Western name or a Christian 
background.  
Turning to the more inclusive criteria, those who consider a knowledge of 
Dutch culture and history to be important mentioned various reasons for doing so. 
Respondents argued that this knowledge is important to the strengthening of 
personal commitment to the Netherlands, while others said that this background is 
essential to be able to participate in Dutch society. It was also mentioned that 
having this knowledge is important to protect and sustain Dutch culture, norms 
and values. In the same vein, respondents said that it is important to be proud of 
the Netherlands, ‘because only then would you know which norms and values you 
have to maintain and protect’. Pertinently, it was argued that it is important to 
learn from history to be able to live in a multicultural society. In this respect, a 
specific knowledge of the centuries-old history of immigration and ethnic diversity 
in the Netherlands, and of Dutch involvement in colonialism and slavery was seen 
as important, as it could foster a more tolerant attitude towards people with 
different cultural and religious backgrounds. Similarly, it was argued that the 
history of World War II should be taught in school, because it illustrates the 
importance of tolerance and non-discrimination. However, respondents who said 
knowledge of history and culture is important acknowledged that among many 
Dutch citizens, including themselves, this knowledge is pretty sparse. 
                                                     
46 Items were derived from previous research by Devos & Banaji (2005) and Theiss-Morse (2009) 
and from the International Social Survey Programme survey on citizenship and national identity 
(ISSP 2005). After testing in a pilot survey and in-depth interviews, items were deleted, added and 
rephrased.  
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Table 3.447 
Criteria for being perceived as a ‘truly Dutch’ individual: Means, (scale from 1 = least important to 4 = 
most important), Standard Deviations, and Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components 
Analysis – CATPCA, transformed variables rotated with PCA). 
Item, ranked by mean M SD C1 C2 C3 C4 
Speak Dutch 3.7 0.6 -.14 .43 .13 -.52 
Legal Dutch citizenship 3.3 0.8 -.15 .11 .04 -.78 
Feel Dutch 3.3 0.8 -.11 .79 .08 -.01 
Proud of the Netherlands 3.1 0.8 .20 .34 -.10 -.30 
Feel more attached to the Netherlands and the 
Dutch than to other countries or other ethnic groups 
2.9 0.9 .14 .67 .04 -.08 
Only have Dutch citizenship and no other citizenships 2.9 1.2 .16 -.05 -.12 -.69 
Lived in the Netherlands for part of one’s life 2.9 0.8 -.06 .12 .82 .20 
Have knowledge of Dutch history and culture 2.9 0.8 .12 .76 .03 .08 
Grown up in the Netherlands 2.9 0.9 .08 .01 .83 -.14 
Lived in the Netherlands for most of one’s life 2.9 0.9 .07 .02 .88 .02 
Born in the Netherlands 2.7 1.0 .34 -.25 .43 -.46 
Have Dutch ancestors 2.1 0.9 .64 -.10 .16 -.24 
Have a Western European appearance 1.8 0.9 .69 .01 .17 -.04 
Have a Western name 1.7 0.8 .81 .09 .01 -.05 
Have a Christian background 1.5 0.7 .79 .13 -.10 .23 
Eigenvalues 4.38 1.89 1.63 1.28 
Variance accounted for (%) 29.20 12.61 10.87 8.56 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result the means can be used only for 
exploratory analysis. 
Note. Loadings with a value higher than .30 are shown in bold. The loadings used for constructing 
scales are italicized. 
 
There is more agreement among those who considered the criteria of having been 
born, growing up or living in the Netherlands to be important. Most of these 
respondents argued that these are necessary preconditions to be able to feel Dutch 
                                                     
47 Cf. Devos & Banaji (2005: 450). 
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or to have a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. Many of those who considered 
feeling Dutch itself to be the most important precondition to be ‘truly Dutch’, 
argued that the other criteria are much less or not important at all, because there 
would not be many truly Dutch people if the other criteria had been decisive. 
‘How many Dutch citizens really know about Dutch history, and really have a 
good command of Dutch language?’ one respondent asked. 
Most of the respondents who consider the more exclusive criteria to be 
important, did not offer any motivation for their opinion. A few said it is 
important to be Christian, because ‘the Netherlands is a country based on 
Christian principles’. Those who consider having a Western European appearance 
or name to be important did not elaborate, with the exception of a few who 
explained that ‘foreign names are difficult to pronounce’ or that ‘truly Dutch’ 
people generally have a white skin colour. 
Respondents also mentioned other criteria they consider important to be ‘truly 
Dutch’, most relating to certain values and attitudes such as loyalty to the 
Netherlands (discussed in Chapter 4), obeying the law, respecting each other’s 
freedom of speech, non-discrimination and tolerance of people from various 
cultural and religious backgrounds and with various sexual preferences and life 
principles. It was also argued that immigrants have to adapt to become a ‘truly 
Dutch’ person, for example, by learning to speak Dutch and by respecting Dutch 
norms and values. Furthermore, respondents expect immigrants to participate in 
society, or succinctly to get a job or work as a volunteer. (Views on adaptation and 
participation will be explored in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6.)  
Finally, the term allochthon, which officially designates individuals of whom at 
least one parent was born outside the Netherlands (see Section 3.3), was clearly 
used by respondents as a term to describe those who do not fully belong to the 
national group. For example, respondents argued that ‘the culture of allochthons’ 
does not belong in the Netherlands and can pose a threat to society (this 
perception of threat will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). Some argued that the 
term allochthon should be abandoned, because the distinction it indicates is 
misleading. As one respondent said, referring to immigrants and their descendants, 
‘They belong to the national group, so we should not regard them as allochthons’. 
To examine the relationships between the items in Table 3.4 above, a 
Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was carried out, in which 
four components were extracted whose (rotated) loadings are presented in the same 
table.48 The clustering of the items on these components suggests that these 
                                                     
48 A CATPCA analysis with option ‘impute missing values with mode’ resulted in 4 components with 
eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 4 components could 
be extracted, which explained 61.23% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option 
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components represent four different conceptions or types of Dutch national 
belonging: ethnic and exclusive (C1 – see Table 3.4 above), civic and inclusive (C2), 
territorial (C3) and legal (C4). The ethnic and exclusive type includes the criteria 
having Dutch ancestors, having a Western European appearance and name, and 
having a Christian background. The civic and inclusive type of Dutch belonging 
includes criteria which refer to a sense of belonging, feeling more attached to the 
Netherlands than to other countries, and having knowledge of Dutch history and 
culture. Furthermore, the territorial type of Dutch national belonging entails that 
those who have grown up and lived part or most of their lives in the Netherlands 
are Dutch. This relates to the territorial dimension of national identity as defined 
by Guibernau (2004: 138), who suggests that ‘for the large majority of peoples, the 
territorial boundaries of the nation signal the limits of their homeland and fellow-
nationals are usually portrayed as if they were more “human” than outsiders, as 
deserving our support, concern and nurture’. Finally, the legal type of Dutch 
national belonging appears to imply an exclusive legal citizenship status, including 
the criteria having legal Dutch citizenship and not having multiple citizenship. 
The distinction between the ethnic, civic and territorial types of Dutch 
national belonging can be further explored by taking the above-mentioned 
arguments of respondents into account. Those who considered the territorial 
criteria such as having been born, growing up or living in the Netherlands to be 
important, argued that these criteria are necessary preconditions to be able to feel 
Dutch or to have a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. In other words, the 
territorial criteria are seen as preconditions for the civic aspects of national 
belonging.  
This finding nuances the distinction, indicated in studies by Hjerm (1998) and 
Kunovich (2009), between ethnic and civic types of national belonging. In these 
studies the above-mentioned territorial criteria – namely, having been born and 
living for most of one’s life in the country – are not distinct from, but part of, the 
ethnic type. In other words, these authors suggest that citizens who attach 
importance to these territorial criteria have an ethnic and exclusive conception of 
national belonging. In the Netherlands these territorial criteria appear to be 
inclusive for the descendants of first generation immigrants and for those first 
generation immigrants who have lived most of their lives in the Netherlands as 
well. However, it must be stressed that the present study included more items (15) 
to describe possible types of national belonging than the studies by Hjerm and 
Kunovich (6 and 8 respectively), which made it possible to discern more different 
                                                                                                                                  
‘exclude missing values’ gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used 
to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some 
technical background). 
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components in the (Categorical) Principal Components analysis. Moreover, the 
respondents in this study were asked to motivate their ratings of the items, which 
made it easier to interpret the difference between the civic, territorial and ethnic 
types of national belonging.  
To assess the relative importance of these four types of Dutch national 
belonging, scales representing the types were constructed. For the ethnic, civic and 
territorial types, summated scales were constructed using the items with the highest 
loadings on the respective components (see Table 3.4 above).49 To represent the 
legal type of national belonging, only the criterion of not having multiple 
citizenship has been included in the analysis, as in this study this is the most 
important item of those which load on this component. An analysis of variance 
(Friedman’s ANOVA) indicates significant differences between the means of the 
scales, which indicates that there is a hierarchy among these types of Dutch 
national belonging.50 Most importance is attached to the civic type of Dutch 
national belonging (M = 3.0, SD = 0.7), followed by the importance attached to 
the territorial type of national belonging (M = 2.9, SD = 0.7). The level of 
importance attached to exclusive citizenship status barely differs from the 
importance attached to the civic and territorial types (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1), but the 
standard deviation indicates more disagreement on this issue (which will be 
explored in more detail in Chapter 4). By far the least importance is attached to the 
ethnic and exclusive type of Dutch belonging (M = 1.8, SD = 0.7).  
In order to explore the characteristics of those who consider these types of 
Dutch national belonging important, Categorical Regression analyses were carried 
out that included age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income. 
Furthermore, separate Categorical Regression analyses were carried out, controlled 
for age, gender, descent, religion, educational level and income, to examine 
relationships between these boundary types on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, political preference and the phenomena discussed earlier in this section: 
affective commitment to the Netherlands, the two dimensions of the tendency to 
identify with a group, and typicality.  
                                                     
49 Cronbach’s Alpha values for scales representing: ethnic type = .77; civic type = .68; territorial type = 
.79. 
50 The averages of the importance attached to the types of national belonging mentioned are 
significantly different, χ2(2) = 708.11, p < .001 (Friedman’s ANOVA).Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
were used to follow up this finding. A Bonferroni correction was applied and so all effects are 
reported at a .000167 level of significance. The significant pairwise comparisons indicated that the 
civic type was clearly more important than the territorial type, followed by the ethnic type of national 
belonging. However, the importance of not having multiple citizenship is not significantly different 
from the civic and territorial types. 
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These analyses show that the affective commitment to the Netherlands is 
significantly and positively related to the importance attached to all mentioned 
types of Dutch national belonging. The strongest correlation was found with the 
importance given to the civic (β = .39, p < .001) type. The correlations with the 
territorial (β = .23, p < .001) and ethnic type (β = .18, p < .001) are clearly less 
strong, and the importance attached to exclusive legal citizenship status is least 
related to the affective commitment to the Netherlands (β = .13, p < .005). 
Similarly, the analysis indicates that those who consider themselves more 
typically Dutch tend to attach more importance to all mentioned types of Dutch 
national belonging (civic: β = .37, p < .001; territorial: β = .33, p < .001; ethnic: β 
= .28, p < .001; exclusive legal citizenship status: β = .26, p < .001). Finally, 
positive correlations were also found between the previously discussed tendencies 
to identify with territorial or socially defined groups on the one hand and on the 
other hand the importance attached to civic and ethnic types of Dutch national 
belonging.51 
These findings make it possible to specify which types of Dutch national 
belonging are deemed important by highly committed members of the Dutch 
national group. Research in the tradition of Tajfel’s social identity theory shows 
that highly committed group members tend to exaggerate differences between the 
in-group and out-groups, to defend the distinctiveness of the group (see Section 
3.2.4). With respect to Dutch national belonging, highly committed group 
members appear to defend the distinctiveness of their national group by attaching 
most importance to expressions or feelings of Dutch national belonging, and to a 
lesser extent to ethnic and exclusive criteria for national belonging. This 
corresponds to the findings of Duyvendak (2011), who argues that Dutch citizens 
are increasingly constructing national group boundaries by stressing the 
importance of expressions and feelings of national belonging.  
Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that immigrants and their descendants 
of non-Western origin consider all types of national belonging significantly less 
important than do the native Dutch, while immigrants of Western origin consider 
the territorial type and exclusive legal citizenship status less important than do the 
native Dutch. 52 This is not surprising, in view of the fact that immigrants and their 
descendants consider themselves less typically Dutch than their native Dutch 
                                                     
51 Correlations between, on the one hand, tendencies to identify with territorial and socially defined 
groups and, on the other hand, the civic type (β = .34, p < .001 and β = .26, p < .001 respectively), 
and the ethnic type (β = .15, p < .001 and β = .21, p < .001 respectively) of Dutch national 
belonging. 
52 Civic type: β = .21, p < .05; territorial type: β = .24, p < .001; exclusive legal citizenship: β = .20, p 
< .001; ethnic type: β = .14, p < .005. 
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compatriots. After all, as discussed above and as suggested in the literature 
discussed in Section 3.2, typical group members are more inclined to set group 
boundaries. Crucially Kunovich (2009: 576) has pointed out that citizenship 
provides access to state resources. Therefore, from a rational choice perspective it 
can be expected that minority groups do not attach importance to boundaries 
which would exclude them. Nevertheless, the need to belong and the need for 
social recognition, as discussed earlier in this chapter, also play a role and should 
not be dismissed. In this respect, it is important to realize that the construction of 
exclusive group boundaries can result in discrimination (see Section 3.2.4). Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Hjerm (1998) concluded from his study that there is a 
positive relationship between the level of xenophobia and the level of importance 
attached to ethnic (exclusive) types of national belonging. In the present study, this 
link will be explored in Chapter 5. 
Among all respondents, the higher their educational level the less importance 
they attached to the ethnic type of Dutch national belonging and exclusive legal 
citizenship status (β = -.29, p < .001 and β = -.21, p < .001 respectively). These 
findings about the role of education are similar to those of Kunovich (2009: 585), 
who suggests that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more 
importance to ethnic (exclusive) types of national belonging because they perceive 
economic competition from immigrants and their descendants, who also have a 
lower socio-economic status. (This link between construction of boundaries and 
ethnic threat will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5.) Kunovich also suggests 
that those with a higher level of education have greater cognitive skills which allow 
them ‘better [to] imagine belonging to larger groups’ (2009: 575).  
The Categorical Regression analyses indicate that voters for the various 
political parties in the 2012 general election differed significantly in the importance 
they attached to the four types of Dutch national belonging.53 This can also be seen 
in Table 3.5 below. 
 
                                                     
53 Civic: (β = .26, p < .001); exclusive legal citizenship status: (β = .28, p < .001); territorial: (β = .20, 
p < .001); ethnic: (β = .27, p < .001).  
 Multicultural citizenship and national belonging 57 
 
Table 3.5  
Importance attached to types of Dutch national belonging (means, scale from 1 = least important to 4 = 
most important). Ordered by size of political party in 2012 national election. 
Voters for political party Civic Exclusive legal
citizenship status 
Territorial Ethnic 
VVD 3.2 3.2 2.9 1.7 
PvdA 3.0 2.6 2.7 1.6 
PVV 3.2 3.6 3.3 2.3 
Socialist Party (SP) 3.1 3.5 3.0 1.9 
CDA 3.2 2.8 2.7 1.9 
D66 3.0 2.5 2.7 1.5 
Christian Union (CU) 3.0 2.3 2.9 2.1 
Green Left 2.9 2.2 2.7 1.5 
SGP 3.4 3.6 3.2 2.5 
Non voters 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.9 
Totala 3.0 2.9 2.9 1.8 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for 
exploratory analysis.  
a See the hierarchy calculation in the text above.  
 
First of all, it is clear from the values in the columns in the table that respondents 
are most in agreement on the importance of the civic type of national belonging. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that voters for parties on the right of the political 
spectrum (VVD, PVV, CDA, and the SGP) and those supporting the left-wing SP 
and the Christian CU tend to attach more importance to setting national group 
boundaries, whether they are inclusive or exclusive, than those who vote for parties 
on the left of the political spectrum: PvdA (Labour Party), D66 (liberal Democrats 
66) and the Green Left party. Voters for the PVV and SGP attach by far the most 
importance to group boundaries. This is principally attributable to the relatively 
high importance they attach to the exclusive and ethnic type of national belonging.  
The finding that both respondents with a lower level of education and voters 
for the PVV – who generally have this level of education – tend to attach more 
importance to the ethnic type of national belonging relates to the ideas of Fenton 
discussed in Section 3.2.6. The increasing interest in the issue of national identity 
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noted by Fenton (2011) might be because of the importance attached to ethnic 
types of national belonging by members of the traditional working class, who no 
longer predominantly support left-wing social-democratic parties, but are turning 
to populist, anti-immigrant parties like the PVV. To what extent this can be 
explained by the perception of ethnic threat, as suggested by Kunovich (2009) (see 
above), will be explored in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 4  
Citizenship and 
loyalty to the nation-state 
4.1 Introduction 
In contemporary scientific discussions about citizenship, citizens’ loyalty to their 
nation-states is generally considered to be a virtue (Kymlicka & Norman 2000: 7). 
More specifically, it is considered to be important to the health and stability of 
democracies, as are such behaviours as abiding by the law and participating in 
political institutions (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; Kymlicka & 
Norman 2000: 30-31).  
Since the 1980s, there has been an increasing emphasis in these discussions on 
the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of immigrant citizens, which leads to 
questions about their transnational ties and multiple citizenship (Erdal & Oeppen 
2013; Leydet 2011). Some authors argue that ethno-cultural distinctiveness and 
transnational ties can lead to multiple loyalties which immigrants might have to 
their ethnic groups and countries of origin, and that such loyalties can potentially 
undermine their loyalty to the nation-state (e.g. Gitlin 1995; Huntington 2004; 
Pickus 2005; Schlesinger 1998). Multiple citizenship is a potential security risk, 
especially during international conflicts when the question might arise which 
country citizens with multiple citizenship will support. Consequently, proponents 
of this view oppose the formal recognition of immigrants’ cultural distinctiveness, a 
policy referred to as multiculturalism. From their point of view, defenders of 
multiculturalism assert that public and formal recognition of cultural 
distinctiveness is an essential element in fostering a sense of national belonging, 
which, in its turn, is an indispensable condition for national loyalty (e.g. Kymlicka 
2001). Moreover, they take the line that not just immigrants but every individual 
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in society has multiple loyalties which can potentially conflict with his or her 
loyalty to the nation-state. Baron (2009: 1040) suggests that this clash of loyalities 
does not differ from ‘the usual conflict of commitments that characterize politics’. 
Loyalty to the nation-state in multicultural societies is not and has not been an 
issue confined to scientific discussions, it is also a topic of political debates. In 
2003, a debate in which the loyalty of citizens with multiple citizenship to the 
Dutch nation-state was the central theme commenced in the Dutch Parliament. In 
first instance, politicians who took part in this Dutch debate tended to focus on 
the loyalty of Muslim immigrants. Their emphasis shows that not only was the 
mere fact of holding multiple citizenship at stake, the ethnic, cultural and religious 
backgrounds of some immigrants were also assumed to conflict with their loyalty 
to the nation-state (De Hart 2005a).  
The theoretical approaches to loyalty and citizenship, as well as the Dutch 
political debate and government policies which are relevant to these topics, will 
pass review in this chapter. It also looks at the views on loyalty to the nation-state 
current in Dutch society. These will be explored by analysing empirical data 
collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires used in this research. 
This type of empirical analysis is especially relevant, as the scientific and political 
debates on this issue are largely hypothetical and theoretical, and are not backed up 
by an empirical basis (Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).  
The theoretical review of the scientific debates on loyalty to the nation-state 
will focus on two main aspects. The first aspect is the concept of loyalty to the 
nation-state and the concepts used in the relevant literature to examine this issue. 
Among these, ideas about patriotism predominate. Attention will be paid to such 
questions as how these concepts are differentiated in the literature, how they are 
operationalized and which attitudes (behaviours and feelings of individuals) are 
associated with these phenomena. The second aspect covers views on loyalty to the 
nation-state in the context of the above-mentioned scientific debate on 
multiculturalism and transnational ties of immigrants. 
4.2 Perspectives on loyalty to the nation-state 
4.2.1 Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state 
Loyalty has been studied in various scientific disciplines, among them philosophy, 
social psychology, political science and sociology. Although authors differ in their 
description of loyalty,1 it is generally agreed that the concept refers to an emotional 
commitment and its associated behaviour in the form of taking the side of the 
                                                     
1 For a discussion of some of these differences see Keller (2007: 1-23). 
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object of loyalty, for example, a friend, a group or a nation-state (Druckman 1994; 
Keller 2007; Kleinig 2013; Oglensky 2008; Zdaniuk & Levine 2001). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the loyalty concept refers to a special 
relationship with the particular object of loyalty, which means that loyalty to, for 
example, the Netherlands, is not motivated simply by the principle that a citizen 
should be loyal to her or his country, but also by the fact that the citizen personally 
considers it to be her or his country (Keller 2007: 17-18). In this guise, loyalty 
implies identification with the object of loyalty (see also Chapter 3). Importantly, 
this does not mean that loyalty should override other commitments. It is possible 
that an individual is strongly motivated to take the side of his or her country 
because of a commitment to defend his or her family or certain principles, and not 
so much out of loyalty per se to their own country (Keller 2009: 13-15). 
In any discussion of the loyalty concept, is important to distinguish between 
the normative and descriptive uses made of it. An example of the former is the claim 
that citizens should be loyal to the nation-state. This normative use of the concept 
is also to be found in the philosophical debate of moral universalists versus 
communitarians, as described by Keller (2007: ix, 53-54). In this debate, moral 
universalists take the stance that moral principles should preferably be impartial 
and not dependent on specific attachments or allegiances to others, for instance, 
communities or nation-states. The fly in the ointment is that, of its very nature, 
loyalty implies partiality and hence it poses a problem for advocates of universalist 
morality. Communitarians, on the other hand, take the view that moral principles 
are and should be at least partly derived from a shared culture within the 
community or nation-state, and hence they consider specific loyalty to the nation-
state to be a virtue.2 
The term loyalty is used as a descriptive concept in studies of the various forms 
of behaviour through which loyalty is expressed. This has led Keller (2007: 3-7) to 
distinguish different forms which he describes as types of loyalty: loyalty in 
concern, in advocacy, in ritual, in identification and in belief. Loyalty in concern is 
expressed by prioritizing the interests of the object of loyalty over someone or 
something else’s interests. Another way for expressing loyalty is to speak up in 
defence of the object of loyalty, a form of behaviour Keller refers to as loyalty in 
advocacy. Loyalty can also be expressed by such ritual practices as saluting the 
national flag or standing for the national anthem, referred to as loyalty in ritual. It 
can also be expressed by a strong tendency to identify with the object of loyalty, 
referred to as loyalty in identification, which can lead to feelings of both pride and 
                                                     
2 This does not mean that moral universalism is in principle incompatible with loyalty, or that only 
communitarians consider loyalty to the community to be a virtue. For a discussion see Keller (2007: 
162-181, 220-222). 
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shame (cf. Dresler-Hawke & Liu 2006: 134). Finally, Keller discusses loyalty in 
belief, a term he uses to refer to the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about 
the object of loyalty. One example would be the refusal to believe that, despite 
evidence to the contrary, the country (the object of loyalty) has violated human 
rights treaties.  
Closely related to these types of loyalty is the concept of patriotism. Authors 
generally agree that patriotism refers to an emotional commitment to one’s own 
country and to the associated behaviour which is expressed by taking the side of 
this country (Brubaker 2004; Depuiset & Butera 2005; Druckman 1994; Huddy 
& Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999; cf. Herrmann, Isernia & Segatti 
2009). In this sense, patriotism implies identification with one’s country. Passing 
the discussion of loyalty above in review, it is therefore not surprising that some 
scholars describe patriotism as a type of loyalty to the country or nation-state (e.g. 
Druckman 1994; Keller 2007; Keller 2009).  
As has loyalty, expressions of patriotism have been intensively studied. Both 
theoretical considerations and empirical studies indicate that patriotism is not a 
one-dimensional phenomenon, but that its various expressions represent various 
types of patriotism, the most widely discussed being constructive patriotism, 
uncritical (or blind) patriotism, symbolic patriotism and national pride (Huddy & 
Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). In view of the above-mentioned 
general description of patriotism, these four types can be considered specific types 
of loyalty to the country or nation-state. Constructive patriotism has been defined as 
a type of loyalty to country which is expressed in criticism and questioning 
motivated by ‘a desire for positive change’ (Schatz, Staub and Lavine 1999). One 
example is the constructive criticism of fellow citizens’ discriminatory behaviour 
towards immigrants. In contrast, uncritical patriotism is characterized by 
‘unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance of criticism’ 
(Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999: 153). This type of patriotism relates to loyalty in 
belief, the tendency to form or resist certain beliefs about the object of loyalty, one 
of the types of loyalty distinguished by Keller (2007). This illustrates that not every 
expression of loyalty to a country is necessarily good for its interests: uncritical 
patriotism can imply refraining from or even opposing criticism, which is 
contradictory to the principles of democracy. Symbolic patriotism refers to the 
emotional importance attached to such symbolic representations of the country as 
the national flag and anthem (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Parker 2009). This type of 
patriotism relates to loyalty in ritual, another of the previously discussed types of 
loyalty. Finally, some authors describe national pride as a distinct expression of 
patriotism (Davidov 2010; cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007), which involves what has 
been called loyalty in identification, namely, a strong tendency to identify with the 
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object of loyalty which can result in feelings of both pride and shame (Keller 2007: 
6).  
4.2.2 Loyalty and group belonging 
Considering that group loyalty refers to a special relationship with a group and 
emotionally motivated behaviour favouring that group, it is not surprising that 
expressions of loyalty have been linked to social identity. As discussed in Chapter 
3, in the context of social identity research, Tajfel (1981) has proposed that social 
categorization is a basic human tendency which serves individuals to achieve 
positive self-esteem by differentiating their in-group positively from out-groups. 
Individuals categorize or identify themselves and are categorized or identified by 
others as belonging to certain groups. Research has shown that this need for 
positive distinctiveness can be expressed by in-group favouritism, in-group loyalty 
and by adhering to in-group stereotypes in the form of behavioural and normative 
expectations (Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe 2004).3  
In line with these findings, some scholars have described patriotism as an 
indicator of, or even as synonymous with, national self-identification (for 
discussions, see Huddy & Khatib 2007 and Theiss-Morse 2009: 23-24). However, 
research in the tradition of social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner 
1979) suggests that a distinction should be made between these two concepts. As 
explained in Chapter 3, national self-identification as an aspect of social identity 
refers to a multi-dimensional phenomenon which is composed of cognitive, 
affective and evaluative components. Empirical research has indicated that it is the 
affective component of self-identification, and not the cognitive and evaluative 
components, which determines the tendency of people to behave in terms of their 
group membership. Importantly, the affective and evaluative components of self-
identification do not necessarily co-vary in a predictable way. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, although affection for a group can undoubtedly influence the 
evaluation of that group, individuals with a strong affective commitment to a 
certain group can evaluate certain characteristics of that group negatively (Ellemers, 
Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk 1999: 386, and 373 respectively). From this perspective, 
the various types of patriotism discussed above are not synonymous with, but 
should instead be considered possible expressions of, national self-identification (cf. 
Latcheva 2010: 191). After all, while patriotism assumes a sense of national 
belonging, it also specifically refers to forms of behaviour and to evaluations of 
aspects of the nation-state (see Section 4.2.1). 
                                                     
3 However, the need for positive distinctiveness is not always expressed in these ways. See Shadid 
(2007:183); see also Jenkins (2008: 114-115); Theiss-Morse (2009: 41). 
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Factor analyses conducted by Huddy and Khatib (2007) which revealed a 
distinction between national self-identification4 on the one hand, and constructive 
patriotism, uncritical patriotism, symbolic patriotism and national pride on the 
other hand support these insights.5 Their investigation indicated all these types of 
patriotism relate not only to national self-identification, they are also related to 
political ideology. Conservatives appeared to be more uncritically patriotic than 
liberals, and liberals were more constructively patriotic than conservatives (Huddy 
& Khatib 2007: 70). Cogently, no relationship was found between national self-
identification and political ideology. (This concurs with the present study, in 
which no relationship between the affective component of national self-
identification and political preference was found – see Chapter 3.) 
There have also been discussions about whether these types of patriotism, or, in 
other words, positive evaluations of one’s national in-group, are part of or distinct 
from feelings of national superiority. Several studies indicate that these phenomena 
are indeed empirically distinct, but that there is a positive relationship between 
them (Blank, Schmidt and Westle 2001; Feshbach 1987 and 1990, as discussed in 
Druckman 1994: 46; Huddy & Khatib 2007). It should be noted that in these 
studies feelings of national superiority are not referred to as such but are labelled 
nationalism, using a general definition of nationalism as an idealization of one’s 
nation (Sumner 2006).6 
Scholars have also gone a step farther and investigated whether a favourable 
attitude towards one’s in-group – for example, in the form of loyalty or patriotism 
– is consistently accompanied by negative evaluations of out-groups (see 
Druckman 1994: 63; Spruyt & Vanhoutte 2009). In other words, the question is 
whether a positive evaluation of one’s in-group necessarily implies ethnocentrism, 
                                                     
4 Huddy & Khatib (2007) use the term ‘national identity’ and not ‘national self-identification’. 
However, their operationalization reveals that they measure the internal aspect of (national) social 
categorization, of which the term ‘national self-identification’ is a more specific description. 
5 See also Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001). 
6 As discussed in Chapter 3, the concept of nationalism is often used to describe views and behaviour 
stressing the distinction between one’s own national group and other national, ethnic or religious 
groups (cf. Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993; Latcheva 2010). This definition has lead several authors to 
suggest that nationalism refers to an idealization of one’s nation (e.g. Sumner 1906), which can be 
expressed by the sense that one’s own nation is superior to other nations (e.g. Davidov 2010; Huddy 
& Khatib 2007; Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999). Furthermore, a distinction is often made between 
civic and ethnic nationalism. The former refers to the view that membership of a nation is first and 
foremost a legal and political category, implying that criteria for national belonging include respect 
for institutions and laws and a sense of national belonging (Calhoun 2002). In contrast, ethnic 
nationalism refers to the view that membership of a nation is rooted in specific ethnic or cultural 
criteria. These ethnic and civic conceptions of national belonging are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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which is generally defined as a combination of a positive evaluation of one’s own 
culture with a negative evaluation of the cultures of others (Shadid 2007: 57). 
Research in the tradition of social identity theory reveals that this is not the case 
(Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170). In a study of 22 countries, Coenders 
(2001) found a positive relationship between patriotism and negative attitudes 
towards immigrants in only two countries. In the other countries these 
relationships were not significant or reversed. On a more general level, a study by 
Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) indicates that a positive evaluation of one’s in-
group is a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative 
evaluation of immigrants (see also Ariely 2012). In this study, the relationship 
between types of loyalty to the nation-state and negative attitudes towards 
immigrants will be explored in Chapter 5. 
Whether individuals evaluate out-groups negatively appears to depend on the 
level of affective commitment to their in-group and on the social context (Ellemers, 
Spears & Doosje 2002: 163-166). When, in a certain social context, the group 
distinctiveness of a group is cast in doubt, group members with a strong (affective) 
commitment to their group tend to defend this distinctiveness by exaggerating 
differences with out-groups. The outcome of this sort of reaction can be a high 
degree of self-stereotyping, and negative evaluations and discrimination of out-
groups (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 177; Fiske 2002). These findings also 
suggest that normative expectations of group loyalty, as aspects of self-stereotyping, 
are stronger when members of the national group perceive a threat to the 
distinctiveness of this group (cf. Carter, Ferguson & Hassin 2011; Depuiset & 
Butera 2005; Druckman 1994). 
Finally, the relationship between group belonging and loyalty implies that 
individuals can be simultaneously loyal to more than one group. As explained in 
Chapter 3, every individual self-identifies and is socially categorized by others 
according to a number of different criteria, which means that every individual 
belongs to various groups at the same time.7 An individual can belong legally to the 
Dutch national group, and simultaneously be categorized as belonging to another 
ethnic group, or to a family or a political party. In other words, individuals have 
partial or multiple social identities and belongings, and the logical consequence is 
that they must have multiple group loyalties and can be subject to multiple 
normative group expectations of group loyalty. In itself, these multiple loyalties 
and expectations of loyalty are not problematic. However, problems can arise when 
an individual belongs to groups which have or develop conflicting interests. 
                                                     
7 See Jenkins (2008: 104) for a discussion of the distinction between categories and groups. 
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4.2.3 Perspectives on loyalty to the nation-state in multicultural societies 
This discussion has quite clearly revealed that loyalty to the nation-state can be 
manifested in distinct forms of behaviour, and that individuals have multiple 
loyalties to the groups to which they belong. At the beginning of this chapter it was 
said that some authors argue that ethno-cultural distinctiveness and transnational 
ties lead to multiple loyalties. Conflicts of loyalties might undermine the loyalty to 
the nation-state of particular groups such as immigrants (e.g. Gitlin 1995; 
Huntington 2004; Pickus 2005; Schlesinger 1998). In this section, the scientific 
debate aroused by this argument will be reviewed. 
One transnational tie which is widely discussed in the context of this debate is 
the multiple citizenship of immigrants.8 Opponents of multiple citizenship argue 
that it poses a problem because it raises the spectre of conflicting loyalties: 
immigrants with multiple citizenship might not favour the interests of the nation-
state in which they reside over the interests of their nations of origin (Renshon 
2004). More specifically, they assert that multiple citizenship poses a security risk, 
especially during military conflicts in which the question of for whom these 
immigrants will fight can arise (De Hart 2005b; Ronkainen 2011). On a more 
general level, there are arguments that multiple citizenship is not the only factor 
which might pose a danger, the different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds 
of immigrants and their descendants are also factors which might lead to multiple 
and possibly conflicting loyalties. It stands to reason that this concern is stronger 
when an actual or ideological conflict is perceived between the nation-state and the 
ethnic or religious groups with which immigrants identify (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 
2013). One cogent example is the perceived conflict between ‘Western civilization’ 
and the ‘Islamic civilization’, coined the ‘clash of civilizations’ by Huntington 
(1993; 1996), a perception which has been strengthened by the discourse on 
‘Islamic terrorism’.  
Disturbed by this fear of conflicting loyalties, some authors oppose 
multiculturalism, which they understand to be the formal recognition of 
immigrants’ cultural distinctiveness by host countries (see Chapters 1 and 6).9 
                                                     
8 For an extensive discussion of the debate on multiple citizenship see De Hart (2012). 
9 Baron (2009) traces the contemporary perceived danger of transnational ties and religious diversity 
back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), in which the concept of Westphalian sovereignty was 
introduced. This concept of the sovereignty of the nation-state included the principle of non-
interference in another nation-state’s domestic affairs. Furthermore, sovereigns could choose the 
religion of their states, and residents who did not adhere to the religion selected by their ruler were, 
for a short period, free to migrate to another state. The ultimate goal was to increase religious 
homogeneity within states to prevent the development of multiple political and religious loyalties. 
This was seen as necessary to achieve a unified allegiance to the sovereign, thereby protecting the 
stability of the nation-state and preventing war. Discussing it, Baron (2009: 1030) writes, ‘[w]hat the 
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These opponents of multiculturalism worry that a civic conception of national 
belonging (see Chapter 3) – which is implied in the recognition of cultural 
distinctiveness – might not be strong enough to foster loyalty to the nation-state 
(Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Consequently, it can be expected that 
these opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship will either support 
immigrant assimilation (see Chapter 5) or will have an ethnic conception of 
national belonging (see Chapter 3), or both. 
Various responses have been made in the relevant literature to counter the 
arguments of these opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship. In the 
first place, multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties are not confined to 
immigrants, every individual can have multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties 
and everyone is subject to multiple expectations of group loyalty from a number of 
different sources (cf. Hirsch Ballin 2011: 19). There are instances in which the 
loyalty of people to their home country can conflict with their loyalty to their 
friends, family members and their (multinational) employer. Obviously, the 
interests of multinational employers especially are likely to conflict with the 
interests of nation-states. In this context it is useful to refer back to the discussion 
in Chapter 3 which revealed that the boundaries of ethno-cultural groups are 
socially constructed, are subject to change and are therefore always dynamic. This 
means that the question centres not only on which ethno-cultural differences and 
transnational ties can cause conflicting interests and loyalties, but also asks which 
differences and transnational ties are perceived to be important in society and why 
(cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013; see also Chapter 5 on integration). For example, 
although an Islamic background is seen by some authors (e.g. Huntington 1993; 
1996) to conflict with the interests of Western nation-states, transnational 
economic trading ties are frequently considered desirable, and as a result 
internationally conflicting economic interests are perceived normal (WRR 2007: 
173).  
This issue is cogent to the argument of Baron (2009), who explains how, in the 
context of the discussion on multiculturalism, the accusation about the putative 
conflicts which might arise from dual or multiple loyalty is often linked to racism, 
an ideology which can be used to justify existing inequality (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 
319; Shadid 2007: 210). By and large, the simple fact of having a migrant 
background, or being part of a minority group, can lead to accusations of multiple 
loyalty. As Baron argues:  
 
                                                                                                                                  
Peace of Westphalia termed a problem of religious faith modernity redefined as an issue pertaining to 
the loyalty of migrant communities’. 
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while a majority may claim that the migrant community needs to share in the 
values and participate in local customs in order to demonstrate its 
inclusiveness, it is also up to the majority to decide when a minority has done 
enough to satisfy the expectations of assimilation. In this regard a minority 
population is always potentially suspect of not fulfilling these expectations over 
assimilation and is thus always subject to the possibility of a dual [or multiple] 
loyalty accusation. (Baron 2009: 1033.) 
 
Consequently, ethnic, cultural and religious differences between immigrants and 
natives are ‘easily construed to pose various kinds of security risks’ (Baron 2009: 
1035), and this can be used to justify inequality. 
Opponents of multiculturalism and multiple citizenship do not restrict their 
arguments to stating that the recognition of cultural distinctiveness and 
transnational ties might lead to conflicting loyalties, they also warn that 
immigrants’ loyalties to their countries of origin and their ethnic or religious 
groups might lead to a weakening of their loyalty to the nation-state in which they 
reside. Taking the opposite tack, proponents of multiculturalism argue that the 
public and formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness is essential to fostering 
affective identifications with the nation-state. In turn, this is indispensable to 
cultivating national loyalty (Kymlicka 2001; Martin 2003; Spiro 1998, 2003; 
Wright & Bloemraad 2012; for a discussion see Chapter 6).  
Considering the fact that individuals always belong to multiple groups, have 
multiple group loyalties and can be subject to multiple group expectations of 
loyalty, it is perhaps understandable that the debate about the relationship between 
multiculturalism and loyalty is largely theoretical (cf. Böcker, Groenendijk & De 
Hart 2005: 161; Driouchi 2007: 113). The few empirical studies which have 
essayed the vastness of this subject indicate that the relationship between ethnic 
and cultural diversity and transnational ties on the one hand and loyalty to the 
nation-state on the other is more nuanced. Multiple citizenship does not appear to 
be a clear indicator of conflicting loyalties or of the strength of loyalty to the 
nation-state (De Hart 2005b; Ronkainen 2011). Furthermore, empirical research 
indicates that transnational ties do not necessarily hinder immigrant integration 
(Erdal & Oeppen 2013). This suggests that holding multiple loyalties to a number 
of groups does not necessarily undermine loyalty to the nation-state. 
Quite apart from this discussion of the sorts of responses to the hypothesis that 
immigrants’ loyalty to the nation-state can be undermined by their multiple 
loyalties to ethnic groups and nations of origin, it is worthwhile asking whether the 
loyalty of citizens to their country is essential to protecting its interests. Some 
expressions of loyalty might actually help protect these interests, whereas other 
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expressions might not, or in fact might even conflict with these interests. 
Consequently, constructive patriotism, as discussed above, might assist a country’s 
interests as it could involve constructive criticism which is motivated by a desire for 
positive change. Conversely, uncritical patriotism can hinder the democratic 
process. Moreover, loyalty to their country is not the only and not even necessarily 
the strongest motivation for citizens to take their country’s side. After all, 
individuals can be strongly motivated to take the side of their country because of a 
commitment to protect their family, friends or certain principles, and not so much 
purely and simply out of loyalty to their country. There is no empirical evidence to 
support the hypothesis that citizens’ loyalty to their country is a better guarantee 
for furthering or protecting its interests than other commitments these citizens 
might have. Authors who argue that loyalty to a particular country is essential to 
protect its interests are either speculating or they are confusing matters by 
conflating the structure with the strength of political commitments (Keller 2009: 
13-15).  
In the Netherlands, the loyalty to the nation-state of immigrants with multiple 
citizenship has been an issue in political debate since 1990. The history of this 
debate will be reviewed in the next section. 
4.3 Loyalty to the nation-state: policies and debates in the Netherlands 
As discussed more extensively in Chapters 3 and 5, in the last few decades debates 
about national belonging and immigrant integration in the Netherlands have 
become highly politicized. One particular issue which has been increasingly 
emphasized in these debates is the loyalty to the Dutch nation-state of immigrants 
with multiple citizenship. The main arguments concerning this issue and the 
Dutch government policies it has elicited will be reviewed in this section. This 
short review is largely based on the extensive overviews and discussions of Dutch 
citizenship laws and policies in the studies of De Hart (2012) and Van Oers, De 
Hart and Groenendijk (2013). Three phases in the development of these policies 
and debates will be distinguished: the phase of restrictive citizenship laws and 
policies until 1953; the less restrictive and more inclusive phase between 1953 and 
the 1990s; and the phase after the 1990s in which citizenship laws have been made 
more restrictive once again.10  
The first laws concerning Dutch citizenship were introduced in the 19th 
century. The Dutch Nationality Act of 1850 stipulated that individuals born in the 
                                                     
10 Chapters 3, 5 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government 
policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of immigrants’ loyalty 
to the nation-state. 
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Netherlands and their descendants were automatically considered Dutch citizens – 
the principle of ius soli. This was altered in the new Dutch Nationality Act of 
1892, which stipulated that Dutch citizenship could only be automatically 
acquired by those who were born to a Dutch father. This ius sanguinis principle 
was considered a better guarantee of loyalty and commitment of citizens to the 
nation-state (Driouchi 2007: 119; Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 43). 
Under the same Act, the right to obtain Dutch citizenship through naturalization 
was made possible for adults who had resided in the Netherlands or its colonies for 
a minimum of five years, provided that they renounced their original citizenship. 
In the throes of the economic crisis of the 1930s, the naturalization policy 
tightened up even more to protect the Dutch labour market. 
From 1953, laws to do with Dutch citizenship and naturalization were made 
less restrictive. This liberalization was partly influenced by two factors, the 
introduction and ratification of international treaties promoting the naturalization 
of refugees and stateless persons, and the incorporation of the right to legal 
citizenship in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Van Oers, De Hart & 
Groenendijk 2013: 5-6). At this time, one of the amendments to the Dutch 
citizenship law implied that third-generation immigrants born in the Netherlands 
would automatically acquire Dutch citizenship. These immigrants did not have to 
renounce other citizenships acquired by ius sanguinis, so this amendment resulted 
in the earliest cases11 of multiple citizenship in the Netherlands.  
A new Dutch Nationality Act was introduced in 1984, when the first structural 
integration policies targeted at immigrants were being developed (see Chapter 5). 
One of the important goals of this new act was to improve the legal position of 
settled immigrants by providing them with easier access to Dutch citizenship. It 
also allowed second-generation immigrants – those who were born in the 
Netherlands, between 18 and 25 years of age, who have resided in the Netherlands 
since birth – to opt for Dutch citizenship. The government ‘assumed that feelings 
of loyalty and commitment towards the Netherlands exist among these 
immigrants’ (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 21). In 1991, the 
requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce their original 
citizenship was abolished. 
However, in 1997 this renunciation requirement was reintroduced, as outcome 
of a parliamentary debate which marked the beginning of a phase in which Dutch 
citizenship laws were once again tightened up. In this debate, members of 
Parliament of the VVD (right-wing liberal People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy) and the CDA (right-wing Christian Democratic Appeal) argued that 
                                                     
11 See De Hart (2012: 160-161) for a more detailed discussion. 
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immigrants who retained their original citizenship did not make a sufficient 
commitment to the Netherlands and should therefore not be allowed to become a 
Dutch citizen. They added grist to their mill by arguing naturalization should be 
earned by completing a process of integration (De Hart 2012: 167; Van Oers, De 
Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 16), which implied learning the Dutch language and 
acquiring basic knowledge of Dutch society (see Chapter 3). Their opponents, 
members of Parliament for several left-wing parties – PvdA (Labour Party), D66 
(liberal Democrats 66) and the Green Left party, argued that in a world caught up 
in the throes of globalization it would be unavoidable that citizens might have 
attachments to more than one country. Turning the tables, they made the case that 
recognition of these multiple attachments, for example, by allowing multiple 
citizenship, would improve immigrant integration. 
Importantly, most immigrants who applied for naturalization were exempted 
from the requirement to renounce their original citizenship. Exemptions were 
made for immigrants of whom such a renunciation could not be reasonably 
expected, among them refugees and citizens whose countries of origin did not 
allow renunciation of citizenship (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2013: 14, 
16). In the Dutch Parliament, the extent of these exemptions was criticized by 
those members representing the political parties CDA and VVD, who ‘claimed 
that most immigrants had been obtaining Dutch citizenship for pragmatic reasons 
rather than as a sign of loyalty to the Netherlands’ (Van Oers, De Hart & 
Groenendijk 2013: 16). The upshot of these debates was an amendment to the 
Dutch Nationality Act, originally proposed in 1998 but which only came into 
force in 2003. Apart from the renunciation of original citizenship, this amendment 
also included new and stricter requirements for people applying for naturalization, 
including tests on Dutch language and society.12 
As discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5, an important shift in the 
debates about the citizenship of immigrants and their descendants occurred around 
the year 2000, when several authors13 claimed that integration policies had failed 
and postulated that social cohesion was under threat because integration policies 
focused too much on the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants and too little 
on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values. As already said, these 
ideas were fused into one political discourse, important parts of which were copied 
by other political parties, pursued by the politician Pim Fortuyn (Penninx 2005). 
In this context, the debate on multiple citizenship was reopened in 2003. 
Several members of the Dutch Parliament suggested that multiple citizenship of 
                                                     
12 See Chapters 3 and 5. 
13 Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
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immigrants could hinder their integration and emancipation, and requested the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration to take steps to prevent citizens from 
obtaining multiple citizenship (De Hart 2012: 169).  
The government responded by issuing the policy document Multiple 
Citizenship and Integration, in 2004 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 2004). In this document the government stated that in order to 
advance the integration of foreigners in the Netherlands, the existing Nationality 
Act already included the renunciation of the original citizenship as a requirement 
for naturalization (discussed above). Furthermore, the government stated that 
ideally immigrants who ‘opt for Dutch nationality and thereby indicate that they 
feel a sense of belonging to Dutch society’ should not retain and pass on their 
original citizenship to their children and grandchildren, especially if these 
descendants were born in the Netherlands and no longer have real ties to their 
parents’ country of origin (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 2004: 3). 14  Consequently, the government stated that it 
intended to set more limits on the (above mentioned) exemptions to the 
requirement of renunciation of original citizenship for immigrants who wished to 
obtain Dutch citizenship.  
The weak point of this document is that in it the government did not attempt 
to explain how multiple citizenship could hinder integration, nor did it give 
concrete reasons why it considered multiple citizenship undesirable. However, 
when this issue was debated in Parliament, the Minister did elaborate on the views 
in the policy document and stated that by renouncing their original citizenship, 
immigrants would be able to offer proof that they really wanted to be Dutch and 
that they did have ties with the Dutch community (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004a: 
94-6075). In the wake of these intentions, in 2005 the government proposed a bill 
which included the elimination of two exemptions to the requirement of 
renunciation of the original citizenship of immigrants who wished to obtain Dutch 
citizenship, namely the exception for second-generation immigrants and the 
exception for partners of Dutch citizens.15  
In the parliamentary debates on this bill, the CDA political party argued that 
immigrants with multiple citizenship should be stripped of their Dutch citizenship 
if they were not committed to Dutch values (De Hart 2012: 220). This political 
party asserted that Dutch citizenship should be exclusive as it implies loyalty to the 
Dutch nation-state. Opposing this interpretation, the political party Green Left 
                                                     
14 Author’s translation. 
15 This bill also included the provision that immigrants with multiple citizenship would forfeit their 
Dutch citizenship if they were ever to act against the fundamental interests of the Dutch state, for 
example, by being involved in ‘terrorist activities’. 
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argued that citizens were able to feel a sense of belonging to multiple groups and 
countries, and that this multiplicity does not necessarily lead to disloyalty to the 
Netherlands. The PvdA likewise argued that multiple citizenship did not 
necessarily correlate with a weaker loyalty to the Netherlands (De Hart 2005a; 
Driouchi 2007: 133).  
In short, opponents of multiple citizenship – including members of Parliament 
for the political parties VVD, CDA and the smaller Christian parties – did not 
only link it to integration, they also associated it negatively with putative disloyalty 
to the nation-state (Driouchi 2007: 113, 143). De Hart (2005a) summarized the 
arguments of these opponents as follows: a lack of integration causes immigrants to 
retain their original citizenship, which in turn, can lead to disloyalty to the Dutch 
nation-state. This debate turned principally on Muslim immigrants, an indication 
that more than multiple citizenship was at stake, the ethnic, cultural and religious 
backgrounds of immigrants were also tacitly assumed to conflict with loyalty to the 
nation-state (De Hart 2005a).16 
In 2007, the new government17 withdrew the bill to further prevent holding 
multiple citizenship which had been proposed in 2005. This withdrawal did 
nothing to stop the debate about this issue. One very hot topic was that two of the 
new secretaries of state held more than one passport. The PVV (right-wing 
populist Party for Freedom) persistently put forward the argument that the 
multiple citizenship of two State Secretaries could lead to conflicting loyalties of 
these members of the government. The PVV leader Wilders explicitly linked this 
debate about loyalty to religion, by explicitly referring to the Islamic background of 
these State Secretaries.18 
It should be stressed that the political debates on the relationship between 
multiple citizenship and integration and loyalty to the nation-state are largely 
hypothetical and theoretical. Their empirical basis is very threadbare (Bloemraad, 
Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b; see also Section 4.2 of this chapter). 
This weakness was recognized by two advisory bodies, namely the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR 2007) and the Advisory Committee on 
Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2008), which published reports on the issue. In fact, an 
empirical study commissioned by ACVZ indicated that there is no relationship 
                                                     
16 This was not the first time that the religion of citizens was linked to their loyalty to the nation-
state. In the 19th century, Roman Catholics were mistrusted because of the perception that their 
loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church could conflict with the interests of the Dutch nation-state 
(Grever & Ribbens 2007: 42-44). 
17 In 2007 a new coalition government came into power, consisting of the political parties CDA, 
PvdA and Christian Union (CU). 
18 De Volkskrant (February 17, 2007), “Je moet kiezen voor een land”. 
74 Chapter 4 
between multiple citizenship of immigrants and their integration (2008: 32; see 
also Dagevos 2008). Both advisory bodies put forward strong arguments which 
denied the relationship between multiple citizenship and the loyalty of citizens to 
the nation-state. WRR stressed that it is important to make a distinction between 
loyalty to the nation-state and citizenship as a legal status, because the legal status 
of citizens cannot be conflated with their emotional commitments. WRR argued 
that there is no reason to assume that citizens with single citizenship are more loyal 
to, or have fewer conflicting loyalties with, the nation-state in which they reside 
than those with multiple citizenship. As stated in the previous section, citizens with 
a single citizenship can also have transnational ties such as economic and business 
relations, which can just as well lead to conflicting loyalties. 
WRR observed that there is a paradox in the reasoning of the opponents of 
multiple citizenship, who demand that citizens should self-identify with only one 
nation-state. These opponents stress the importance of the emotional component 
of identification with the Netherlands, but simultaneously paradoxically deny the 
importance of the immigrants’ emotional ties to their roots. Citizens can be loyal 
to their nation-state for a variety of reasons, including pride in their ancestors, self-
interest and appreciation of the concrete advantages of belonging to the nation-
state (see WRR 2007: 168, 192). ACVZ agreed with the WRR analysis and added 
that there is no scientific evidence indicating that multiple citizenship leads to 
conflicting loyalties which might hinder the process of identification with the 
Netherlands (ACVZ 2008: 30; cf. Hirsch Ballin 2011: 19). ACVZ argued that 
citizens’ loyalty to the Netherlands does not depend on whether or not they are 
loyal to another country, and that renouncing their original citizenship does not 
lead to the disappearance of their emotional ties and loyalties to the countries of 
origin.  
In its response to the WRR report, the Dutch government agreed that multiple 
citizenship is not problematic (Ministerie van Justitie 2007: 2) but it did not take 
steps to abolish the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce 
their original citizenship. Indeed, respective Dutch governments have proposed 
various limitations to the exemptions which might open the door to multiple 
citizenship. Two bills, one passed in 2008 and the other in 2011, dealt with this 
matter. The first bill came into force in 2010 (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 
2013: 39) and the second, which again stated that multiple citizenship might 
hinder immigrant integration, was withdrawn by the new government at the end of 
2012.19  
                                                     
19 Ministerie van Algemene Zaken (2012). 
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Ernst Hirsch Ballin (2011), former Dutch Minister of Justice,20 notes that 
these attempts by the government to limit multiple citizenship seem to have been 
tied into the idea that the success of immigrants’ citizenship and integration 
depends on the extent to which they distance themselves from their culture and 
country of origin. He dismissed this idea as unrealistic. It was obvious that the crux 
of the matter was that people undeniably have multiple belongings and ties with 
various groups and nation-states. Consequently, Hirsch Ballin argued, the 
acquisition of legal citizenship should not depend on the demand that immigrants 
renounce all their ties with their culture and country of origin. Instead, citizenship 
should accept an implicit two-way contract which includes equal rights for citizens 
and acceptance by citizens ‘of the basic principles of liberal democracy, familiarity 
with the language, history and institutions’ (Hirsch Ballin 2011: 20). Such a tacit 
acceptance is especially important as legal citizenship guarantees civil rights, whose 
protection is closely bound up with the protection of such human rights as the 
freedom of speech and freedom of association. Perhaps the most important point is 
that having legal citizenship is a human right itself, which implies that withholding 
legal citizenship on the basis of unrealistic expectations violates human rights 
directly and indirectly (Hirsch Ballin 2011: 20). 
As of 2012, the requirement that applicants for Dutch citizenship renounce 
their original citizenship is still part of the Dutch Nationality Act, which makes the 
Netherlands one of the few West-European countries which still upholds such a 
requirement (Vink & De Groot 2010). However, making use of the exemptions to 
this requirement discussed above, more than one million Dutch citizens have 
multiple citizenship – around 6% of the total population (CBS 2011; see also 
Gijsberts & Dagevos 2009: 55-57). At the moment of writing, views on multiple 
citizenship in Dutch Parliament are still divided. The PVV obdurately opposes 
multiple citizenship on the grounds that it can cause conflicting loyalties, and the 
SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) wants to restrict the legal 
exemptions which can lead to multiple citizenship.21 Taking the opposite tack, the 
PvdA has explicitly stated that multiple citizenship has no relationship to 
integration or loyalty to the nation-state, and the Green Left party made no bones 
about it and simply stated that multiple citizenship should be allowed.22 So far, the 
current government has not proposed any changes to the Dutch Nationality Act.23 
                                                     
20 Ernst Hirsch Ballin was Minister of Justice in the national governments of 1989-1994 and 2006-
2010, for the CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal). 
21 PVV (2012); SGP (2012). 
22 GroenLinks (2012); PvdA (2012). 
23 At the time of writing, the coalition government in the Netherlands consisted of the political 
parties VVD and PvdA, which came into power in November 2012. 
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This discussion illustrates that the laws on Dutch citizenship have become 
more restrictive since the 1990s. Politicians on the right of the political spectrum 
are the principal proponents of the school of thought that the multiple citizenship 
of immigrants, especially of Muslim immigrants, is an indicator of a lack of 
affective commitment to the Netherlands. Hence it is the culprit behind failed 
integration and a putative lack of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state. In the next 
section, the views on loyalty to the nation-state current in society will be examined. 
4.4 Views in society on multiple citizenship and loyalty to the nation-state 
The previous section has revealed that in the last two decades loyalty to the nation-
state of immigrants with multiple citizenship has become a real focus of attention 
in Dutch political debates on the multicultural society. In this section, views 
current in Dutch society about this issue will be explored by analysing empirical 
data collected in the two questionnaires conducted for this research. As mentioned 
at the beginning of this chapter, this sort of empirical analysis is especially relevant, 
as the arguments in the scientific and political debates on citizens’ loyalty to the 
nation-state are hypothetical and theoretical, and lack empirical basis (Bloemraad, 
Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; De Hart 2005b).  
The analysis in this section consists of two parts. The first will examine views 
on multicultural citizenship, and in the second views on loyalty to the nation-state 
will be explored. 
4.4.1 Views on multiple citizenship 
In the questionnaires used in this research, respondents were asked whether and 
why they approved or disapproved of multiple citizenship in the Netherlands. 
Almost half (49%) of respondents disapprove of multiple citizenship. Almost a 
quarter (23%) of them approve. The other respondents (28%) do not have an 
opinion on this issue. These findings indicate that the percentage of Dutch citizens 
who oppose multiple citizenship has decreased, as in June 2010, two and a half 
years before the survey for the present study was carried out, this percentage was 
over 60% (CBS 2011). The reason for this drop in disapproval is not clear. 
Regardless of their view on the issue, respondents said that they found it 
difficult to explain why they held their opinion. Those who did explain and 
disapproved said that holding multiple citizenship indicates a lack of national 
commitment. They insisted that immigrants would have to renounce their original 
citizenship in order to prove their commitment to their new home country. These 
respondents also stressed the risk of conflicting loyalties, showing special concern 
about government officials with multiple citizenship. Another topic which these 
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opponents raised was the matter of the risk of the abuse of welfare subsidies. They 
argued that immigrants with multiple citizenship ‘should not be allowed to live in 
their countries of origin and receive welfare subsidies from the Dutch state’. 
Conversely, respondents who approved of multiple citizenship stressed that 
citizenship status does not say much about a person: ‘It is just a piece of paper’. 
Hence, they considered the political debate about the issue to be a pointless waste 
of time. Proponents also argued that the motives of citizens, including government 
officials, should not be judged by their citizenship status. Instead, people should be 
judged by their behaviour. 
In order to explore the characteristics of those who approved and disapproved 
of multiple citizenship, a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out, including 
the variables age, gender, descent, educational level and income. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, this analysis reveals that the view on multiple citizenship is related to 
the level of education (β = .21, p < .001), descent (β = .20, p < .001) and gender (β 
= .11, p < .05).24 The higher the educational level, the more approving of multiple 
citizenship, and women appear to be slightly more in favour of multiple citizenship 
than men. This is in line with the findings of the Statistics Netherlands (CBS 
2011: 28-29). Furthermore, only 15% of immigrants of non-Western origin, 
opposed to 52% of native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin, disapprove of 
multiple citizenship, findings which are similar to those of the CBS (2011: 29). 
The relationship to descent can be partly explained by the fact that only 21% of 
those with multiple citizenship actually disapprove of it and that all respondents 
with multiple citizenship are immigrants. 
The analysis also indicates a relationship between the views on multiple 
citizenship and political preference, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (β = .26, p < 
.001).25 By and large voters for political parties on the right of the political 
spectrum disapprove of multiple citizenship, voters for the PVV (84% 
disapproval), VVD (65%) and SGP (60%) being particularly vehement. Voters for 
the SP (left-wing Socialist Party) also largely disapprove (67%). Voters for the 
PvdA, D66 and the GreenLeft party, parties on the left of the political spectrum, 
are more divided on the issue, with as many proponents as opponents of multiple 
citizenship. These findings are also similar to the results of the CBS study (2011: 
29). 
                                                     
24 All mentioned βs in this chapter have been standardized.  
25 A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out, with descent, gender, age, educational level and 
income as control variables. 
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4.4.2 Views on loyalty to the nation-state 
As is clear from the literature review in Section 4.2, research has indicated that 
loyalty to the nation-state is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, one of whose 
components is loyalty in identification (which can engender feelings of pride and 
shame in achievements and actions of the nation-state). The other components are 
loyalty in concern, loyalty in advocacy, symbolic patriotism, constructive 
patriotism and uncritical patriotism. Therefore, to explore views of loyalty to the 
nation-state in Dutch society, the questionnaires used in this research included 
several items which relate to these various types. Below, these items will be 
discussed separately first, before using them to explore whether the above-
mentioned types of loyalty to the nation-state are indeed empirically distinct, and 
whether they are distinct from the affective component of national self-
identification, as discussed in the scientific debates (see Section 4.2). Finally, the 
data will be used to explore whether and how these expressions of loyalty to the 
nation-state are related to such background variables as multiple citizenship status, 
descent and political preference, as hypothesized in both scientific and political 
debates (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
4.4.2.1 Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state 
Pride and shame elicited by past and contemporary achievements and actions of 
the nation-state are expressions of a strong inclination to identify with the nation-
state, a tendency which has been called loyalty in identification (Keller 2007: 6; see 
Section 4.2). To explore this expression of loyalty to the nation-state, respondents 
were asked whether they felt proud of various achievements of the Netherlands and 
Dutch people. The results are presented in Table 4.1 below.  
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Table 4.1 
Pride in past and contemporary Dutch achievements: Means (scale from 1 = not proud at all to 4 = very 
proud) and Standard Deviations. 
Items M SD
Dutch achievements in sport 3.3 0.8
Dutch achievements in science and technology 3.2 0.7
Dutch achievements in arts and literature 3.0 0.8
Functioning of Dutch democracy 2.8 0.8
Functioning of Dutch welfare state 2.8 0.8
Equality in Dutch society 2.8 0.9
Dutch economic achievements 2.7 0.8
Dutch political influence in the world 2.3 0.8
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for 
exploratory analysis.  
 
This table demonstrates that respondents are most proud of Dutch achievements in 
sports, science and technology and the arts and literature (means of respectively 
3.3, 3.2 and 3). They are clearly less proud of Dutch political influence in the 
world (M = 2.3). Apart from rating the importance of these items in the survey, 
respondents also elaborated on these items during in-depth interviews, and 
mentioned other aspects of the Netherlands and Dutch society of which they were 
proud. Respondents stressed that they were proud of the high quality of 
institutions, facilities and regulations in the Netherlands and the resultant high 
quality of life. In their explanations, respondents mentioned the education, welfare 
and health care systems, the relative safety in traffic and the low crime rate. 
Respondents also mentioned that they are proud of the worldwide admiration for 
Dutch waterworks, including the Dutch levee system. The cultural and ethnic 
diversity in the Netherlands was also mentioned. Some respondents stressed that 
this is something to be proud of in itself, while others are proud that the 
multicultural society functions well, despite cultural differences. One respondent 
said, ‘It is such a small country with so much diversity, and still we do not beat 
each other’s brains out’. Finally, respondents are proud of certain Dutch values and 
attitudes such as tolerance of people of various cultural and religious backgrounds, 
tolerance of a wide range of life principles, freedom of speech and critical loyalty. 
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The respondents were also asked whether they felt ashamed of negative aspects 
of Dutch history, that is of certain Dutch actions affecting ‘others’ in the past. The 
results are presented in Table 4.2 below. 
 
Table 4.2 
Shame of negative aspects of Dutch history (Dutch actions affecting ‘others’ in the past): Means (scale from 
1 = not ashamed at all to 4 = very much ashamed) and Standard Deviations. 
Items M SD
Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s 2.9 1.0
Dutch involvement in slavery and slave trade 2.8 1.0
Dutch involvement in the fall of Srebrenica in 1995 2.6 1.0
Dutch colonial past 2.5 1.0
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for 
exploratory analysis. 
 
Speaking about historical aspects, respondents said they not only feel ashamed of 
the Dutch military actions in Indonesia in the late 1940s, they were also perturbed 
by the fact that many Dutch people do not want to recognize what happened there 
or even refuse to talk about it. Respondents feel ashamed of current Dutch 
attitudes and behaviour towards immigrants, including discrimination and 
‘unnecessary insults’. In their discussions, some explicitly said they feel ashamed of 
the actions and statements of member of parliament Wilders and his political party 
PVV. Respondents also mentioned that they feel ashamed of certain failings in 
Dutch society, mentioning the bad treatment of asylum seekers and the fact that 
there still is poverty and a need for food banks despite the wealth of Dutch society 
and the strong Dutch economy. Finally, respondents expressed shame about the 
behaviour of Dutch hooligans, and the drinking and vandalism of Dutch holiday-
makers abroad.  
Besides items on pride and shame – expressions of loyalty in identification – 
the questionnaires also included items which relate to other expressions of loyalty 
to the nation-state, as discussed in Section 4.2. The results are presented in the 
following table. 
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Table 4.3 
Expressions of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state: Means (scale from 1 = never to 5 = always) and Standard 
Deviations.  
Items M SD
I am loyal to the Netherlands 3.6 0.8
I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country 3.5 1.0
I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most other countries 3.2 1.0
I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement 3.2 1.0
I put the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of other countries 3.0 1.2
I think that the world would be better if people from other countries were more 
like Dutch people 
2.8 1.0
I am a Dutch patriot 2.7 1.0
I speak up in defence of the Netherlands when people criticize it 2.6 1.0
I get ‘goose bumps’ when the Dutch national anthem is played 2.6 1.3
I get ‘goose bumps’ when the Dutch national flag is hoisted 2.3 1.1
I support the Netherlands, also when I know that it is wrong 2.1 1.0
I think that the Netherlands is virtually always right 2.0 0.8
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. These means were calculated from Likert items. As a result, the means can only be used for 
exploratory analysis.  
 
The results in this table indicate that, on average, Dutch citizens seem to prefer to 
express their loyalty by criticizing their country in order to improve it (M = 3.2 on 
a scale from 1 = never to 5 = always), than by supporting their country uncritically 
(the items indicating the latter – ‘supporting the Netherlands knowing that it is 
wrong’, and ‘thinking that the Netherlands is virtually always right’ – have means 
of 2.1 and 2.0). Furthermore, the results also suggest that Dutch citizens have a 
moderate loyalty in concern (expressed by putting the interests of the Netherlands 
above the interests of other countries, as discussed in Section 4.2) and a moderate 
loyalty in advocacy (expressed by speaking up for the Netherlands when it is 
criticized, as discussed in Section 4.2). They also appear to have a moderate sense 
of national superiority, as the items ‘I think that the Netherlands is a better country 
than most other countries’ and ‘I think that the world would be better if people 
from other countries were more like Dutch people’ have means of 3.2 and 2.8 
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respectively. However, the playing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the 
national flag do not seem to stir up strong patriotic emotions.  
Interestingly, it is less specific items such as ‘I am loyal to the Netherlands’ and 
‘I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another country’ which have the 
highest means, 3.6 and 3.5 respectively. In the in-depth interviews, respondents 
elaborated on these items. Generally speaking, they found it difficult to explain 
what their loyalty to the nation-state entails. Those who did explain, mentioned 
being proud of the country (see also the analysis of national pride, earlier in this 
section), contributing to Dutch society, respecting Dutch norms and values and 
protecting the image of the Netherlands. When talking about contributing to 
Dutch society, respondents said that it is important to participate in society, to 
keep society peaceful and maintain a liveable environment and to support Dutch 
interests in international contexts. They also stressed the importance of being 
critical and constructive in their opinions of government policies and of 
developments in society. On the other hand, respondents also did say that some 
people are too critical and complain too much. They considered it to be important 
to speak up to refute these complaints, as ‘the Netherlands is one of the best places 
to live, and there is not much to complain about’. 
Respondents who argued that the Netherlands is a better country than most 
other countries referred to the high quality of institutions, facilities and regulations 
and the resultant high quality of life (see also the analysis of national pride, earlier 
in this section). Furthermore, respondents argued that this sense of superiority 
could improve the life satisfaction of Dutch citizens, and could encourage their 
willingness to contribute to their country as well. It was also argued that loyalty to 
the nation-state is less important than such other attitudes as ‘trying to be good 
person’, ‘to be loyal to people you feel close to and to those who are in need’. 
Respondents believed that these attitudes are in the interest of the Netherlands as 
well.  
To investigate whether the types of loyalty discussed in Section 4.2 are 
empirically distinct, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) was 
carried out including all items from Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 above. However, the 
item ‘I criticize the Netherlands when that helps its improvement’, which is an 
indicator of constructive patriotism, had to be removed from the analysis as its 
correlations with all other items are lower than .3, resulting in a component on 
which only this item loads significantly. The analysis indicated six distinct 
components, whose (rotated) loadings are presented in Table 4.4 below.26 
                                                     
26 A CATPCA analysis with option ‘impute missing values with mode’ resulted in 6 components with 
eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 6 components could 
be extracted, which explained 65.57% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option 
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Table 4.4 
Expressions of loyalty to the nation-state: Component loadings (Categorical Principal Components Analysis, 
transformed variables rotated with PCA). 
Items C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
I prefer to be Dutch rather than a citizen of another 
country 
.85 -.01 -.02 .03 -.02 -.07 
I think that the Netherlands is a better country than most 
other countries 
.84 .00 -.05 -.06 -.06 -.03 
I am loyal to the Netherlands .82 .00 -.01 .06 .11 -.10 
I think that the world would be better if people from 
other countries were more like Dutch people 
.68 .02 -.07 -.01 -.01 .18 
I am a Dutch patriot .49 .00 .05 .07 .12 .29 
I feel ashamed of Dutch involvement in slavery and slave 
trade 
-.01 .91 -.03 .06 -.03 .01 
I feel ashamed of the Dutch colonial past -.04 .90 -.02 .07 -.02 .01 
I feel ashamed of Dutch military actions in Indonesia in 
the late 1940s 
.05 .88 -.02 .02 .01 -.04 
I feel ashamed of Dutch involvement in the fall of 
Srebrenica in 1995 
.00 .77 .06 -.09 .10 .03 
I am proud of the functioning of the Dutch welfare state .07 .06 -.81 .04 -.23 .06 
I am proud of the functioning of the Dutch democracy .14 .01 -.75 .03 .04 -.11 
I am proud of Dutch political influence in the world .07 .08 -.64 .01 .13 .12 
I am proud of Dutch economic achievements -.01 -.10 -.63 .03 .25 .06 
I am proud of equality in Dutch society -.09 -.07 -.61 .04 .15 -.01 
I get ‘goose bumps’ when the Dutch national anthem is 
played 
.02 .04 -.03 .95 -.01 -.09 
I get ‘goose bumps’ when the Dutch national flag is 
hoisted 
-.02 .02 -.05 .91 -.04 .06 
(Table continued on next page)
  
                                                                                                                                  
‘exclude missing values’ gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used 
to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some 
technical background). 
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(Table 4.4 continued)
Items C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
I am proud of Dutch achievements in arts and literature -.01 .05 -.09 -.04 .77 -.01 
I am proud of Dutch achievements in sport .05 .10 .09 .04 .75 .00 
I am proud of Dutch achievements in science and 
technology 
.04 -.07 -.23 .01 .70 -.02 
I support the Netherlands, also when I know that it is 
wrong 
-.08 .03 -.08 -.05 -.03 .83 
I think that the Netherlands is virtually always right .15 -.02 .03 -.03 -.03 .78 
I speak up in defence of the Netherlands when people 
criticize it  
-.03 -.02 -.04 .32 .05 .58 
I put the interests of the Netherlands above the interests of 
other countries 
.25 -.12 .22 .25 .20 .34 
Eigenvalues 5.67 3.16 2.33 1.66 1.23 1.03 
Variance accounted for (%) 24.64 13.76 10.14 7.20 5.35 4.49 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. The items have been sorted by loadings on each component. Loadings with a value higher than 
.30 are shown in bold. The loadings of the items used for constructing scales are italicized. 
 
 
The items which cluster on these components suggest that these components can 
be characterized as six distinct types of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state: nationalist 
patriotism (C1), shame of negative aspects of Dutch national history (C2), national-
political pride (C3), symbolic patriotism (C4), national-cultural pride (C5) and 
uncritical patriotism (C6).  
The component which can be characterized as nationalist patriotism includes 
items which refer to an idealization of the nation (‘I prefer to be Dutch rather than 
citizen of another country’) and to feelings of national superiority (second and 
fourth items in the table), but also the less specific item ‘I am loyal to the 
Netherlands’. This suggests that the concept of loyalty is associated more with an 
idealization of the nation and feelings of national superiority than with other such 
expressions as pride, the supporting of or speaking up for the Netherlands. The 
term nationalist patriotism seems to be appropriate to characterize this component, 
as the term nationalism is mostly used to refer to an idealization of the nation 
which can be expressed by feelings of national superiority (Sumner 1906; 
Druckman 1994; see also Section 4.2). 
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Furthermore, the items referring to getting goose bumps when the national 
anthem is played or the flag is hoisted both load highly on the same component. 
These are expressions of an emotional importance attached to ritual practices or 
symbolic representations of the country, which is referred to in the literature as 
symbolic patriotism (Huddy & Khatib 2007; Parker 2009; see also Section 4.2). 
Component C6 includes supporting the Netherlands even though it is known 
to be wrong, thinking that the Netherlands is always right, and speaking up for the 
Netherlands when it is criticized. This relates to uncritical patriotism, defined in the 
literature as ‘unquestioning positive evaluation, staunch allegiance, and intolerance 
of criticism’ (Schatz, Staub & Lavine 1999: 153). As argued in Section 4.2, this 
type of patriotism relates to loyalty in belief, namely, the tendency to form or resist 
certain beliefs about the object of loyalty (Keller 2007). (This means that loyalty to 
a country does not necessarily further its interests, as this specific expression of 
loyalty implies refraining from or opposing criticism which is contradictory with 
principles of democracy.)  
The items referring to pride load on two distinct components, which can be 
characterized as national-cultural pride (including pride of achievements in sport, 
science and technology, and arts and literature) and national political pride 
(including pride of Dutch democracy, economy and the welfare state, Dutch 
political influence in the world and equal treatment in Dutch society). These two 
components of national pride correspond to the dimensions of national pride 
found by Hjerm (1998: 343-344) in an analysis of empirical data from Australia, 
Germany, Britain and Sweden. Finally, the items referring to shame all load highly 
on the same component, which can be characterized as shame of negative aspects of 
Dutch national history. As discussed in Section 4.2, pride and shame of past and 
contemporary achievements and actions of the nation-state are expressions of a 
strong tendency to identify with the nation-state, a tendency which has been called 
loyalty in identification (Keller 2007: 6; see Section 4.2). 
These results run along the same lines as the findings of Huddy and Khatib 
(2007) and Blank, Schmidt and Westle (2001) discussed in Section 4.2.2. These 
authors also found empirical distinctions between the idealization of one’s nation 
expressed by feelings of national superiority (which, as mentioned above, these 
authors label nationalism, and in the present study is labelled nationalist 
patriotism), and other types of loyalty to the nation-state (or patriotism). 
Moreover, the distinction between symbolic and uncritical patriotism fits with the 
findings of Parker (2009). To explore the relationships between these phenomena 
in more detail, the items with the highest component loadings presented in the 
table above (italicized) have been used to create summated scales. The values of 
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Cronbach’s Alpha for the summated scales are between .64 and .89.27 The bivariate 
correlations between these scales are presented in Table 4.5 below, which also 
includes the affective component of national self-identification as discussed in 
Chapter 3 (see also Section 4.2). 
 
Table 4.5 
Bivariate correlations between the affective component of national self-identification and expressions of 





































 1.00 .07* -.01 -.05 
Symbolic 
patriotism 
 1.00 .37**** .24**** 
Uncritical 
patriotism 




Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. All values are Kendall’s tau-b coefficients.  
∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .005; ∗∗∗∗p < .001 (all values two-tailed).  
 
 
                                                     
27 Values of Cronbach’s Alpha: for items selected to represent C1 = .81, C2 = .88, C3 = .79, C4 = 
.89, C5 = .72, C6 = .64. 
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These correlations indicate positive relationships between the affective component 
of national self-identification on the one hand and all the expressions of loyalty to 
the nation-state distinguished, with the exception of shame of negative aspects of 
national history, on the other hand. This corresponds with results from studies in 
the tradition of social identity research, which indicate that self-identification with 
a group can be expressed by in-group loyalty (see Section 4.2). However, the 
strength of these relationships is weak to moderate (the highest correlation in this 
table is .41), which suggests that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state should 
not be seen as indicators for, or even synonymous with, the affective component of 
national self-identification, as discussed in Section 4.2 (cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007). 
Similarly, the CATPCA analysis and the correlations in the table above suggest that 
nationalist patriotism is positively related to, but distinct from, other expressions of 
loyalty to the nation-state, which ties in with findings in earlier research as 
discussed in Section 4.2 (e.g. Blank, Schmidt & Westle 2001; Huddy & Khatib 
2007). Importantly, shame of negative aspects of national history appears to be the 
most distinct expression of loyalty to the Dutch nation-state, as the results in the 
table indicate that it is not or only barely related to other types of loyalty.  
4.4.2.2 Who is loyal? 
In both scientific literature and political debates in the Netherlands, as already said, 
various scholars and politicians have hypothesized that multiple citizenship is an 
indicator of weaker loyalty to the nation-state. Furthermore, several empirical 
studies have indicated that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state are more 
strongly related to political ideology than to national self-identification as 
understood in terms of social identity theory (see Section 4.2) (for a discussion see 
Huddy & Khatib 2007). To explore whether such relationships can be found in 
the present study as well, Categorical Regression analyses were carried out for each 
of the above-mentioned summated scales which represent the expressions of 
loyalty.28 This sort of analysis was also carried out for the item ‘I criticize the 
Netherlands when that helps its improvement’. As this item appears to be the only 
indicator of constructive patriotism in the questionnaire, as explained above, in the 
following analysis the variable ‘criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its 
improvement’ will be used instead of the term ‘constructive patriotism’.29 
                                                     
28 In the CATREG procedure, these summated scales were specified as ordinal and discretized by 
ranking, as the scales were derived from ordinal items. 
29 It does not seem sensible to explore the phenomenon of constructive patriotism using only one 
item. In future studies, constructive patriotism could be explored in qualitative research in order to 
develop more items to measure its strength (see also Chapter 2). 
88 Chapter 4 
In the first step, the analyses which were carried out included the variables age, 
gender, descent, religion, educational level and income. These analyses indicate 
that educational level is to some extent related to national-political pride, uncritical 
and symbolic patriotism, and the variable ‘criticizing the Netherlands when that 
helps its improvement’ (β = .20, p < .001; β = -.17, p < .001; β = -.15, p < .05 and 
β = .20, p < .001 respectively). The higher the educational level, the more national-
political pride and the more respondents criticize the Netherlands when they think 
that their criticism will help to improve it, but the lower their uncritical and 
symbolical patriotism. Furthermore, the older respondents are, the more they tend 
to be symbolically patriotic and feel shame about negative aspects of Dutch 
national history (β = .25, p < .001 and β = .20, p < .05 respectively). When it 
comes to gender differences, men have slightly more national-cultural pride than 
women (β = .12, p < .05). The variable descent is slightly related to all types of 
loyalty, except shame of negative aspects of national history. Both native Dutch 
and immigrants of non-Western origin are slightly more proud of national-cultural 
and national-political achievements than immigrants of Western origin (β = .22, p 
< .05 for both scales). Furthermore, native Dutch score slightly higher on the 
nationalist patriotism, uncritical patriotism and symbolic patriotism scales than 
either Western or non-Western immigrants (β = .22, p < .005; β = .18, p < .001 
and β = .12, p < .05 respectively). On the other hand, immigrants of non-Western 
origin criticize the Netherlands when they think that helps its improvement 
slightly more often than their compatriots (β = .10, p < .05). 
Taken together, and considering the weak correlations, these results do not 
indicate that descent is related to the strength of loyalty to the nation-state. To 
explore this in more detail, analyses were also carried out separately for immigrants, 
in which the variable ‘affective commitment to one’s ethnic group’ (discussed in 
Chapter 3) was included as well. Analyses were likewise carried out for Muslim 
immigrants, in which the variable ‘affective commitment to one’s religious group’ 
was included. These analyses did not reveal significant relationships between the 
affective commitment to one’s ethnic or religious group on the one hand, and 
types of loyalty to the nation-state on the other. These empirical results contradict 
the theoretical argument of opponents of multiculturalism, who worry that a civic 
conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3), namely the recognition of 
cultural distinctiveness, might not be sufficient to foster loyalty to the nation-state 
(Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008; see Section 4.2.3). 
To explore relationships between multiple citizenship and types of loyalty to 
the nation-state, the variable ‘having multiple citizenship status’ was added to the 
Categorical Regression analyses. These analyses revealed no significant differences 
in levels of loyalty between those who do and those who do not possess multiple 
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citizenship. Moreover, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, similar analyses did not 
reveal significant differences in the affective commitment to the Netherlands of 
these two groups. This is in line with the findings of the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR) and the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs 
(ACVZ) discussed in Section 4.3, indicating that the legal aspect of citizenship 
cannot be conflated with the emotional commitments of citizens, and that there is 
no reason to assume that citizens with a single citizenship status are more loyal to 
the nation-state in which they reside compared to those with multiple citizenship. 
It also accords with the findings of De Hart (2005b) and Ronkainen (2011), which 
indicated that multiple citizenship is not related to the strength of loyalty to the 
nation-state. 
Finally, the analyses reveal moderate relationships between the political 
preference of respondents and their expressions of loyalty to the nation-state (all βs 
between .19 and .31, with all ps < .001).30 Voters for parties on the left of the 
political spectrum (PvdA, SP, D66 and Green Left) and non-voters are slightly less 
uncritically patriotic than voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum 
(VVD, CDA and PVV) (β = .21, p < .001). These results might be explained by 
the relationship between uncritical patriotism and conservatism, as suggested by 
Huddy and Khatib (2007: 64). These authors also found that those who classified 
themselves as right-wing conservatives tended to be more uncritically patriotic. 
They explained this by referring to the relationship between authoritarianism and 
uncritical patriotism: authoritarians, like uncritical patriots, tend to refrain from or 
oppose criticism of their country, and authoritarians tend to vote for (conservative) 
parties on the right of the political spectrum (see also Schatz, Staub, and Lavine 
1999).  
Conservatism might also partly explain levels of symbolic patriotism, as voters 
for the Christian parties CDA and SGP are more symbolically patriotic than voters 
for other parties (β = .19, p < .001). On the other hand, the relationship between 
political preference and the variable ‘criticizing the Netherlands when that helps its 
improvement’ is difficult to interpret. Although the finding that non-voters score 
relatively low on this variable appears to make sense, it is not clear why voters for 
the largest Christian party (CDA) and the left-wing SP score lower on this variable 
than voters for all other parties (β = .26, p < .001).31 Furthermore, voters for liberal 
parties (VVD, D66) and the right wing populist PVV clearly feel less shame of 
negative aspects of Dutch history than voters for left-wing (PvdA, Green Left) and 
                                                     
30 The variable political preference was added to the Categorical Regression analyses, which means 
that these analyses were controlled for age, gender, educational level and descent. 
31 In future studies, constructive patriotism, for which this variable is an indicator, could be explored 
in qualitative research in order to develop more items to measure its strength (see also Chapter 2). 
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Christian parties (CDA, Christian Union and SGP) (β = .31, p < .001). Voters for 
the SP and non-voters reflect the average for all respondents in this respect. Finally, 
voters for the traditionally largest political parties (the parties who always have 
formed the government coalitions) VVD, PvdA and CDA score higher on the 
national-cultural and national-political pride scales than voters for the other parties 
(β = .24, p < .001 and β = .22, p < .001 respectively). 
 




As discussed in Chapter 1, a multicultural society is characterized by cultural and 
ethnic diversity plus the formal and public recognition of the dimensions of 
multicultural citizenship, including belonging to the national group of both natives 
and immigrants, their cultural distinctiveness and their equality (Shadid 2009: 5-
6). The dimension of equality is an important aspect in fundamental debates on 
citizenship, as in Western countries legal citizenship entails the right to equality (cf. 
Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). This chapter reviews some of the ideas 
about equality prevalent in Dutch society, in an attempt to explore how and 
indeed whether aspects of this dimension of multicultural citizenship are 
recognized and dealt with in practice. The method adopted for this purpose is to 
discuss the policy measures introduced by the Dutch government to promote 
equality and the analysis of relevant empirical data collected in the quantitative and 
qualitative questionnaires conducted for this research. Before this can be done, the 
scientific meaning and usage of the concept of equality and factors which can 
hinder or promote the equality of various groups in society must be discussed. 
In the relevant literature, equality is used by scholars as both a descriptive and a 
normative concept (Capaldi 2002). As a descriptive concept it is employed to 
describe the relationship between entities with certain identical characteristics. In 
this sense, the recognition that all human beings are equal in certain aspects is 
descriptive in nature. A normative use of equality is present in the view that the 
recognition of equality requires a special treatment of human beings (Capaldi 
2002: 1).  
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The question of which kind of special treatment is required and indeed 
desirable to achieve equality has been widely discussed in the literature (Barnard & 
Hepple 2000; Capaldi 2002; Miller 1996; Rosenfeld 1986; Shin 2009). Various 
types of equality are distinguished, including such descriptive types as the equality 
of conditions and equality of opportunity, and normative types, among them 
formal equality and substantive equality of opportunity. Formal equality enshrines 
the ideal that all persons should be treated equally. In the Netherlands, this 
principle is laid down in Article 1 of the Constitution, which stipulates that ‘All 
persons in the Netherlands shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. 
Discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief, political opinion, race, or sex, or 
on any other ground whatsoever shall not be permitted.’1 In other words, formal 
equality refers to the act of equal treatment. However, equal treatment does not 
guarantee equality of opportunity, because the latter depends not only on the 
absence of acts of unequal treatment, also called discrimination,2 it also requires 
equal starting points (Barnard & Hepple 2000: 566) or, in other words, equal 
conditions (cf. Miller 1996: 203). When starting conditions are unequal because of 
the disadvantaged position of a group, for example, in the labour market or 
because the level of education of its members is holding back from acquiring a 
better position in society, the opportunities for the members of this group will be 
limited. The concept of equality which includes measures to overcome these 
limitations and to level the playing field (Roemer 1998) is referred to as substantive 
equality of opportunity. Such measures are usually referred to as measures for 
positive/affirmative action (Barnard & Hepple 2000).3 
Since the 1980s, various policies and regulations have been developed in the 
Netherlands to achieve both formal equality and substantive equality of 
opportunity for those citizens from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds who 
had come to the country primarily as labour migrants. These efforts include 
positive action policies, measures and regulations to prevent and combat prejudice 
and discrimination and policies designed to assist integration. In this context, the 
term integration refers to the process of incorporating immigrants and their 
descendants into society. The equality of citizens was one of the main principles of 
the first structural integration policy developed by the Dutch government in the 
early 1980s, and since then—as will be discussed later in this chapter—integration 
has been used as a central concept to describe the juxtaposition between equality 
and the ethnic and cultural diversity in society. 
                                                     
1 Translation by Rayar & Wadsworth (1997). 
2 But see Section 5.3.1 for the difference between legal and empirical conceptions of discrimination. 
3 For an extensive discussion of various aspects of formal and substantive equality, see Loenen & 
Rodrigues (1999). 
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To examine these concepts of equality and the types of Dutch policies devised 
to promote equality in more depth, in this chapter the views on three particular 
topics will be examined: integration, prejudice and discrimination, and positive 
action. It will also attempt to probe into the matter of whether these views are 
related to such other variables as educational level, political preference and the 
frequency of social contact with other ethnic groups. Hence the chapter is divided 
into three sections, each of which concentrates on the three designated topics. In 
the first part of each section, the existing relevant literature will be discussed. This 
is followed by a discussion of policies and regulations. In the last part of each 
section, an analysis of the empirical data will be presented. 
5.2 Integration 
5.2.1 Perspectives on integration of immigrants and their descendants 
Since the 1920s, the integration of immigrants and their descendants in nation-
states has been the central theme in studies by scholars in various disciplines 
(Kivisto 2005; Waters, Tran, Kasinitz & Mollenkopf 2010: 1169) and has 
presented a challenge to policy makers in many immigration countries, as among 
them Canada, Australia, the United States and, more recently, European nations 
(see for example Bijl & Verweij 2012). The purpose of this section is not to offer a 
comprehensive overview of these studies but to present a brief discussion of the 
main results of the relevant scientific research on this topic.  
In essence studies about the integration of immigrants and their descendants 
are about the process of change elicited by migration to a different society (cf. Bolt, 
Özüekren & Phillips 2010: 173; see also Hoving, Dibbits & Schrover 2005). 
Although the studies are many and varied, there is no consensus among scholars 
about which concept to use to refer to this process. Although the concept of 
integration is the one most used in European studies, whereas in the United States 
the concept of assimilation tends to be more prevalent (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 
2010; Vermeulen 2010), other concepts such as acculturation and incorporation 
are also in common use. In the present study, the concept of integration is the one 
chosen. 
Notwithstanding the fact that different concepts are used to attempt to explain 
it, there is general agreement among scholars that the integration process is a prism 
made up of legal, social, cultural, political, and economic aspects. These aspects are 
frequently categorized into two separate dimensions: the structural and socio-
cultural dimension (Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 128; Portes & Rivas 2011; Waters, 
Tran, Kasinitz & Mollenkopf 2010). The concept of structural integration is used 
to refer to the socio-economic incorporation of immigrants and their descendants 
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into society, and covers such straightforward topics as attempts to improve their 
educational status and their position in the labour market. In contrast, socio-
cultural integration describes aspects which are more complex and difficult to 
measure (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013: 871), such as immigrants’ social relationships 
with ‘natives’, discrimination, and the real or perceived differences in norms and 
values between immigrants and natives (Goodman 2010; Spencer & Cooper 
2006).  
The concepts of integration and assimilation are not confined to their 
empirical purposes but are also used to form normative judgements. Hence, these 
concepts are used in empirical studies on the process of change driven by 
migration, and also to describe the desired end points of this process or the goals of 
integration policies (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). 
Many theoretical models to describe empirical differences in the pace, progress 
and outcome of the integration process have been proposed, discussed and 
measured (e.g. Gordon 1964; Shadid 1979; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault & Senécal 
1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Alba & Nee 2003; Berry 2011). Berry has 
proposed an influential two-dimensional model to describe different strategies for 
acculturation (1974; 2011). The first dimension of this model relates to the relative 
preference displayed by immigrants and their descendants to maintain their own 
culture and identity; whereas the other dimension describes their relative 
preference to interact with other groups in society. These two dimensions produce 
four intercultural strategies which can theoretically be resorted to by immigrants 
and their descendants: integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization. 
Integration and assimilation both refer to strategies adopted by immigrants and 
their descendants who wish to interact with other groups in society. These two 
strategies are opposed to the other dimension: integration refers to the strategy 
adopted by which immigrants and their descendants who wish to maintain their 
original culture and assimilation refers to the strategy adopted when they do not 
wish to adopt the norms and values of the receiving society. Berry goes on to define 
separation and marginalization as strategies in which immigrants and their 
descendants do not wish to interact with other groups in society, but 
differentiating between the way in which they wish to maintain their original 
culture. Separation refers to the strategy followed by immigrants and their 
descendants who wish to maintain their original culture, marginalization describes 
the strategy in which they do not (2011: 2.6). 
However, this model presents a one-sided view of the acculturation process, 
because it does not take into account important factors which influence this 
process, for instance, the fact that preferences for cultural retention and interaction 
with other groups actually have to be developed in interaction with others and that 
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they also depend on specific individual, societal and institutional factors (cf. Berry 
2001; Bowskill, Lyons, & Coyle 2007; Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-
Soekar 2009; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga & Szapocznik 2010). Moreover, the 
model presents only a limited number of mutually exclusive strategies in which 
there is no place for contextual variations. It does not take into account that 
individuals might prefer to interact with members of their own ethnic or cultural 
group in their free time, but do not object to interacting with members of other 
ethnic and cultural groups in the labour market (cf. Schrauf 2002; Schwartz & 
Zamboanga 2008).  
To understand the factors which influence the integration process, it is not 
sufficient to restrict any investigation only to the preferences of immigrants and 
their descendants. Integration studies recognize that the integration process can be 
influenced by, inter alia, individual, institutional and societal factors. Contributory 
individual factors might be the specific socio-economic background of first 
generation migrants, which implies examining their level of education, work 
experience and the reasons for their immigration (Haller, Portes, & Lynch 2011; 
Shadid 2007: 298). These studies also recognize the influence of social networks 
encountered at school and at work (Eve 2010).  
The effect of institutional factors on the integration process is discussed in 
various studies, among them those by Crul & Schneider (2010) and Reitz (1998). 
In their comparison of educational systems in different countries, Crul & 
Schneider show that differences between national education systems goes a long 
way towards explaining the differences between the educational attainments of 
second-generation ethnic Turks (2010: 1258; also see Alba, Sloan & Sperling 2011 
and Wiesbrock 2011).4 Another widely discussed factor which can help or hinder 
the process is residential segregation. However, so far evidence of a relationship 
between this factor and the integration process is limited and inconclusive 
(Musterd & Ostendorf 2009; Phillips 2010).  
Finally, societal factors which influence the integration process include 
discrimination (cf. Vermeulen 2010; Vedder, Sam & Liebkind 2007), which limits 
opportunities, and normative views on integration—either current in society in 
general or explicitly formulated in integration policies (cf. Crul & Schneider 2010: 
1260).  
In normative approaches to the integration process, the concept of assimilation 
is often used to describe an endpoint of change which is reached when immigrants 
and their descendants have come to resemble the natives in both socio-economic 
                                                     
4 Specific educational challenges related to increasing ethno-cultural diversity in the classroom have 
also been studied. See for example Vedder, Horenczyk, Liebkind & Nickmans (2006). 
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and socio-cultural aspects (Bolt, Özüekren & Phillips 2010). This use of the term 
assimilation is in contradiction to the normative use of the term integration, which 
describes a process in which immigrants and their descendants do achieve equal 
opportunities (e.g. in the labour market and in education) but generally retain their 
own cultural identities (Phillips 2010). Normative ideas about the goals of the 
integration process are made explicit when they are laid down in policies developed 
by governments to advance the integration of immigrants and their descendants. 
These goals can include, but are not limited to, equal treatment and equal 
opportunities for newcomers (Geddes 2003; Penninx 2005). In recent years, 
integration policies in several European countries have been amended to include 
more specifically honed goals, from a practical point of view the newcomers’ 
proficiency in the native language and, something less easy to pinpoint, their 
knowledge of the norms and values of the receiving society. In some countries, 
such as the Netherlands and Germany, these latter goals—referred to as civic 
integration (Goodman 2010: 755)—have recently been made requirements even 
for acquiring temporary and permanent residency, not to mention for obtaining 
legal citizenship (Goodman 2010; Green 2007; Joppke 2007). 
Both empirical studies of and normative views about the integration process 
often make distinctions between the native group and groups of immigrants and 
their descendants. These distinctions can be used as tools to detect and describe the 
disadvantages experienced by certain groups, for example, in the labour market 
(e.g. Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). However, several authors warn that 
focusing on this distinction can be problematic in any attempt to explain 
differences in the course of the integration process (Crul & Schneider 2010; Erdal 
& Oeppen 2013: 870; Groenendijk 2007: 104). They point out that, in the first 
place, it can lead to the incorrect perception that the native groups and the various 
groups of immigrants and their descendants are homogenous entities. This 
perception can lead to assumptions about causal relations between ethnicity and 
the integration process that are, ‘in the worst case, tautological’, as Crul & 
Schneider (2010: 1255) write, referring to Latour (1999: 71). In practice, there are 
many differences between the various immigrant and native groups in society as 
well as differences within each group (cf. Vermeulen 2010: 1219).5 It is an 
inescapable fact that the socio-cultural aspects and structural aspects of integration 
are related, but, partly because of individual differences, the causal relations 
between these aspects can be bi-directional and are difficult to investigate 
                                                     
5 The process of integration will probably only compound these differences. For example, consider 
the possible effects of intermarriage between natives and immigrants or their descendants – see Song 
(2010). 
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pertinently (cf. Portes & Zhou 1993; Dagevos 2001; Veenman 2002; Demant 
2005). 
Very importantly, as explained in Chapter 3, boundaries between ethno-
cultural groups are socially constructed and simultaneously dynamic. Therefore the 
nub of the matter is not just which ethno-cultural differences can explain aspects of 
the integration process, but also which differences are perceived to be important in 
society and why (cf. Erdal & Oeppen 2013; Eve 2010: 1233). With respect to 
integration, an important question is therefore which cultural and religious 
differences between these groups are recognized and accepted and which are not 
(cf. Shadid 2009; Waldinger 2007). The relationship between actual acceptance 
and recognition and formal integration policies has been studied by academics 
whose work leads them to construct national models to describe country-specific 
regulations and public attitudes towards immigration, citizenship, and integration 
(e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005). 
These models have been constructed on the basis of empirical studies of the 
relationships between integration policies, views on national identity and the 
(mutual) recognition of cultural differences. 
This discussion has explicitly revealed that—although no consensus exists on 
the meaning of the concept of integration—there is a recognition that the process 
of integration is inexorably influenced by many factors, including institutional and 
societal factors, such as discrimination and the presence of an integration policy. 
The next section will shed some light on the principles and goals of integration 
policies developed by the Dutch government in the period 1980-2013. 
5.2.2 Integration of immigrants in the Netherlands: policies and debates 
Since the 1980s, both the national and local governments in the Netherlands have 
developed a series of policies designed to integrate immigrants and their 
descendants. 6  Over the years, pronounced changes have been made in the 
principles and goals set out in these policies. These changes will be discussed in this 
section. Five phases in this discussion will be distinguished (cf. Bruquetas-Callejo, 
Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007; Duyvendak & Scholten 2012; 
Penninx 2005): the period of laissez-faire without any structural integration policy 
prior to the 1980s; the Ethnic Minorities policy of the 1980s which was 
characterized by accommodation; the policies of replacement (De Zwart & 
Poppelaars 2007) in the 1990s in which the focus on ethnic groups was replaced by 
                                                     
6 For an overview of current national integration policies see “Integration”, accessed July 25, 2013, 
http://www.government.nl/issues/integration. An example of local government policies can be found 
in the overview of policy principles and goals in the municipality of Amsterdam: Bestuurlijke reactie op 
de Staat van Integratie Rotterdam – Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam 2012). 
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a focus on socio-economic disadvantages; the period between 2002 and 2011 in 
which cultural adaptation was stressed; and the period since 2011 in which the 
replacement policies of the 1990s have been combined with a focus on the 
responsibility of the immigrants themselves in the integration process.7  
In the first phase, prior to 1980, the government constructed its immigration 
policies on the premise that the Netherlands was not and would not become a 
country of immigration (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & 
Scholten 2007). The question had not yet become pressing as immigrants from 
former Dutch colonies were considered repatriates, and the presence of the labour 
migrants who had been coming to the Netherlands since the 1950s was viewed as 
temporary. As there was not perceived need, no structural policies for immigrant 
integration were developed (Penninx 2005; Poppelaars & Scholten 2008). Instead, 
the government adopted laissez-faire policies to accommodate the assumed 
temporary residence of the labour immigrants, who were called ‘guest workers’ as a 
consequence (cf. Penninx 1996). 
However, during the 1970s it was becoming more obvious that most (of the 
recently arrived) immigrants had no plans to return to their countries of origin and 
wanted to remain in the Netherlands permanently. Consequently, the government 
realized that the laissez-faire policies, founded on a premise of temporary 
migration, needed revision (Penninx 2005). In its search for advice, the 
government consulted the scientific community. In 1976, the Ministry of Culture, 
Recreation and Social Work (CRM), at that time responsible for the welfare of the 
labour immigrants, established the Advisory Committee on Research related to 
Minorities (ACOM). Although ACOM advised the government about research 
matters, a report published in 19798 by another advisory body, the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR), was the factor which led the government 
to develop its first national and structural integration policy. 
This new policy, devised and implemented in the 1980s, was known as the 
Ethnic Minorities Policy. One of the main principles was, Penninx wrote, 
‘[e]quality in the socio-economic domain, inclusion and participation in the 
political domain and equity in the domain of culture and religion within 
constitutional conditions and to the extent feasible’ (2005: 38; see also Bijl & 
Verweij 2012: 242). The government at that time considered such structural 
factors as discrimination and the immigrants’ lack of education, not ethnic and 
cultural diversity, the main obstacles to their successful integration and socio-
economic success. In fact, socio-cultural emancipation was seen to have positive 
                                                     
7 Chapters 3, 4 and 6 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government 
policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of integration policies. 
8 The report was called Ethnic Minorities (WRR 1979). 
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effects on their integration in society (see also Chapter 6). Hence, the integration 
policies were targeted at specific ethnic minorities with a low socio-economic 
status. Therefore, the Ethnic Minorities Policy of the 1980s can be characterized as 
a policy of accommodation, when accommodation refers to the fact that this policy 
explicitly targeted groups whose boundaries were defined not just by their socio-
economic status, but also and primarily by their ethnic background (De Zwart & 
Poppelaars 2007).  
In its efforts to develop the integration policies in this period, the government 
commissioned several research reports (Penninx 2005) and also began to monitor 
the integration process and the effects of its integration policies (Bijl & Verweij 
2012: 245). Ever since then, in the formulation of the principles and goals of 
minorities policies, the government has made use of reports from various scientific 
institutions such as the above-mentioned WRR, the Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research (SCP) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS), which have all been 
commissioned by the government to study the process of integration at various 
times. 9  In this regard, the government has also commissioned researchers to 
monitor discrimination in the Netherlands. A prominent example is the Monitor 
racisme & extremisme, originally started by Jaap van Donselaar (see Donselaar 
1997; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010: 251). 
In 1987, the Dutch government requested WRR to evaluate the effects of the 
Ethnic Minorities Policy, and it presented its report in 1989 (WRR 1989). In this 
report, WRR concluded that the Ethnic Minority Policy had failed to make an 
adequate contribution towards improving the socio-economic position of 
immigrants, especially in the fields of education and employment. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, WRR went on to state that a focus on ethnic groups and an excess of 
government attention paid to the socio-cultural emancipation of immigrants could 
hinder their advancement in the fields of education and the labour market. WRR 
recommended that the government should take account of the differences between 
and within the immigrant groups, focus on socio-economic goals and leave the 
responsibility for the development of their cultural identity to the immigrant 
groups themselves (WRR 1989: 19-24). 
These recommendations were enshrined as principles in the Contourennota, a 
new policy document the government presented in 1994 (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken 1994). The government opted for what De Zwart and 
Poppelaars (2007) call ‘replacement’, in other words the focus on ethnic groups 
and socio-cultural emancipation in the old policies was replaced by a focus on such 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos (2012) and Huijnk & Dagevos (2012). For a study 
of this co-operation between researchers and policy makers see Penninx (2005). 
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socio-economic categories as groups considered to be socio-economically 
disadvantaged (Scholten & Timmermans 2004) and disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods.  
These changes were reinforced by a focus on civic integration, which has been 
discussed in Chapter 3. This involved individual immigrants being given training 
in Dutch language and courses about Dutch society in general and the functioning 
of the labour market in particular. Initially developed by local governments in the 
early 1990s, this civic integration policy was implemented nationally as the 
Newcomers Integration Act (Wet inburgering nieuwkomers) in 1998 (Bruquetas-
Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007). The courses were made 
mandatory for new immigrants and those with a temporary residence permit. 
The next shift in the integration policy occurred around the year 2000. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, several authors claimed, notwithstanding the fact that 
during the 1990s the socio-economic position of immigrants had improved 
substantially (Penninx 2005: 42, footnote 7; Ham & Van der Meer 2012: 14), that 
the integration of immigrants had failed.10 These authors not only warned that 
social cohesion was threatened because the norms and values of Muslim 
immigrants in particular appeared incompatible with Dutch culture. They also 
argued that immigrants’ and their descendants’ knowledge of Dutch society and 
language was inadequate, and this linguistic disadvantage impeded their 
integration. In 2001 the politician Pim Fortuyn married the ideas about the failure 
of integration and fears of the threat of Islam together in one political discourse. 
Weighing up the situation, Penninx argues that other political parties appropriated 
important parts of this discourse, and that this inevitably influenced integration 
policies (2005: 43). Integration and immigration became political priorities, 
especially after the elections of 2002, a shift which was reflected in the attention 
political parties devoted to the topic in their political programmes.11 
Under these circumstances, the Dutch Parliament decided that the best move 
would be to investigate the effects of the integration policies and a parliamentary 
research committee known as the Blok Commission (chaired by Stef Blok from the 
VVD, the right-wing liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) was 
established for this purpose. Despite the biased text of the parliamentary motion 
which led to this investigation, in which no bones were made about the effects of 
the policies being ‘unsatisfactory’ (Blok Commission 2004: 9), in its 2004 report 
the commission concluded that the integration of ‘many immigrants has been fully 
or at least partially successful’ (Blok Commission 2004: 105). This conclusion was 
                                                     
10 Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
11 See, for example, Verdeeld verleden, gedeelde toekomst by the political party PvdA (2009). 
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supported by statistics which showed immigrants’ progress in the fields of 
education and employment (cf. Gijsberts 2004: 38). Nevertheless, the Blok 
Commission was criticized for not focusing enough attention on the alleged 
problems caused by cultural and religious aspects of immigrant integration 
(Duyvendak & Scholten 2012: 277), and its conclusions were ‘widely dismissed as 
naïve’ (Bruquetas-Callejo, Garces-Mascarenas, Penninx & Scholten 2007: 20). 
These concerns about the socio-cultural aspects of immigrants’ integration 
were reflected in the Integration Policy New Style, formulated by the Dutch 
government in 2003. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the stated goal of this policy was 
to promote ‘common citizenship’, a process which sensibly included the pragmatic 
step of learning the Dutch language and also the rather less tangible goal of abiding 
by ‘basic Dutch norms’ (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004: 8). The text of the policy 
document quite clearly makes plain that the government linked the goal of 
integration to national identity and social cohesion. Persistent cultural and 
religious differences were considered a possible hindrance to social cohesion and 
therefore an obstacle to integration. Moreover, the national integration policies 
developed since 2003, focusing on Dutch language tests and courses about Dutch 
society,12 have increasingly served as instruments to regulate the admission of 
immigrants (Groenendijk 2011: 159; see also Chapter 3). 
One overriding problem with this focus on cultural and religious aspects as 
obstacles to integration is that it can lead to the disregarding of individual 
differences within immigrant and native groups, masking them and causing the 
other obstacles to integration, including societal and institutional factors, to be 
underestimated (see the previous section).13 Analysing Dutch policy debates about 
setting up a programme to promote the socio-economic integration of non-
Western immigrant women, Korteweg & Triadafilopoulos show that these debates 
                                                     
12 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the most recent law is the Wet inburgering (Law on Civic Integration) 
passed 2006, implemented in 2007. In 2012 this law was slightly amended. The law applies to 
immigrants from outside the European Union and a group of residents who do not have Dutch 
citizenship. These immigrants can only obtain a residence permit after passing an exam consisting of 
tests to assess language skills and knowledge of Dutch society. Applicants in the Netherlands have to 
contact the municipality which works in conjunction with Regional Educational Centres (ROCs) 
which are qualified to run courses and set the requisite exams. Individuals outside the EU who want 
to migrate to the Netherlands have to pass a similar civic integration test at the Dutch embassy or 
consulate abroad (the Wet inburgering buitenland or Law on Civic Integration Abroad). Since 2013, 
applicants have to pay for the courses and exams themselves. Depending on their circumstances, 
applicants can apply for a loan to pay the tuition fees. In some cases, those who commenced their 
courses before 2013 can have their fees paid by the municipality. (See “Integration in the 
Netherlands”, accessed July 25, 2013, http://en.inburgeren.nl.) 
13 However, the development of the policies and regulations to prevent and combat discrimination 
seem to be much less affected by this debate. See the next section. 
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‘framed the social problems of these women to effectively reduce a diverse range of 
ethnic minority women into a narrowly defined group of Muslim women’ (2013: 
109). In short, the complexity of the integration process with all its possible 
individual, societal and institutional barriers was reduced to a problem of religious 
and cultural practices. 
Around the same time as the introduction of the Integration Policy New Style, a 
discussion about residential segregation commenced in the city of Rotterdam. At 
its core was the problem of high concentrations of low-income residents as an 
obstacle to integration.14 The city launched a trial which meant that people with a 
minimum income were prevented from renting houses in designated 
neighbourhoods, a clear example of what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call 
replacement policies (see above). In 2005, the Equal Treatment Commission ruled 
that such a policy was discriminatory, as it affected people from certain ethnic 
backgrounds disproportionately (CGB 2005a). Despite this ruling, Rotterdam 
persevered with its policy and in 2005 the national government implemented a 
law, 15  widely known as the Rotterdam law (Rotterdamwet), which allows all 
municipalities to implement similar policies under specific conditions.16  
Despite this focus on replacement policies, Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) 
show that policy makers at the local level, who are confronted daily with a diversity 
of problems and structural barriers to integration, have continued to develop 
‘tailor-made projects’ and to involve immigrant organizations in this process, 
because the national approach expressed in general policies ‘often fails to 
substantiate’ and is simply not up to scratch for tackling the variety of problems 
and barriers met in reality (Poppelaars & Scholten 2008: 352).17  
The ongoing immigration debate and the widely voiced criticism of the idea of 
a multicultural society have been the two mainsprings in the continuous 
adjustment of principles and goals of integration policies developed by both the 
national and local governments. One recent adjustment can be found in the 
government policy document Integration, Belonging and Citizenship issued in 2011 
                                                     
14 Although segregation has been an important theme in Dutch housing policies for decades, until 
2000 not many policies had been devised to combat segregation (Van Kempen et al. 2000). 
15 The Wet bijzondere maatregelen grootstedelijke problematiek, of 22 December 2005. 
16 In a report published in 2007, SCP concluded that the effects of this law and similar policies on 
ethnic segregation in the Netherlands were either at worst unmapped or at the very most limited 
(Gijsberts & Dagevos 2007: 240-241). 
17 Many local initiatives have been focused on the social aspect of integration. In a report published in 
2007, SCP counted almost 400 projects whose goal was to stimulate social contact between natives 
and immigrants. Some of these projects aimed to bring people together through shared interests, the 
goal of others was to familiarize people with each other’s ethnic and cultural diversity (Gijsberts & 
Dagevos 2007: 252). 
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(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), which, unlike 
the Integration Policy New Style of 2003, explicitly criticizes the integration debate. 
In its 2011 policy document, the government argues that the debate has created 
the misconception that the integration of minorities has stagnated and stresses that 
progress is clearly indicated in the statistics.18 However, in this document the 
government does recognize that there are large differences between and within 
minority groups and that, although there are positive developments, problems still 
remain. The problems discussed in the document include the over-representation 
of immigrants and their descendants in the statistics on crime, school drop-outs 
and unemployment in these groups, their perceptions of discrimination, views in 
society about the incompatibility of norms and values and distrust between native 
Dutch and immigrants.  
Despite admitting the existence of these problems, the policy document stresses 
the principle that integration is not the responsibility of the government, but of the 
immigrants and their descendants themselves. The government also emphasizes 
that integration policies would no longer target specific groups, thereby reiterating 
the principles of the national integration policy introduced in 1994 (see above). 
Instead, the government has argued, the integration process will be encouraged by 
general policies in the fields of the labour market, education and housing. Any 
policy focus on specific ethnic groups was thought to be undesirable because it 
would, the government felt, emphasize the boundaries between groups, thereby 
creating unwanted separations between group members (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011). This last argument is typical of 
what De Zwart and Poppelaars (2007) call ‘replacement’ strategies, in which a 
focus on ethnic categories is replaced by a focus on such socio-economic issues as 
school drop-outs and unemployment in general. The most recent government 
policy document on integration issued in 2013 contains similar principles, and 
explicitly adds that education plays an important role not only in instilling norms 
and values in children but also in teaching them how to deal with diversity in 
society (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013).  
In a nutshell, the principal message conveyed by this section is that the role of 
the Dutch government in the process of immigrant integration has undergone 
pronounced changes during the last few decades. In the 1980s the government 
developed specific integration policies devised to target ethnic minorities, but since 
the 1990s the national government has steadily abrogated its position, adopting the 
stance that, apart from the civic integration courses designed for new immigrants, 
                                                     
18 A similar argument can be found in a 2004 report by SCP, in which it was argued that the picture 
of integration would be much more optimistic if the steady rise in the socio-economic position of 
ethnic minorities were to be taken into account (Gijsberts 2004: 38). 
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general policies would suffice. These changes have introduced a politicization of 
the integration debate which is specifically directed towards the cultural adaptation 
of Muslim immigrants. The section below examines views about immigrant 
integration prevalent in society.  
5.2.3 Views in society on immigrant integration 
The discussion in the previous section has brought to light several themes in the 
debate on immigrant integration which raise questions about the views prevalent in 
society about this topic. Since 2000, these debates have become more heavily 
focused on the degree of the retention of the immigrants’ home cultures as a 
perceived obstacle to integration. The government integration policies which 
targeted specific minority groups in the 1980s have been abandoned in favour of 
general policies to do with such issues as disadvantaged neighbourhoods and 
learning how to deal with diversity. Therefore, the investigation in this section will 
focus on views about the need for government policies on integration and views 
about the retention of their cultures by immigrants. However, as the most direct 
way in which native Dutch and immigrants are confronted with the integration 
process is their mutual social interaction, the frequency of, and views on, inter-
ethnic social relations will also be explored.  
5.2.3.1 Social contact and views on inter-ethnic relations  
The analysis shows that more than one-third (36%) of the native Dutch never have 
any social contact with immigrants or their descendants in their free time, that 
42% of them never interact socially with immigrants of non-Western origin and 
that 65% never interact socially with Muslims. A little more than half of the native 
Dutch who did report social contact with immigrants mentioned that they 
interacted with them frequently. The higher the educational level of respondents, 
the higher the frequency of their social contact with immigrants (β19 = .21, p < 
.001).20 Similar results were found by Huijnk and Dagevos (2012: 63). 
On the other hand, almost all the immigrants and their descendants in the 
sample indicate that they interact socially with natives in their free time. This 
finding differs from the results obtained by Huijnk and Dagevos, who reported 
that between 14% and 32% of the non-Western immigrants in their sample never 
interacted socially with native Dutch (2012: 53). Huijnk & Dagevos also found 
that the number of natives who never interacted socially with immigrants was 
                                                     
19 Unless otherwise stated, the βs mentioned in this study are standardized. 
20 Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income 
significantly predict the frequency of social contact. 
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higher than the number of immigrants who never interacted socially with natives. 
Considering the results presented by Huijnk and Dagevos (2012) and Gijsberts 
and Dagevos (2009: 228-231), the frequency of social interactions between 
immigrants and natives appears to have remained mostly stable since 1994. 
Views on inter-ethnic relations have been measured by other scholars as ‘social 
distance’ (Bogardus 1925; Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 47). To measure this social 
distance, the questionnaire included items to do with the acceptance of a Dutch 
person with another ethnic background as a neighbour, colleague, boss, future son-
in-law or future daughter-in-law, and an item about children with another ethnic 
background as the classmates of one’s own children. Later in this section, a distance 
scale will be constructed to explore relationships between these views and other 
personal variables but the first step is to discuss views about the inter-ethnic 
relations themselves. 
The percentages of native Dutch who either approve or disapprove of the types 
of inter-ethnic relations adduced are presented in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.121 
Approval and disapproval by native Dutch in percentages. 
Person with another ethnic background as Approved Disapproved Don’t know Total 
A classmate of own children 83 13 4 100 
A colleague 83 14 3 100 
A neighbour 75 21 4 100 
Own boss 70 26 4 100 
Daughter-in-law 54 39 7 100 
Son-in-law 51 41 8 100 
Note. n = 468 (sub-sample of native Dutch, see Chapter 2).
 
The conclusion has to be that the majority of the native Dutch approve of inter-
ethnic contact. In this context, expatiating on this they referred to equality, mutual 
respect and mutual understanding. A sample of some respondents’ quotes are ‘we 
are all humans and we are all equal’, ‘background does not matter, as long as there 
is mutual respect’ and ‘as long as they behave according to the law’. Talking about 
                                                     
21 The questionnaire contains 5 categories for these items, including ‘don’t know’. Three of those 
categories measured disapproval: ‘unpleasant’, ‘very unpleasant’ and ‘I would resist’. Most 
disapproving respondents scored in the first two categories. The three categories have been merged 
into the category ‘disapproved’ for presentation in this table. 
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mutual understanding, it was stated that inter-ethnic relationships are not a 
problem ‘as long as they speak Dutch’, and ‘as long as you understand each other’s 
habits’. 
However, as is clear from Table 5.1, views on inter-ethnic relations differ with 
respect to the intimacy of the relationship type presented. Natives are clearly less 
tolerant of having a future daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic 
background than of other inter-ethnic relations. Those who disapproved of inter-
ethnic relations mentioned the incompatibility of norms and values, and more 
specifically their fear of extremist Muslims. The percentages are similar to those 
discussed by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 264-266), and, given the development 
discussed by these authors, appear to indicate that the views of Dutch natives on 
inter-ethnic relations have become somewhat more positive in the last few years. 
Compared to the natives, immigrants and their descendants, of both Western 
and of non-Western origin, are much less negative about such inter-ethnic 
relations. Around 24, as opposed to around 40% of the natives (see Table 5.1 
above), disapprove of a future daughter- or son-in-law from another ethnic 
background. Less than 10% disapprove of the other inter-ethnic relations 
mentioned. 
In order to investigate the statistical relationships between views on inter-
ethnic relations and other variables, the items discussed above have been used to 
construct a social distance scale (cf. Bogardus 1925; Huijnk & Dagevos 2012: 47). 
For each respondent, this scale indicates the average degree of approval of the types 
of inter-ethnic relations presented.22 The scale varies from 1 to 3, where 1 indicates 
the smallest social distance, corresponding to most approval for inter-ethnic 
relations, and 3 indicates the largest social distance, indicating the most 
disapproval.23 As might be expected from what has just been said, the native Dutch 
indicate a larger average social distance with immigrants and their descendants, 
with a score of 1.34 (SD = 0.49) on the scale, than the reverse, with the 
immigrants and their descendants scoring an average of 1.16 (SD = 0.33). 
                                                     
22 The eigenvalues and scree-plot of a CATPCA analysis (see Chapter 2) of the items indicated that 
one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 59%, 
total VAF was 68.98%.  
23 As mentioned in the footnote of Table 5.1, each item originally contained 5 categories, including 
‘don’t know’. In the construction of the social distance scale, the category ‘don’t know’ has been 
coded as missing, and the two categories indicating most disapproval were merged. The score for each 
respondent on the social distance scale was established by calculating the means of all six items. 
Another way would have been to calculate factor scores from a factor analysis of these items. 
However, a comparison between these methods did not result in different outcomes for the analyses 
in this study. Cronbach’s Alpha of the items: .87. 
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To explore the relationships between social distance and such other variables as 
the frequency of social (inter-ethnic) contact, gender, age, educational level and 
political preference, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.24 
This analysis indicates that, among the native Dutch, social distance is related to 
social contact, educational level and political preference.25 This can be seen in the 
‘joint plot of category points’ below, in which the relationships between the 
categories are displayed. The strength of these relationships is indicated by the 
distance between the categories in the plot: : the smaller the distance, the stronger 
the relationship. 
As the ellipses in this plot indicate, three clusters of categories can be distinguished. 
In each cluster the categories are scattered around one of the social distance 
categories: ‘Large’, ‘Medium’ and ‘Minimal’. Obviously these categories are related 
to the social contact categories, respectively ‘Never’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘Often’.  
The respondents in the first cluster, on the left in the plot, can be characterized 
as intolerant of other ethnic groups. They indicate a large social distance, implying 
a relatively disapproving view of inter-ethnic relations, rarely or never have social 
contact with members of ethnic minorities, have a relatively low average 
educational level and many of them voted for the PVV (right-wing populist Party 
for Freedom). Not included in this cluster are the categories representing non-
voters and voters who support the SGP (ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed 
Political Party) and the SP (left-wing Socialist Party), because these categories are 
much closer to the other social distance categories (‘Medium’ and ‘Minimal’) than 
the category representing the PVV voters.  
The respondents in the second cluster, at the top in the plot, can be 
characterized as being moderately tolerant of other ethnic groups. They indicate a 
medium social distance, have moderate social contact with members of ethnic 
minorities and generally voted for the CDA (right-wing Christian Democratic 
Appeal) or the VVD. Their average educational level is medium to high. The 
category representing voters for the left-wing Green Left party is not included in 
this cluster, because this category is much closer to the social distance category 
‘Minimal’. 
Finally, respondents in the third cluster, lower and to the right in the plot, can 
be characterized as tolerant of other ethnic groups, as they seem to acknowledge 
diversity fully. They indicate a minimal social distance and have relatively frequent 
social contact with ethnic minority members, and voted for PvdA (left-wing 
                                                     
24 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA. 
25 No relationships between social distance and other factors was found for the immigrants and their 
descendants, clearly because most immigrants in our sample have a minimal social distance from 
native Dutch. 
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Labour Party) or D66 (left-wing liberal Democrats 66). Their average educational 
level is between medium and high. 
 
Figure 5.1: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of social distance and 
other factors for native Dutch (n=468). (Variable principal normalization.) 
 
This analysis reveals that, among native Dutch respondents, social distance is 
related to the frequency of their inter-ethnic social contact, educational level and 
political preference. These conclusions can also be drawn from Categorical 
Regression analyses.26 Those who had more frequent contact with ethnic minority 
                                                     
26 Categorical Regression analyses were used to test whether age, gender, educational level or income 
significantly predict social distance. 
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members indicated a smaller social distance, implying more positive views on inter-
ethnic relations (β = -.33, p < .001). This relationship between social contact and 
social distance is in line with Allport’s contact hypothesis which states that ‘under 
appropriate conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to 
reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members’ (1954). At the 
same time, the lower the educational level of native Dutch, the larger their social 
distance, implying relatively disapproving views of inter-ethnic relations (β = -.16, 
p < .01). Finally, a moderate relationship between social distance and political 
preference can be observed (β = .23, p < .005) for the native Dutch. Most voters on 
the left of the political spectrum (D66, PvdA, Green Left) indicate a lower social 
distance than those on the right (PVV, SGP). The voters for the parties on the 
right of the political spectrum (CDA and VVD) indicate a medium social distance, 
and voters for the SP are divided. 
5.2.3.2 Views on retention of immigrants’ cultures 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, ideas current in society on the 
question of the integration of immigrants will also be investigated by examining 
views on the retention of immigrants’ cultures. The reason for this is that since 
2000 the integration debates have been increasingly concerned with cultural 
retention by immigrants as a perceived obstacle to integration. To examine views 
on retention of immigrants’ cultures, the two questionnaires used in the present 
study included items on the desirability of immigrants’ cultural retention in the 
public and the private spheres. Later in this section, relationships between these 
views and other variables will be explored. First of all, the views on cultural 
retention themselves will be discussed. 
The analysis shows that around two-thirds of the native Dutch and immigrants 
of Western origin (69%), as opposed to a minority of the non-Western immigrants 
(23%) and an even smaller minority of the Muslim immigrants (9%), disapprove 
of immigrants’ cultural retention in the public sphere. These findings are similar to 
those found by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 262). Results presented by these 
authors indicate that the opposition to cultural retention in the public sphere has 
increased since the changes in the political and public debate on the multicultural 
society in 2000 (see section 5.2.2), from 57% of the total population (16 years of 
age and older) in 1994 to almost two-thirds in 2006. At the same time, the analysis 
indicates that less than a third of the natives and very small minorities of the other 
groups disapprove of cultural retention in the private sphere. 
Respondents who disapprove of cultural retention in the public sphere 
perceived some aspects of immigrants’ cultures either as outright obstacles to 
integration or as not compatible with Dutch culture. In explicating their ideas on 
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the former, both native Dutch and immigrants referred to a lack of language skills, 
the wearing of a burqa and discrimination as a consequence of not adapting 
sufficiently to Dutch culture. Objections to the burqa concentrated on the fact it is 
important to see someone’s face in order to be able to communicate. Explaining 
their ideas about discrimination, respondents said that they personally did not have 
any problem with immigrants’ cultures, but that immigrants, unfortunately, have 
to adapt to avoid discrimination in society. 
Turning to the perceived incompatibility of some aspects of immigrants’ 
cultures to Dutch culture, both natives and non-Muslim immigrants mentioned 
that certain aspects of Islamic culture, such as the burqa, the headscarf and 
mosques did not fit into Dutch society (see Chapter 6 for a more extensive 
discussion of the recognition of religious practices). Talking about this topic, some 
natives stressed the importance of maintaining the Christian identity of the 
Netherlands. Finally, some respondents of immigrant origin said that you simply 
have to adapt to local norms and values when you want to settle in a new society. 
Those who approve of cultural retention by immigrants were either indifferent 
and referred to the importance of respect for the law, mentioning that, ‘It’s OK as 
long as you play by the rules’, or were positive, and stressed the value of diversity 
because it ‘colours society’ and ‘you can learn from people with different cultures 
and ideas’.  
To explore relationships between views on cultural retention and such other 
variables as gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Categorical 
Regression analysis was carried out.27 The variables frequency of social inter-ethnic 
contact and social distance (see previous section) were included in this analysis. 
The analysis indicates that views on cultural retention are related to social distance, 
social contact, educational level and political preference. In these relationships, the 
higher the level of education and the smaller the social distance, the stronger the 
approval of immigrants’ cultural retention in the public sphere (β = .22, p <.001 
and β = -.40, p <.001 respectively). The frequency of social inter-ethnic contact 
was only slightly positively related to this approval (β = .14, p <.01). Similar 
relationships were found with regard to approval of immigrants’ cultural retention 
in the private sphere. These relationships might also be explained by the contact 
hypothesis. Less social distance and more social contact could lead to more tolerant 
views of cultural distinctiveness, although the direction of the causality could not 
be established in this study. 
                                                     
27 This analysis included the variables descent, age, gender, educational level, income, political 
preference, social contact and social distance. 
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Politically, those who approve of cultural retention in the public sphere 
generally voted for parties on the left of the political spectrum, PvdA, D66 and 
Green Left. Voters for the VVD, CDA, SP and the non-voters are divided on the 
issue, and voters for the PVV and SGP generally disapprove of cultural retention in 
the public sphere (β = .29, p <.001). The relationship between political preference 
and views on cultural retention in the private sphere is slightly different. Those 
who disapprove of this retention generally voted for the PVV and SGP, while those 
who approve, voted for other parties (β = .24, p <.001). 
5.2.3.3 Views on the need for national integration policies 
As pointed out in the previous section, national integration policies have 
undergone pronounced changes. The integration policies targeted at specific 
minority groups in the 1980s have been abandoned in favour of general policies 
devised to deal with such issues as disadvantaged neighbourhoods and helping 
people learn how to deal with diversity. Therefore, as mentioned at the beginning 
of this section, views current in society on the integration of immigrants will also 
be explored by examining what people think about the need for government 
policies to deal with this matter. 
To examine these views, the two questionnaires used for the present study 
included items on the need for national policies to ensure the proper functioning 
of the multicultural society. and they also contained items on the desirability of 
such specific policies as teaching pupils in schools to deal with diversity in society, 
the importance of which was stressed in the most recent government policy 
document on integration (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 
2013).28 Later in this section, relationships between these views and other factors 
will be explored. First of all, it is important to take a look at the views themselves. 
The great majority of all respondents (more than 84%) consider ethnic and 
cultural diversity important and support the idea that pupils should learn how to 
deal with cultural diversity in society in school. Proponents explained that this sort 
of education is an important way to prevent the growth of prejudice and 
discrimination against various groups. One respondent said that, ‘To prevent 
conflict later, it is important to encourage tolerance in children’. Another said that, 
‘You have to begin early, because it is difficult to unlearn prejudice later in life’. In 
a similar vein, one respondent argued that, ‘Children still have few prejudices, and 
you have to help them to keep it that way’. 
                                                     
28 Note, however, that the questionnaires for the present study were developed before this policy 
document was published. 
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Opponents of diversity education are either those who hold the opinion that 
education about how to deal with diversity does not work or those who believe that 
schools should not interfere in these matters. Supporters of the former opinion 
argued that it is more important that both the government and educational 
institutions promote cultural heterogeneity and combat segregation in 
neighbourhoods and schools, because children will only be able to learn how to 
deal with diversity in a culturally diverse environment.29 Whereas one argument 
put forward to support the second opinion was that children should be allowed to 
form their own ideas about how to deal with diversity. ‘If children do not want to 
accept certain others, that’s is up to them’, one respondent said. 
Turning to the need for national policies to be put in place if a multicultural 
society is to function properly, more than two-thirds of all respondents are of the 
opinion that such policies should be developed.30 Their arguments hinge on 
removing obstacles to integration, promoting tolerance of cultural diversity, 
preventing a baleful influence of Islam and preventing the abuse of welfare 
subsidies. When thinking about how to deal with obstacles to integration, 
respondents mentioned that the government should take the initiative to create the 
essential preconditions for it and remove barriers to participation, for example, by 
providing courses on Dutch language and culture. Besides envisaging this role for 
the government, it was also suggested that an anti-discrimination policy be devised 
as discrimination is considered to be a real obstacle to participation. Talking about 
stimulating tolerance of cultural diversity, respondents, especially those with a 
Muslim background, mentioned that, if a better mutual understanding is to take 
root, Dutch citizens need to acquire more knowledge about the cultural and 
religious norms and values of various immigrant groups. Another take on this issue 
was provided by some non-Muslim respondents who argued that the government 
has to formulate measures to avoid ‘the Islamization’ of society and by so doing 
anticipate the problems this putative process might create. Finally, proponents of 
government policies stated that proper measures have to be taken to prevent 
immigrants and their descendants abusing welfare subsidies.  
Interestingly, in response to the general issue of policies which would facilitate 
the proper functioning of the multicultural society, for which no specific directions 
were suggested, not one person mentioned that policies should be implemented to 
reduce the substantive disadvantages experienced by (certain) minorities in the 
labour market.  
                                                     
29 This opinion has been substantiated by research conducted by Geel & Vedder (2011). 
30 This opinion was shared by 69% of native Dutch, 72% of immigrants of non-Western origin and 
81% of immigrants of Western origin. 
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The small number of respondents who oppose national policies to facilitate the 
proper functioning of the multicultural society (around 10% of all groups31) 
expressed the opinion that these sort of policies can lead to unequal treatment. 
These respondents clearly interpreted ‘Policies for the proper functioning of the 
multicultural society’ to be those targeted at specific groups. Whereas some of the 
opponents did not explicitly mention discrimination, stating instead that the 
government should not implement policies targeted at specific groups, others said 
that they felt discriminated against by such policies. As one respondent said: ‘The 
government is already doing too much for immigrants, they are neglecting and 
discriminating against the real Dutch’. 
To explore the statistical relationships between these views and such other 
variables as social distance and political preference, a Categorical Regression 
analysis was carried out.32 This analysis shows that the lower a respondent’s social 
distance to other frequent groups, the stronger their support for policies to 
encourage the functioning of the multicultural society and educating pupils in 
schools how to deal with specifically with ethnic and cultural diversity (β = .32, p 
<.001 and β = .35, p <.001 respectively). Examining their political preference, most 
opponents of national policies to encourage the proper functioning of the 
multicultural society are among those who voted for the VVD (19% opposed), the 
PVV (15%) or were among the non-voters (13%). Among those who voted for 
other parties, the percentage of opponents of these policies is much lower (around 
6%). As explained above, opponents of such policies objected to the fact that the 
policies are targeted at specific groups. Nevertheless, it might seem surprising that 
the percentage of PVV voters who oppose such policies is only 15%. However, 
PVV voters figured largely among the proponents of the view that national policies 
should be developed to oblige immigrants to learn the Dutch language, norms and 
values, and should also be extended to prevent ‘Islamization’ and the abuse of 
welfare subsidies.  
The analysis in this and the previous section show that discrimination is 
considered an obstacle to the participation of immigrants and their descendants, 
and that it is also an unwanted side-effect of integration policies. The latter 
argument will be discussed in more detail in the section on positive action (5.4). In 
the next section, views on discrimination and policies to combat and prevent this 
social phenomenon will be explored. 
                                                     
31 Around 20% of the respondents did not have an opinion on this issue, more than two-thirds 
supported such policies, as explained above. 
32 This analysis included the variables descent, age, gender, educational level, income, political 
preference, social contact and social distance. 
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5.3 Prejudice and discrimination 
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, discrimination implies differential 
treatment and is therefore the opposite of equal treatment. Basically it limits the 
opportunities open to individuals and groups. Discrimination of individuals or 
groups can be motivated by prejudice (Bodenhausen & Richeson 2010; Fiske 
2002), which has been defined by Allport as ‘an antipathy based on a faulty and 
inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a 
group as a whole or toward an individual because he is a group member’ (1954: 9). 
In response to the debates about immigrant integration ever since the 1980s, 
policies and regulations have been developed in the Netherlands for the specific 
purpose of preventing and combating prejudice, racism and discrimination, the 
sought-after goals being both the formal equality and the equality of opportunity 
for citizens of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. It is important to stress 
that, whereas discrimination and prejudice refer to behaviour and attitudes 
respectively, the concept of racism relates to an ideology which can be used to 
justify existing inequality (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003: 319), hierarchical classification of 
groups and discrimination on the basis of racial, ethnic or cultural criteria. 
Statements such as ‘minorities should leave the country, because the Netherlands is 
full’ and ‘keep the Netherlands white and clean’ are expressions of racist views 
(Shadid 2007: 210). 
As part of the exploration of whether and how aspects of equality are formally 
and publicly recognized and accepted in the Netherlands, in this section Dutch 
measures to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination will be discussed and 
the views about these topics prevalent in society will be examined. Before 
commencing this operation, it is necessary to shed some light on the scientific use 
of the concept of discrimination, and a brief discussion of the main results of the 
current scientific research will be presented. 
5.3.1 Perspectives on prejudice and discrimination 
Discrimination has been extensively studied in a wide range of scientific 
disciplines, including social psychology, social and cultural anthropology, law, 
economics and medical sciences (e.g. Bodenhausen & Richeson 2010; Crengle, 
Robinson, Ameratunga, Clark & Raphael 2012; Havinga 2002; Loenen & 
Rodrigues 1999; Pager & Shepherd 2008; Visweswaran 1998). Research has also 
been instigated by or on behalf of policy makers and organizations for human 
rights at both national and international levels (e.g. Human Rights Watch 2008; 
McCrudden & Prechal 2009; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010). In these studies, the 
concept of discrimination is used first and foremost to refer to behaviour, actions, 
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policies and structures which in a specific context might result in a relative 
disadvantage for members of groups whose group characteristics are irrelevant in 
that context. Examples of this are when public education benefits men more than 
women, women are discriminated against when gender is considered to be 
irrelevant to this differential treatment. Conversely, when a dark-skinned actor is 
preferred to a light-skinned actor to play the role of Nelson Mandela in a film, this 
is usually not considered discrimination because skin colour is relevant in this 
context. 
It is important to take cognizance of the fact that discrimination is used as a 
legal and as an empirical concept. In a juridical sense, discrimination can be 
defined as a prohibited form of unequal treatment that results or can result in 
disadvantage for the discriminated groups (cf. Terlouw 2010: 8-10). Legal 
discussions focus on which forms of unequal treatment are or should be prohibited. 
Depending on international and national legislation, exceptions can be made to the 
principle of equal treatment. Examples are the above-mentioned selection 
procedure for the role of Nelson Mandela, the prohibition of certain religious 
manifestations in institutions for denominational education in the Netherlands 
(discussed in Chapter 6, also see Section 5.3.2), and positive action (see Section 
5.4).33 In contrast, studies in which discrimination is used as an empirical concept 
generally focus on its effects and its causes, and also include the role of prejudice 
and racism (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Pager & Shepherd 2008). 
A useful definition of discrimination is that in the Dutch Penal Code. This 
definition stipulates that discrimination ‘is to be taken to mean any form of 
differentiation, any act of exclusion, restriction or preference, that intends or may 
result in the destruction or infringement of the recognition, enjoyment or equal 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the field of politics or 
economics, in social or cultural matters or any other area of social life’.34 This 
definition is useful because it focuses on behaviour which might result in 
inequality, but does not presume underlying causes for this behaviour (cf. Pager & 
Shepherd 2008: 182).  
Therefore, this definition covers intentional, unintentional, conscious and 
unconscious forms of discrimination. As it so happens, direct and indirect 
discrimination are distinguished in both empirical studies and anti-discrimination 
legislation of various countries including the Netherlands (cf. McCrudden & 
                                                     
33 There are also other possible exceptions. For an overview of exceptions in the Netherlands, see 
Gelijkebehandelingswetgeving (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, 
http://www.mensenrechten.nl/gelijkebehandelingswetgeving. 
34 Article 90quater, Dutch Penal Code. Translation of the provisions of the Dutch Penal Code by 
Rayar & Wadsworth (1997). 
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Prechal 2009). Direct discrimination refers to acts or policies with the apparent 
intent to exclude members of specific groups, whereas indirect discrimination can 
be both intentional and unintentional, and refers to acts, policies or structures 
which are not directly aimed at specific groups but nevertheless result in 
disadvantages for members of specific groups.35 For example, the practice of 
recruiting new employees by an organization primarily through informal social 
networks, also known as nepotism, is a form of indirect discrimination when 
immigrants and their descendants do not have equal access to these networks 
(Nilsson & Wrench 2009: 38). Nepotism in this example is also referred to as 
institutional discrimination. Institutional discrimination, sometimes called 
structural discrimination,36 can be direct as well as indirect, and refers to acts, 
policies, ideologies or structures of institutions which disadvantage specific groups 
(Bovenkerk 1986: 36, 53-54; also see Pager & Shepherd 2008; Shadid 2007: 309-
310). 
Empirical studies on discrimination and inequality indicate that discrimination 
is not a social phenomenon which can be consigned to the past. Discrimination is 
prevalent and persistent, even in such countries as the United States (cf. Bobo & 
Fox 2003: 323; Pager & Shepherd 2008) and the Netherlands (cf. Andriessen, 
Nievers & Dagevos 2012; Havinga 2002; Rodrigues & Donselaar 2010) where 
there is strong support for the principle of formal equality. In a concise overview, 
Bobo and Fox (2003: 323) address the causes for the prevalence and persistence of 
discrimination (also see Pager & Shepherd 2008: 186-200) and the reluctance of 
members of majority groups to support certain measures, such as positive action 
which could pave the way for equality. They distinguish three sets of theories 
which address these issues.  
The first set of theories is based on social psychological research which 
indicates that discriminatory behaviour is not confined to individuals with an 
explicit racist ideology. These studies suggest that unequal treatment in general is 
an inevitable consequence of negative stereotypes, prejudice or social 
categorization. As explained in more detail in Chapter 3, there is convincing 
evidence that all people categorize themselves and others into social categories and 
ascribe general characteristics to these categories. A negative consequence of this 
process is that people tend to overestimate the differences between social categories 
and, simultaneously, underestimate the differences between individuals within 
                                                     
35 The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination should not be confused with the 
distinction between conscious and unconscious discrimination. Both direct and indirect 
discrimination can be conscious or unconscious. Intentions and aims can be unconscious and the act 
of direct discrimination can result from unconscious prejudices (Wax 2008). 
36 See Pager & Shepherd (2008: 197) for a discussion. 
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their own social category, or, to use a social psychological term, their in-group. 
This leads to bias which implies, ‘reacting to a person on the basis of perceived 
membership in a single human category, ignoring other category memberships and 
other personal attributes’ and can be described as, ‘a narrow, potentially erroneous 
reaction, compared with individuated impressions formed from personal details’ 
(Fiske 2002: 123). Biases underlie stereotypes, prejudice, ethnocentrism (cf. Shadid 
2007: 209), discrimination and unequal treatment in general. 
The second set of theories distinguished by Bobo and Fox explains 
discrimination as a consequence of ‘competing group interests’ (2003: 323). These 
theories postulate that bias originates when people perceive a threat to their in-
group. This threat might be thought to be to ‘real or symbolic resources and 
privileges’ (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323). It can emerge when in the perception of 
natives their jobs are being taken by immigrants, or that traditional values are 
threatened (Fiske 2002: 127). Moreover, dominant groups among whose members 
these biases originate, ‘develop and propagate ideologies that maintain and even 
legitimize their higher social status’ (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323), such as racism and 
sexism.  
The third set of theories discussed by Bobo and Fox explains opposition to 
equality policies among members of majority groups as being rooted in ‘race-
neutral values and ideologies such as fairness or individualism’ (2003: 323). An 
example is the rejection of positive action measures on the basis of the argument 
that such measures constitute reverse discrimination. Bobo and Fox argue that such 
arguments can indeed play a role, but point out that many studies show that 
opposition to equality policies is usually linked to stereotypes and prejudice. 
Moreover, it appears to be difficult to reduce prejudice and stereotyping. 
Bodenhausen and Richeson postulate that adopting the perspective of a member of 
a disadvantaged group seems to be the best way to reduce bias (2010: 357). The 
stumbling block to any such move is that, in a real, functioning society, this 
requires constructive intergroup contact, which, Fiske (2002: 127) states must 
feature ‘equal status within the immediate setting’ and co-operation in the pursuit 
of shared goals. As a consequence, inequalities between groups limit such 
constructive intergroup contacts and, as research by Brezina and Winder (2003) 
shows, can even reinforce the negative stereotypes of the group with the lower 
socio-economic status. In turn, these negative stereotypes can partly explain 
opposition to equality policies, even among ‘egalitarian-minded’ majority members 
(Brezina & Winder 2003: 407). 
Related causes for the prevalence and persistence of discrimination are the 
accumulation of its effects (Pager & Shepherd 2008: 199), and the fact that it is 
maintained by ‘feedback effects’ between social domains (Reskin 2012: 31). This 
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means that a disadvantage in one social domain, for example, the level of prosperity 
of the neighbourhood one lives in, leads to relative disadvantages in other domains, 
such as education, which in its turn leads to a lower level of income. As an 
example, Pager and Shepherd discuss how a disproportionately high number of 
minority students in the United States attend public schools in ‘high poverty 
neighbourhoods’. Compared to schools in richer neighbourhoods, these schools 
have fewer resources, provide a lower quality of education and have to deal with 
more social problems, the upshot being the greater the disadvantages confronting 
the minority students, a clear example of institutional discrimination (2008: 198). 
Relative disadvantages as a result of discrimination can also accumulate because, as 
explained above, negative stereotypes of a certain group can be reinforced by this 
group’s lower socio-economic status. For example, the relatively high 
unemployment rates in a specific group can lead to the stereotype that it members 
are unwilling to work. Discrimination occurs when, on the basis of this stereotype, 
an employer refrains from employing members of this group – a phenomenon 
which is called statistical discrimination. This implies a self-fulfilling prophecy and 
an accumulation of disadvantage. 
Although these theories explain discrimination and opposition to the 
implementation of equality policies in different ways, empirical research underlying 
these theories has definitely shown that prejudice plays an important role, and that 
discrimination is prevalent and persistent, partly because of its cumulative effects. 
In the next section, Dutch national policies and regulations to prevent and combat 
prejudice and discrimination will be reviewed. 
5.3.2 Prejudice and discrimination in the Netherlands: policies and debates 
In the past few decades, policies and regulations have been developed in the 
Netherlands to prevent and combat prejudice and discrimination on various 
grounds, such as gender, ethnic origin and disability. In this section, the 
development of and debates on the desirability and effectiveness of relevant 
measures regarding ethnic minorities will be discussed. 
In 1971, the Dutch Penal Code was adapted to include specific provisions 
against racial discrimination.37 These changes followed Dutch acceptance of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), a United Nations convention which came into force in 
1969 (Rodrigues 1997). The next significant changes in the Dutch anti-
discrimination legislation to do with ethnic minorities occurred in the 1980s when 
the Constitution was amended in 1983 to include the prohibition of 
                                                     
37 Where the concept of race refers to skin colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin (Neut 1986). 
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discrimination in Article 1, which since then reads: ‘All persons in the Netherlands 
shall be treated equally in equal circumstances. Discrimination on the grounds of 
religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever 
shall not be permitted.’38 The principles laid down in this article were elaborated in 
more detail in the Equal Treatment Act (ETA) 39  of 1994, which explicitly 
prohibits both direct and indirect forms of discrimination.40 This act also provided 
for the establishment of the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC), an independent 
semi-judiciary body tasked with, inter alia, investigating complaints about 
discrimination and handing down opinions on individual cases (Goldschmidt & 
Gonçalves-Ho Kang You 1997).41  
Notwithstanding these legal developments, national and local governments and 
organizations in various sectors have recognized that legislation on its own is not 
enough to prevent and combat discrimination.42 Therefore, since 1987 codes of 
conduct in organizations have been established in various sectors, including 
employment agencies, the insurance sector, labour unions and the national 
government.43 The goal of these codes goes beyond providing clear social norms 
and well-defined complaint procedures, they have also been devised to raise 
awareness of and support for anti-discrimination measures. Furthermore, since the 
late 1990s the government has commissioned various researchers, anti-
discrimination organizations and scientific institutes to monitor discrimination in 
the Netherlands. A prominent example is the Monitor racisme & extremisme, 
originally started by Jaap van Donselaar (see Donselaar 1997; Rodrigues & 
Donselaar 2010: 251).44 Additionally, in the context of the World Conference 
Against Racism (WCAR), held in 2001, the Dutch government developed a 
National Action Plan against Racism, which includes initiatives undertaken by the 
national government itself, as well as municipalities, NGOs and schools.45 These 
initiatives consist of awareness campaigns, and plans to improve the national 
monitoring of discrimination and the functioning of local anti-discrimination 
                                                     
38 For the text of the Dutch Constitution see Nederlandse Grondwet (in Dutch), accessed January 18, 
2013, www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl. 
39 In Dutch: Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling (AWGB). 
40 The ETA explicitly prohibits discrimination in the fields of employment, education, the supply of 
goods and services, including healthcare and housing. 
41 ETC was incorporated into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) in 2012. 
42 See, for example, Blok Commission (2004: 233-239). 
43 See, for example, Algemene Bond Uitzendbureaus (1987) and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties (2001). 
44 See also Boog, Dinsbach, Donselaar & Rodrigues (2010). 
45 Nationaal Actieplan tegen Racisme (Tweede Kamer 2003-2004b; Final report: Tweede Kamer 2006-
2007). 
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bureaus which handle individual questions and complaints.46 In 2010, the Law 
Municipal Anti-discrimination Facilities came into force. This law requires 
municipalities to provide their residents with access to a local complaints office.47 
These policies and regulations have been developed with the backing of wide 
political support (Blok Commission 2004: 39, 234; cf. Pellikaan, Van der Meer & 
De Lange 2003). Only a few populist politicians, such as Fortuyn (also see Section 
5.2.2) and the PVV leader Wilders, have advocated the abolition of Article 1 of the 
Constitution, because, they have argued, it limits freedom of speech. More 
specifically, their bone of contention is that the principle of equal treatment 
prevents them from criticizing Islam.48, 49 
On account of the extent of the policies and regulations it has developed, the 
Netherlands has been called ‘Europe’s champion of anti-discrimination policy’ 
(Joppke 2007: 260). Nevertheless, the Netherlands has been criticized, among 
other bodies by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
(see ECRI 2008) which object to proposed government policies and discriminatory 
statements by politicians. The political parties PVV and SGP, for example, have 
called for a ban on the construction of mosques,50 and in the context of the 
discussion about civic integration the government has proposed such 
discriminatory measures as the mandatory civic integration courses for immigrants 
who had already acquired Dutch citizenship (Groenendijk 2011: 164-165). 
Criticism has also been expressed about the ineffectiveness of the existing anti-
discrimination legislation, as research indicates that discrimination and inequality 
in the Netherlands are persistent. The unemployment rates of non-Western 
                                                     
46 These bureaus have been established since the 1980s, see Rodrigues (1997). 
47  The Law Municipal Anti-discrimination Facilities (Wet Gemeentelijke Antidiscriminatie-
voorzieningen - WGA), implemented on January 28, 2010. 
48 De Volkskrant (February 9, 2002), De islam is een achterlijke cultuur. Interview met Pim Fortuyn; 
De Volkskrant (March 21, 2006), Wilders wil artikel 1 uit Grondwet schrappen. 
49 Another criticism regarding the contents of the anti-discrimination legislation concerns the legal 
exception to the principle of equal treatment for institutions for denominational education, on the 
basis of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution which guarantees freedom of education. This exception 
allows these institutions, in their application and admission procedures, to demand from teachers and 
pupils that they support the ideological or religious principles of the institution. Some critics point 
out that this makes the exclusion of homosexual teachers from these schools possible, which they find 
unacceptable. Others argue that Article 23 leads to educational segregation, which, according to 
them, hinders integration (also see Chapter 6). An overview (in Dutch) of these discussions can be 
found at Vrijheid van Onderwijs (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, 
http://www.vrijheidvanonderwijs.nl. 
50 See Shadid (2009: 14) for several references. 
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immigrants and their descendants remain disproportionately high,51 which can at 
least partly be attributed to discrimination (Andriessen, Nievers & Dagevos 2012; 
Gijsberts, Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). This suggests that the effects of the anti-
discrimination legislation might be limited. Havinga (2002) argues that this is 
indeed the case. One reason for this ineffectiveness, Havinga says, is the limited 
knowledge of the law in society. In their ignorance, people do not know whether 
their own behaviour, for example in the context of selection procedures, 
contravenes the law. As has already been said, this lack of awareness could be partly 
remedied by the implementation of codes of conduct. However, research indicates 
that only a few organizations have implemented these codes of conduct, and often 
only partially.52 In 2008, ECRI recommended the Dutch government improve the 
implementation of these codes of conduct, and also consider making human rights, 
including anti-discrimination, a compulsory subject in the curricula of primary and 
secondary schools (ECRI 2008). 
Another reason for the ineffectualness of the anti-discrimination legislation is 
sought in the fact that the enforcement of this legislation depends principally on 
the individuals who feel discriminated against. If the regulations are to be effective, 
these individuals have to take action, for example, by lodging a complaint. 
Havinga, referring to Macaulay (1979) and Griffiths (1999), calls this the 
‘individual rights strategy’ (2002: 82; also see Crosby & Ropp 2002). One problem 
with this strategy is that victims of discrimination are sometimes reluctant to step 
forward and lodge a complaint for fear of escalation or retaliation (Bochhah 2006; 
Sechrist, Swim & Stangor 2004). Research also shows that some individuals do not 
recognize or do not want to admit that they are being discriminated against 
(Crosby, Iyer, Clayton & Downing 2003), or, instead of lodging a complaint, they 
adapt their behaviour to avoid further discrimination (Nievers 2007). 
Some of these causes have been addressed by the Racial Equality Directive 
issued by the European Union (EU) which came into force in 2000.53 In 2004, the 
Dutch Equal Treatment Act was amended to implement this directive. These 
changes allowed the sharing of the burden of proof: provided that the plaintiff has 
established facts supporting the presumption of discrimination, a judge can decide 
to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Moreover, the changes include better 
                                                     
51 For example, in February 2014 the employment rates of non-Western immigrants and their 
descendants was 18.6%, as opposed to 6.7% among native Dutch. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 
2014, http://statline.cbs.nl. 
52 See Bochhah (2002); Masselman (1998); Meloen (1991). 
53  EU Council Directive 2000/43/EC, accessed August 9, 2013, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l
33114_en.htm. 
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protection for those who lodge a discrimination complaint, entailing the 
stipulation that the defendant is explicitly prohibited to victimize the plaintiff.54 In 
another move, since 2009 organizations are required by law to implement such 
policies as complaints procedures, to protect their employees from discrimination.55 
Another, more general limitation of the individual rights strategy is that it only 
indirectly addresses institutional discrimination. For individuals it can be difficult, 
or indeed impossible, to detect institutional discrimination, for example, during a 
job selection procedure (Boog, Coenders & Kik 2007). A ruling in an individual 
case can lead to a change in institutional practices, but these practices are not often 
directly scrutinized or legally challenged (Boog & Houtzager 2007; cf. Böcker & 
Havinga 2000). To address this problem, in 2006 and 2007, the municipality of 
Nijmegen experimented with anonymous job applications, on the premise that this 
would reduce the number of rejections on the basis of ethnic background in the 
phase prior to face-to-face job interviews. Although it was impossible to establish 
whether these experiments had any effect, it was assumed that they did lead to an 
increased awareness of possible discrimination in selection procedures (Gemeente 
Nijmegen 2008). Another way to address these limitations of the individual rights 
strategy is the legal possibility for advocacy groups to file a complaint in the 
interest of others or in a collective interest such as upholding the non-
discrimination principle. Advocacy groups in the Netherlands make use of this 
instrument, but on a relatively small scale (for an extensive discussion see 
Rodrigues 2011). 
Finally, the effects of the current anti-discrimination legislation are limited by 
the stumbling block that inequality itself can cause and maintain discrimination. 
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the lower socio-economic status of a certain group 
can reinforce negative stereotypes of this group, which, in turn, can lead to 
discrimination of its members. 
To address this effect of inequality and the problem of institutional 
discrimination, ECRI recommended the government to implement wider measures 
for positive action (2008; 2012). ECRI also recommended the maximum penalties 
in the Penal Code provisions against racial discrimination should be increased, 
racist motivations for an offence as an aggravating circumstance in sentencing be 
established and to disqualify employers who are found guilty of discrimination 
from tendering public contracts (ECRI 2008). Among the political parties in the 
                                                     
54 CGB (2005b). 
55  See “Discriminatie onderdeel Arbowet” (in Dutch), accessed August 10, 2013, 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/nieuws/2009/07/06/discriminatie-onderdeel-arbowet.html. 
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Netherlands, only the SP and Green Left called for similar measures in their 2012 
programmes.56  
In its most recent policy documents on discrimination, the Dutch government 
has recognized the persistence of discrimination and how important it is that the 
authorities, organizations and citizens in a concerted effort continue to be 
permanently involved in the struggle to prevent and combat discrimination 
(Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012; Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2013). Furthermore, the limitations of 
the individual rights strategy have been implicitly recognized, by stressing the 
importance of the reporting of discrimination by victims. Various measures, 
including those to raise awareness, were announced to encourage the willingness of 
victims to lodge a complaint. However, in these policy documents the government 
has still failed to address the problem caused by the fact that the individual rights 
strategy is also limited by institutional discrimination and by inequality itself. 
This discussion clearly shows that, although the Netherlands is praised for its 
anti-discrimination measures, discrimination and inequality are persistent in Dutch 
society and the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination legislation is limited. In the 
next section, in order to investigate the public recognition of equality in the 
Netherlands, prejudice and support for anti-discrimination policies in society will 
be examined. 
5.3.3 Prejudice and views on anti-discrimination policy in society 
The discussion in Section 5.3.1 has brought to light the fact that even when a 
person supports the principle of formal equality, this does not have to imply that 
he or she also supports anti-discrimination policies in general. This phenomenon 
has been explained by three sets of theories (Bobo & Fox 2003), which postulate 
that opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be motivated either by race-
neutral values or by an existing bias towards other groups, directly influenced by 
social categorization or perception of group threat. Furthermore, Section 5.3.2 has 
revealed that the effects of the current anti-discrimination policies in the 
Netherlands appear to be limited. In this section, perceptions of group threat, the 
support for equal treatment and views on anti-discrimination policies in Dutch 
society will be explored. 
To measure the support for the principle of equal treatment, the questionnaires 
included items on the desirability of teaching pupils in schools to treat people of 
various cultural backgrounds equally. A large majority (around 90%) of both 
Dutch natives and immigrants and their descendants is in favour of such 
                                                     
56 GroenLinks (2012); Socialistische Partij (2012). 
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education. Proponents argued that this is important because the older a person the 
more difficult it is to combat prejudice. Although opponents of this sort of 
education supported the principle of equal treatment, they thought that children 
should learn this principle at home and not at school. 
Those who do not support this principle appear to have a specific view on who 
can be fully included in their national group: they attach more importance to the 
in exclusive (ethnic) criteria of Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch 
ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background (β = -.22, p < .001) 
discussed in Chapter 3.57 The support for the principle of equal treatment also 
appears to be negatively related to educational level (β = -.14, p < .005). 
Furthermore, voters for the PVV and SGP are slightly less in favour of the equal 
treatment principle (β = .12, p < .001). 
Nevertheless, as said, this strong support for equal treatment does not imply 
that respondents are not prejudiced towards other groups. More than a third 
(37%) of the native Dutch thinks that there are too many immigrants and their 
descendants living in the Netherlands, but a much lower 24% explicitly disagrees 
with this point of view. Among immigrants and their descendants of both Western 
and non-Western origin, 18% holds the opinion that there are too many 
immigrants living in the Netherlands. More than 40% do not support this view. 
These findings are similar to those presented by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 
259). According to these authors, the percentage of the Dutch population (16 years 
of age and older) that is of the opinion that there are too many immigrants living 
in the Netherlands has decreased, from around 50% in the 1990s and 53% in 
2002 to 39% in 2008. 
Both natives and immigrants who are of the opinion that there are too many 
immigrants in the Netherlands adduced the argument that immigration generates 
such problems as segregation and a rise in the crime rate, as well as causing the 
country unacceptable economic costs. One respondent said, ‘They profit from 
social security benefits and the healthcare system, and we pay for it. The 
Netherlands is too small.’ On the other side of the fence, those who did not think 
there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands either argued that there is no 
problem as long as they participated and ‘respect the rule of law’, or else put 
forward the idea that the Netherlands is historically an immigration country. As 
                                                     
57 A Categorical Regression analysis was used to test whether age, gender, educational level, income or 
political preference significantly predict the support for the equal treatment principle. Categorical 
Regression analyses were also carried out to test whether this principle is related to the in Chapter 3 
discussed types of national belonging. The latter analyses were controlled for descent, age, gender, 
educational level and income. 
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one respondent said, responding to the question of whether there are too many 
immigrants, ‘Since when? Since the year 1500?’ 
These sorts of opinions are related to perceptions of group threat (see threat 
theory of discrimination in Section 5.3.1). This means that those who think there 
are too many immigrants agree with the opinion that immigrants take the jobs of 
the native Dutch (V = .56, p < .001). In this respect, however, the native Dutch are 
more concerned about labour migrants from Eastern Europe (55%) than about 
immigrants with Dutch nationality (36%). The perception of too many 
immigrants in the Netherlands is also related to the opinion that they present a 
threat to Dutch culture (V = .42, p < .001). Of the native Dutch, 44% feel that 
their culture is under threat. They were concerned that the immigrants’ norms, 
especially those associated with Islam, and values might become too influential. ‘It 
feels threatening, the way Muslims deal with women’, one respondent said. A 
similar percentage (40%) was found in 2008 by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259-
260). These authors found that this percentage is on the rise, from 18% in 1995 to 
40% in 2008, with the strongest increase taking place in the period 2000-2005, 
when the political and public debate on the multicultural society peaked (see 
Section 5.2.2 and Chapter 6). 
On the other hand, the native Dutch who do not feel that their culture is 
threatened (43%) referred to the Netherlands as an immigration country (also see 
above) and to the contribution of immigrants to Dutch culture, which ‘has always 
been largely shaped by immigrants’, as one respondent said. 
To explore whether such prejudice is related to such other variables as gender, 
age, educational level, political preference, the frequency of social (inter-ethnic) 
contact, and social distance (see Section 5.2.3), a Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis (MCA) was carried out.58 This analysis included 6 items indicating such 
prejudice, including the items discussed above. The relationships can be seen in the 
following ‘joint plot of category points’ in which the relationships between 
categories are displayed. The closer the categories are to each other, the stronger 
their relationship. 
                                                     
58 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA. 
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Figure 5.2: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of prejudice and other 
factors. All respondents (n=710). (Variable principal normalization.) 
 
The ellipses in this plot indicate that three clusters can be distinguished. The 
categories in each cluster are scattered around the categories of the variables 
indicating prejudice: ‘Agree’, ‘Impoverishment’ and ‘Negative effect’, meaning that 
respondents were prejudiced, ‘Disagree’, ‘Enrichment’ and ‘Positive effect’, 
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meaning that they rejected prejudice, and ‘Undecided’, ‘Neither’ and ‘No effect’ 
meaning that they neither agreed nor disagreed with prejudice. As the six items 
measuring prejudice appear to be strongly correlated, these items were used to 
construct a summated scale describing the level of the prejudice that immigrants 
are a source of cultural and economic threat.59 A Categorical Regression analysis 
was carried out to assess in more depth to what extent this prejudice is related to 
the above-mentioned variables. 
This analysis and the plot indicate that respondents in the first cluster, on the 
top left of the plot, can be characterized as unprejudiced: they generally reject the 
idea that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat, indicate a 
‘Minimal’ social distance, generally have a high level of education and voted for 
parties on the left of the political spectrum (D66, Green Left or PvdA). 
Respondents in the second cluster, on the top right of the plot, can be 
characterized as prejudiced: they clearly think that immigrants are a source of 
cultural and economic threat, indicate a ‘Large’ social distance to immigrants, 
rarely or never have social contact with them, are not highly educated and generally 
voted for the political parties PVV or SGP. The respondents in the third cluster, 
below in the plot, can be characterized as ambivalent: they could not decide 
whether to agree with or to reject this type of prejudice. Among them is a relatively 
large number of SP voters. Finally, voters for the VVD are divided with respect to 
this type of prejudice. 
The Categorical Regression analysis shows that the lower respondents’ 
educational level, the stronger their prejudice that immigrants present a cultural 
and economic threat (β = -.33, p < .001). The relationship between this prejudice 
and political preference is moderate (β = .36, p < .001). Furthermore, the 
relationships between this type of prejudice and social distance and the frequency 
of social inter-ethnic contact (β = .60, p < .001 and β = -.25, p < .001 respectively) 
are in line with the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954, also see Section 5.2.3). 
Unsurprisingly, this type of prejudice is negatively related to the support for the 
principle of equal treatment discussed above (β = -.19, p < .001). 
It is also not surprising that the stronger this type of prejudice, the more 
importance respondents attach to the criteria for national belonging discussed in 
Chapter 3. The stronger the respondents’ prejudice, the more exclusive the type of 
national belonging they consider to be important, which agrees with studies by 
Hjerm (1998), Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere and Boen (2010), and Wakefield et 
al. (2011). Hence, the level of this prejudice towards immigrant groups is most 
                                                     
59 The eigenvalues and scree-plot of a CATPCA analysis (see Chapter 2) of the items indicated that 
one component could be extracted. Variance Accounted For (VAF) per item was higher than 48%, 
total VAF was 55.85%. Cronbach’s Alpha of these six items is .89. 
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strongly related to the importance attached to the ethnic type of national belonging 
(β = .56, p < .001), and clearly less strongly to the exclusive legal citizenship (β = 
.40, p < .001), the territorial (β = .36, p < .001) and the civic types (β = .26, p < 
.001).60 This relationship can be explained by social identity theory, as research 
indicates that those who are perceived by the majority to deviate from their own 
nominal group characteristics, are not fully recognized as group members and can 
be marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see 
also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005).61  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the importance attached to the most exclusive 
types of Dutch national belonging – ethnic and exclusive legal citizenship – is 
negatively related to educational level. These relationships between the levels of 
prejudice and education discussed above have been explained by Kunovich (2009: 
585), who argues that those with a lower educational level tend to attach more 
importance to exclusive criteria for national belonging because they perceive an 
economic threat from immigrants and their descendants (who generally share their 
low socio-economic status) (cf. Kaya & Karakoç 2012: 37). The finding that these 
respondents generally vote for the populist and anti-immigrant political parties 
PVV or SGP is also in line with the ideas of Fenton (2011) mentioned in Chapter 
3. 
This type of prejudice also appears to be slightly related to the affective 
component of national self-identification discussed in Chapter 3 (β = .15, p < .05), 
and more strongly related to some of the expressions of loyalty to the nation-state 
discussed in Chapter 4: national-political pride (β = .31, p < .001), uncritical 
patriotism (β = .27, p < .001), nationalist patriotism (β = .22, p < .001) and shame 
of negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = -.29, p < .001). However, no 
significant relationships were found between this type of prejudice and the other 
expressions of loyalty described in Chapter 4: national-cultural pride, symbolic 
patriotism and the item which indicates constructive patriotism. This ties in with 
the study of Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) discussed in Section 4.2.2. In it they 
found that a positive evaluation of one’s national in-group (expressed by loyalty) is 
a necessary precondition for, but does not necessarily imply, a negative evaluation 
of immigrant groups (expressed by prejudice) (see also Coenders 2001; Ellemers, 
Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170).  
                                                     
60 Categorical Regression analyses were carried out to test whether this prejudice is related to the types 
of national belonging discussed in Chapter 3. In these analyses was controlled for descent, age, 
gender, educational level and income.  
61 As mentioned in Chapter 3, this relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), 
and the related process of subtyping (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001). 
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Despite the fact that more than a third of the native Dutch harbours the 
prejudice that immigrants and their descendants present a cultural and economic 
threat, only 13% of them and a similar percentage of immigrants were of the 
opinion that national anti-discrimination policies are not needed, as is clear from 
Table 5.2 below. 
 
Table 5.2 










Native Dutch 44 23 13 20 100 
Non-Western 
Immigrants 
62 15 11 12 100 
Western 
immigrants 
55 13 13 19 100 
Total 47 21 13 19 100 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2).  
 
Some opponents of anti-discrimination policies, both native Dutch and 
immigrants, argued that these policies are not effective because it is impossible to 
‘cure’ adults of prejudice and discrimination simply by putting such measures in 
place, and that the only way to prevent discrimination is to teach children about 
equal treatment at a very young age. It must also be pointed out, some native 
Dutch opponents thought that the problem of discrimination is exaggerated, 
arguing, for example, that ‘it is the immigrants’ own fault’, because, as one 
respondent said, ‘they want to be different from the Dutch’.  
While a minority of respondents (19%) said they have no idea what these 
policies entail, the majority (68%) approved of anti-discrimination policies, and 
almost half (47%) was of the opinion that these policies should be improved. Some 
stated that the current policies are completely ineffectual, and that other measures, 
such as quota systems and preferential treatment should be introduced. Others 
mentioned that policies can only be effectual when the government and politicians 
set a good example, and said that politicians should stop making polarizing 
statements.  
The percentage of non-Western immigrants who believed that these policies 
should be improved was relatively high (62%). A possible explanation is that they 
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have more experience of being discriminated against. Unlike the native Dutch, the 
immigrants referred to their personal experiences when explaining their view that 
the policies should be improved. Some referred to the difficulty in proving 
discrimination, and one respondent argued that individuals are powerless to 
combat discrimination. 
To explore whether these views are statistically related to the type of prejudice 
and other variables discussed, for instance, social distance and political preference, 
a Categorical Regression analysis was carried out. The table above already indicates 
that non-Western immigrants are more in favour of national anti-discrimination 
policies than are the native Dutch (β = .14, p < .005). Not surprisingly, opponents 
of such policies attach more importance to exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national 
belonging discussed in Chapter 3, such as having Dutch ancestors and a Western 
name (β = -.23, p < .001), and exhibit a stronger prejudice that immigrants do pose 
a cultural and economic threat (β = -.37, p < .001). This is in line with the theories 
discussed in Section 5.3.1, which postulate that opposition to anti-discrimination 
policies can be explained by an existing bias towards other groups caused by social 
categorization, namely, attaching importance to criteria for national belonging, or 
the perception of group threat (cf. Bobo & Fox 2003; Shadid 2007: 209). Finally, 
voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, SP and Green Left appear to be slightly more 
in favour of anti-discrimination policies (β = .22, p < .001). 
In the next sections, views on the measures to take positive action and its 
relationships with prejudice will be analysed. But first of all, to provide some 
background the relevant literature, government policies and political debates 
concerning the topic of positive action will be passed in review. 
5.4 Positive action 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, equal opportunities for individuals 
and groups in society not only require equal treatment, they must commence from 
equal starting conditions. A group’s disadvantaged position limits the opportunities 
of its members. Policies, measures and regulations to overcome the effects of these 
limitations, or, in other words, to achieve substantive equality of opportunity for 
members of these groups, are referred to as measures for positive action (Bovenkerk 
1986; Sabbagh 2011: 109; Waddington & Bell 2011: 1521).  
In the Netherlands, positive action policies targeted at women, ethnic 
minorities and the disabled have been being developed since the 1970s. In the next 
section some light will be shed on the variety of forms of positive action and on the 
main results of relevant scientific research.. 
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5.4.1 Perspectives on positive action 
Measures for positive action have been introduced in various countries over the 
years, among them the United States, the United Kingdom (Bovenkerk 1986; 
Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006), India, Malaysia, South Africa (Sabbagh 2011) 
and the Netherlands (Verbeek & Groeneveld 2010). Different terms are used to 
refer to such measures in these countries. Although the term positive action is 
common in Europe, in the United States the term affirmative action is generally 
used (Waddington & Bell 2011: 1507-1508). 
In 1986, Bovenkerk published the results of an extensive comparative study of 
measures for positive action in the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, in which he distinguished various forms of such measures (1986: 21, 
56). In his first step, Bovenkerk distinguishes between procedural and substantive 
measures. The aim of a procedural measure is to increase the opportunities of 
members of disadvantaged groups, for example, through such outreach efforts as 
advertising a vacancy in such a way that it reaches all groups in society, instead of 
exclusively using informal networks to recruit employees.62 A substantive measure 
implies that explicit preference is given to members of disadvantaged groups, for 
example, in job selection procedures or by developing specific training programmes 
for members of these groups. A distinction can be made between the substantive 
measures which reduce the application or job requirements for members of 
disadvantaged groups, and the substantive measures in which this is not the case. 
The former type of measures is sometimes called positive discrimination. In the 
latter type, commonly labelled preferential treatment (Bovenkerk 1986: 22), 
preference is given to the member of a disadvantaged group, but only when his or 
her qualifications are at least equal to those of other qualified candidates. 
Such procedural and substantive measures are referred to as direct measures 
when they are implemented by organizations to increase the opportunities of 
members of disadvantaged groups in these organizations. Indirect measures are 
those steps take to motivate or oblige other organizations to implement direct 
measures (Bovenkerk 1986; Verbeek & Penninx 2009: 69). Sometimes, 
governments might implement both indirect and direct measures to set an example 
to other organizations (Bovenkerk 1986: 56). An example of an indirect measure is 
contract compliance. This entails that the government makes the granting of 
assignments and subsidies to organizations conditional on their implementation of 
                                                     
62 Another procedural measure worth mentioning here is the policy of replacement (De Zwart & 
Poppelaars 2007) discussed in Section 5.2.2, which entails that instead of developing policies targeted 
at specific ethnic groups, additional resources are provided to specific economically disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods, which in practice benefits the disadvantaged ethnic minorities who live in those 
neighbourhoods. Sabbagh calls these policies ‘indirect affirmative action’ (2011: 110). 
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specific measures to promote the employment of disadvantaged groups (Bovenkerk 
1986: 56; Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 587). One of the strongest indirect 
measures the government can implement is a quota system for job allocation (cf. 
Waddington & Bell 2011: 1509). This means that a minimum number or 
percentage of the workforce of an organization has to consist of members of a 
specific group.  
The central argument for introducing measures for positive action is that they 
appear to be the best way to level the playing field by overcoming the limiting 
effects of disadvantage, whether or not the disadvantage is a direct result of 
discrimination (cf. Holzer & Neumark 2006: 466). Proponents argue that, because 
measures for positive action do not rely on an individual rights strategy (see Section 
5.3.2), they are more effective in preventing and combating both direct and 
institutional discrimination than (other) anti-discrimination legislation (Crosby, 
Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 592). Moreover, measures for positive action contribute, 
in various ways, to the reduction of bias and the prevention of expressions of bias 
(Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen 2006: 592). Reducing bias requires a number of 
preconditions among them constructive intergroup contact, featuring co-operation 
in the pursuit of shared goals and, very importantly, equal status in the context of 
the interaction because, among other reasons, negative stereotypes of groups can be 
reinforced by their lower socio-economic status. In society, intergroup contact 
featuring equal status of group members is only possible when inequality has been 
reduced, or, in other words, when the playing field is levelled, for example, by 
positive action measures (cf. Bovenkerk 1986: 36, 50). 
Measures for positive action have been the subject of intensive debates, in 
which both empirical and normative arguments have been used (for an overview 
see Bovenkerk 1986). A widely discussed normative argument is that these 
measures imply reverse discrimination – discrimination against members of non-
disadvantaged groups. Opponents argue that giving preference to members of a 
certain group on the basis of their group membership is an unacceptable violation 
of the principle of equal treatment. However, proponents argue that when equal 
treatment is taken to imply that people should be treated equally in equal 
circumstances, positive action does not imply discrimination because measures for 
positive action can only apply in unequal circumstances. Moreover, when equality 
is interpreted as having equal opportunities, equal starting points are required, and 
this could justify measures for positive action (cf. Bovenkerk 1986: 40). 
Apart from the debates about the desirability of positive action measures, there 
is also discussion about whether empirical research has shown that such measures 
are really effective, and whether they have negative effects which outweigh their 
possible positive results. Since the 1990s, it has become easier to address such 
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questions, because, as Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 586) point out, studies 
on positive action have become increasingly empirical and interdisciplinary. 
Looking at putative negative effects, critics refer to the possibility of resentment 
and group tensions resulting from the perception by members of non-
disadvantaged groups that positive action implies reverse discrimination. Empirical 
studies discussed by Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 593) indicate that, while 
poorly implemented diversity programmes can indeed cause resentment, members 
of non-disadvantaged groups who work for organizations which implement 
positive action measures or who interact with the beneficiaries of those measures, 
do not react negatively. By and large, Bovenkerk (1986: 107) says, it can be 
expected that measures in which requirements for members of disadvantaged 
groups are reduced do lead to more resentment than measures in which preference 
to a member of these groups is given only when his or her qualifications are at least 
equal to if not better than those of other qualified candidates. 
Another possible negative effect which measures for positive action might set in 
train is group stigmatization, suggesting that its beneficiaries cannot succeed on 
their own. However, Bovenkerk (1986: 107) has argued that when measures for 
positive action succeed, these stigma will eventually disappear, a hypothesis which 
has been confirmed in later studies (see Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 593).  
The remaining empirical issue is whether positive action can really improve the 
socio-economic position of minorities. Generally, the available empirical studies 
indicate that it does indeed have a positive impact on the position of members of 
disadvantaged groups in the fields of education and employment (Bovenkerk 1986: 
69-71; Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 588-591; Holzer and Neumark 2006; 
Kalev, Kelly & Dobbin 2006). Apart from this, Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 
(2006: 590) also consider increased ethnic diversity, especially at educational 
institutions, as a positive effect. They refer to research results indicating that this 
diversity has improved the ability of students to take the perspective of others into 
account. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, this is probably the best way to reduce bias 
and the expression of bias.63  
The crux of the matter is that the success of measures for positive action 
depends on various factors, including the type of measures taken, the scale of its 
implementation and also the quality of implementation and the reception of such 
                                                     
63 Other possible positive effects of increased ethnic diversity on the work floor and in educational 
institutions are also mentioned, by Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen (2006: 590-591) and by Bovenkerk 
(1986). These effects include the improvement of both services and the representation of interests of 
minority groups, because, as Bovenkerk argues, police officers, doctors, lawyers, social workers and 
other professionals who are members of disadvantaged groups, are in a better position to assess 
possible special needs of these groups (1986: 55). 
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measures by decision makers in the selection procedures, the beneficiaries 
themselves and the wider society. Successful implementation requires raising 
awareness of procedures and goals, which must also cover the provision of 
information about barriers to opportunities and the way these barriers can be 
overcome by the measures (Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 594). Obviously, 
poor communication can lead to the stigmatization of the beneficiaries and lack of 
support from decision makers in selection procedures, which, in turn, can weaken 
the implementation. Moreover, according to Shadid, the effects of measures for 
positive action will be limited as long as the cultural distinctiveness of ethnic 
minorities is not structurally recognized within organizations (2007: 310; also see 
Chapter 6). This view was confirmed in a longitudinal study (covering the period 
1971-2002) of a large sample (n=708) of organizations by Kalev, Kelly & Dobbin 
(2006). These scholars found that the increase in the employment of minority 
employees in private sector management was largest in organizations which had 
structurally embedded accountability, authority and expertise on diversity and 
positive action (2006: 611). 
In the end, to paraphrase Holzer and Neumark, whether and in what form 
positive action will be implemented, depends on whether citizens believe it is fair 
to give preference to such disadvantaged groups as ethnic minorities and women in 
some contexts, ‘to overcome the barriers they continue to face from current 
discrimination, past discrimination, and a variety of other causes. Views on fairness 
are very subjective, and sometimes impervious to empirical evidence’ (2006: 484). 
In other words, while empirical evidence indicates that positive action has positive 
effects, whether measures for positive action will be implemented depends on the 
views on this issue in society and on decisions by politicians. In the next section, 
these decisions by politicians and debates about positive action in the Netherlands 
will be discussed. 
5.4.2 Positive action in the Netherlands: policies and debates 
The discussion in Section 5.3.2 has undeniably revealed that, although the 
Netherlands is praised for its anti-discrimination measures, discrimination and 
group inequality do persist in Dutch society and the effectiveness of the anti-
discrimination legislation appears to be limited. This section contains a discussion 
of whether and how these problems have been addressed by implementing 
measures for positive action. 
The first measures for positive action in the Netherlands, introduced in the 
1970s and it was devised to improve the position of women on the labour market 
(Bacchi 1994). In 1986, in the context of the implementation of the first structural 
integration policies for ethnic minorities, the Advisory Committee on Research 
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related to Minorities (ACOM) (see Section 5.2.2), recommended the government 
implement such measures to assist ethnic minorities. However, ACOM explicitly 
recommended that positive discrimination measures should not be introduced but 
that instead preferential treatment, without reducing the job or application 
requirements for members of disadvantaged groups, be adopted to prevent the 
possible stigmatization of the beneficiaries (see Section 5.4.1) and also to lower the 
risk of giving places to employees with insufficient qualifications (Bovenkerk 1986: 
145). In 1989 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) also 
recommended the implementation of contract compliance (WRR 1989: 37).  
Since 1990, a series of measures for positive action have been implemented by 
the Dutch government, and municipalities and organizations in various sectors 
have followed suit (Dagevos, Gijsberts & Van Praag 2003; Shadid 2007: 306-307). 
Legally, the Equal Treatment Act (ETA), which came into force in 1994, allows 
preferential treatment (but not positive discrimination) for women, ethnic 
minorities and the disabled. ETA also permits outreach procedures and quota 
systems, but considers strict quota systems which reserve a specific number of jobs 
for members of a disadvantaged group are out of the question.64 Consequently, 
ETA has complied with EU anti-discrimination legislation. In various directives 
this legislation has authorized member states to implement measures for positive 
action.65 
In 1990, employers and labour unions66 signed an agreement to allocate 
60,000 jobs for members of ethnic minority groups over a period of five years. In 
the same period, the national government implemented a plan to increase the 
number of immigrant employees in government service to 5%.67 The first indirect 
nation-wide measure for positive action targeted at ethnic minorities was 
introduced by the government in 1994. This Act for the Stimulation of 
Proportional Labour Participation (WBEAA)68 obliged organizations in the private 
and public sectors with more than 35 employees to implement measures to achieve 
a proportional representation of ethnic minorities in their workforce. 
Organizations had to register the ethnicity of their employees so that information 
on the representation of ethnic minorities among their staff could be made public 
                                                     
64  See for an overview: Dossier voorkeursbeleid (in Dutch), accessed August 13, 2013, 
http://www.mensenrechten.nl/dossier/voorkeursbeleid. 
65 For a discussion of these aspects of EU law see Waddington & Bell (2011). For an overview of the 
implementation and practices in EU countries see Wrench (2007). Nota bene: the possibility to 
implement measures for positive action was already included in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) which came into force in 1969. 
66 United in the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid). 
67 The EMO plan (Ethnic Minorities in Government Service). 
68 The Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen (WBEAA). 
136 Chapter 5 
(Berkhout, Homburg & Van Waveren 1996). This act was replaced in 1998 by the 
similar Act on the Stimulation of Labour Market Participation of Minorities (Wet 
SAMEN),69 which was abrogated at the end of 2003. Both these acts came into a 
great deal of from employers and employers’ organizations and consequently 
compliance was weak (Dagevos, Gijsberts & Van Praag 2003). Glastra, Schedler 
and Kats (1998) say that the employers’ organizations were generally opposed to 
measures for equality of opportunity, and they doubted the beneficial effects of 
such measures. Their preference was for favourable investment to ensure job 
growth and educational measures to improve the qualifications of ethnic minority 
members. 
Apart from these indirect measures, since 2000 the government has also signed 
agreements with employers’ organizations to increase the labour market 
participation of ethnic minorities by registering job vacancies. It is hoped that by 
doing so they will fill these vacancies with more people from ethnic minorities, 
provide training programmes and develop tailor-made approaches for employment 
in specific sectors (Schaafsma 2006: 20).70 The effects of these agreements have 
generally been evaluated as positive (Blok Commission 2004: 257). 
However, since these measures and agreements ended in the early 2000s, no 
nationwide indirect measures have been implemented and preferential treatment 
and quota systems have continued to be controversial (Schaafsma 2006; De Zwart 
2012).71 Research in 2006 indicated that both employers and employees, including 
members of ethnic minority groups, generally rejected preferential treatment 
measures (Schaafsma 2006: 56-57). Employers perceived such measures to be 
unfair, and generally explained the under-representation of minorities in their 
organizations by pointing out that they did not apply or were not sufficiently 
qualified (cf. Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 599). For their part, members of 
ethnic minority groups feared the risk of stigmatization (Schaafsma 2006: 68-69).  
The effectiveness of positive action measures in the Netherlands has also been 
questioned. In their analysis of the national indirect measure Wet SAMEN, 
Verbeek and Groeneveld found no short-term effects of preferential treatment, but 
suggest that this could be explained by weak implementation (2010: 234). 
                                                     
69 The Wet Stimulering Arbeidsdeelname Minderheden (Wet SAMEN). 
70 Respectively through the MKB Covenant, RGO Covenant and the .KOM Project. 
71 In 2008, the then incumbent Minister of the Interior Ter Horst announced measures for positive 
action to increase the number of ethnic minority members and women in the management of the 
police force. This elicited widespread criticism, even within the police force (see NRC Handelsblad 
(March 10, 2009), Voorkeursbeleid scheidt minister en politietop). The Dutch Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science and the supporting organization (in Dutch: ondersteunende / ambtelijke 
organisatie) of Dutch Parliament implemented preferential treatment measures (in 2010 and 2008 
respectively), to increase the number of ethnic minority employees (see CGB 2008; CGB 2010). 
 Multicultural citizenship and equality 137 
However, they certainly did find a positive relationship between the increase in 
ethnic minority representation and the existence of structural diversity policies in 
organizations (Groeneveld & Verbeek 2012), which is in line with the views of 
Shadid (2007) on the structural recognition of diversity and the findings of Kalev, 
Kelly and Dobbin (2006) discussed in Section 5.4.1.  
Despite all efforts, the unemployment rates of ethnic minorities in the 
Netherlands remain disproportionately high. 72  For this reason, the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommended the Dutch 
government should make better use of measures for positive action (ECRI 2008). 
However, as mentioned in Section 5.2.2, in the policy document Integration, 
Belonging and Citizenship issued in 2011 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 2011) the government emphasized that integration policies 
would no longer target specific groups. It appears therefore that the government no 
longer advocates the principle of positive action. Nevertheless, the above 
mentioned Equal Treatment Act (ETA) still allows preferential treatment for 
women, ethnic minorities and the disabled. In their programmes for the national 
elections in 2012, a few political parties, concerned about the above mentioned 
unemployment rates, advocated outreach measures (Green Left, SP, VVD) and 
preferential treatment (Green Left) in an effort to assist disadvantaged 
groups.73Nevertheless, their efforts came to nought and the implementation of 
strong measures for positive action continued to be a pipe-dream. The most recent 
government policy document on discrimination does not mention measures for 
positive action (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012) at all, and 
the most recent policy document on integration announced only one such 
measure, namely that the government will co-operate with municipalities in 
supporting young members of ethnic minority and their parents with their 
entrance into the labour market (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 
2013).74 
What has just been said shows that it goes without saying that the introduction 
and the effects of positive action measures are controversial in the Netherlands. 
Part of the problem appears to be that such hard measures as preferential treatment 
and contract compliance have barely been implemented, and therefore few people 
                                                     
72 For example, in February 2014, the employment rates of non-Western immigrants and their 
descendants was 18.6%, as opposed to 6.7% among native Dutch. CBS Statline, accessed February 3, 
2014, http://statline.cbs.nl. 
73 GroenLinks (2012); Socialistische Partij (2012); VVD (2012). 
74 The government elected in 2012 also announced a quota system for the disabled, to be enforced in 
2015 (Rutte & Samsom 2012: 32). 
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are familiar with such measures. In the next section, views current in society on 
such measures will be examined. 
5.4.3 Views in society on positive action 
As was just stated, the discussion on policies and debates in the Netherlands has 
revealed that measures for positive action are controversial. Research has shown 
that, whereas many Dutch natives considered such measures unfair, immigrants 
and their descendants also viewed them negatively because they feared the risk of 
stigmatization. Whereas they are still haunted by controversy in the Netherlands, 
research in the United States has indicated that people who are familiar with these 
measures tend to view them more positively. Possibly measures for positive action 
have acquired a bad name in the Netherlands because people equate these measures 
with positive discrimination and not with preferential treatment, not realizing that 
positive discrimination is illegal in the Netherlands. As Bovenkerk wrote in 1986, 
it can be expected that measures for positive discrimination, implying that 
application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are reduced, 
would lead to more resentment than measures for preferential treatment, in which 
preference is only given to the member of a disadvantaged group only when his or 
her qualifications are at least equal to those of other qualified candidates (1986: 
107; also see Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen 2006: 595). 
In this section, the views in Dutch society on measures for positive action will 
be examined. This will include an analysis of relationships between these views and 
prejudices or race-neutral values, relationships which are postulated in the theories 
discussed in Section 5.3.1. Hence, the analysis will not only include the prejudices 
in society analysed in Section 5.3.3, but also a comparison of views on measures for 
positive action targeted at ethnic minorities and at women. 
Support for positive action was measured by including an item in the 
questionnaires on the acceptability of preferential treatment for both (naturalized) 
immigrants and their descendants and for women in the context of job 
applications. The results are shown in Table 5.3 below.  
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Table 5.3 
Opinions about preferential treatmenta in percentages. 
 For immigrants For women 
 Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove 
Native Dutch 17 74 33 52 
Non-Western 
Immigrants 
32 53 38 47 
Western 
immigrants 
17 73 29 58 
Totald 18 72 33 51 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
a But see the analysis below.  
 
From this table it is clear that, although almost a third of all groups approve 
preferential treatment for women, only 18% approve such measures for 
immigrants. Among non-Western immigrants the support for such measures is 
clearly higher (38% and 32% respectively). Muslims in this last group were even 
more positive (43% and 41% approval respectively). 
The main argument of those who support preferential treatment of both 
women and ethnic minorities was that it is necessary to combat prejudices and 
discrimination. ‘In an ideal world, such measures should not be necessary, but alas, 
we have to deal with discrimination’, one respondent said. Some native Dutch 
pointed out that increasing ethnic diversity in organizations is not the same as 
overcoming disadvantages for ethnic minorities. These respondents support 
preferential treatment as a way to increase diversity, but did not think that the 
opportunities of ethnic minorities are still limited. 
Many native Dutch who approve of preferential treatment for both women 
and ethnic minorities admitted that, although they support the principle of equal 
treatment, they have more difficulty approving of preferential treatment for the 
latter group. As one respondent said, ‘After some heart searching, I would say yes 
to preferential treatment for women, and no to preferential treatment for ethnic 
minorities. But, with some hesitation, I approve of both, because you have to treat 
people equally.’ 
Interestingly, although the strength of the prejudice that immigrants present a 
cultural and economic threat appears to explain the opposition to anti-
discrimination policies to a substantial extent (see Section 5.3.3), it barely explains 
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the opposition to preferential treatment of immigrants and their descendants (β = -
.14, p < .05). Moreover, the analysis indicates that this type of prejudice goes only 
a very little way towards explaining the difference between respondents’ opposition 
to preferential treatment of immigrants and their opposition to a similar policy for 
women. Likewise, this opposition also cannot be explained by respondents’ views 
on who can be fully included in the national group. There are no significant 
relationships between this opposition and the importance they attach to the criteria 
for national belonging discussed in Chapter 3, among them having Dutch 
ancestors or having a Western name. These findings contradict two theories, 
discussed by Bobo & Fox (2003), which claim that opposition to preferential 
treatment can be explained by a bias towards immigrants, resulting either from the 
perception of ethnic threat or from the process of social categorization (that is, 
attaching importance to criteria for national belonging). This suggests that 
opposition to such policies in the Netherlands could be explained by a third theory 
discussed by Bobo and Fox, namely, opposition rooted in ‘race-neutral values and 
ideologies such as fairness or individualism’ (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; see Section 
5.2). Indeed, these sorts of ideas have led respondents to argue that policies like 
these can cause stigmatization, and that gender or ethnicity are two categories 
which should never be used as criteria in selection procedures.  
The qualitative interviews revealed the problem that preferential treatment is 
often confused with positive discrimination measures: many respondents 
mentioned that preferential treatment is unacceptable because it implies ‘reverse 
discrimination’. After the interviewer explained that preferential treatment implies 
that application or job requirements for members of disadvantaged groups are not 
reduced, and that positive discrimination is illegal in the Netherlands, most of 
these respondents said that they do approve of preferential treatment.75 Therefore, 
a lack of understanding of such policies might also explain the opposition to some 
degree. Nonetheless, the substantial difference between the opposition to 
preferential treatment of immigrants and preferential treatment of women remains 
largely unexplained. 
Finally, the analysis revealed no significant relationships between views on 
preferential treatment – which was apparently understood by many as positive 
discrimination – and the variables gender, age, educational level and political 
preference.  
 
                                                     
75 This finding cannot be generalized however, as the number of in-depth interviews was only 66 (see 
Chapter 2).  
Chapter 6  
Multicultural citizenship  
and cultural distinctiveness 
6.1 Introduction 
Cultural distinctiveness is the third dimension of multicultural citizenship to be 
examined in this study. As discussed in Chapter 1, a society can be characterized as 
multicultural when the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship, which also 
include belonging to the national group and the equality of both native and 
immigrant citizens, are formally and publicly recognized (Shadid 2009: 5-6). This 
chapter examines views on cultural distinctiveness prevalent in Dutch society, in an 
attempt to explore how and whether aspects of this dimension of multicultural 
citizenship are recognized and actually dealt with in practice. 
Since the 1980s, various authors have raised the concern that extending 
citizenship rights specifically to certain groups, among them women and ethnic 
and racial minorities, has not produced the sought-after social equality (Leydet 
2011; Young 1989). They are convinced that it is necessary to recognize such 
group differences as gender, culture and religion formally, in order to achieve 
citizen equality (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Shadid 2009). If formal recognition has not 
been granted, it is an uphill battle to achieve equality, as ‘the purported neutrality 
of difference-blind institutions often belies an implicit bias towards the needs, 
interests and identities of the majority group’ (Leydet 2011, see also Bloemraad, 
Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Consequently, this sort of recognition implies the 
justification of differential treatment in society and the acknowledgement of special 
minority rights. Examples of such policies in the Netherlands include, inter alia, 
the recognition of the right of Muslims to build mosques and the right of women 
to maternity leave. However, such policies, especially those to do with cultural and 
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religious distinctions, often referred to by scholars and politicians as 
multiculturalism, have been, and still are, the subject of fierce debates (Wright & 
Bloemraad 2012: 78). One of the arguments embraced by opponents of 
multiculturalism is that the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness can 
hinder immigrants’ integration and impede the development of their loyalty to the 
nation-state (see also Chapter 4). Furthermore, it is argued that formal recognition 
of cultural distinctiveness, especially when such distinctiveness has anything to do 
with religion, is incompatible with the neutrality of the state (e.g. Cliteur 2004). 
It goes without saying that the recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of 
immigrants is not, and has not been, an issue confined to purely scientific 
discussions, it has also fuelled political debates in the Netherlands and other 
nation-states with a history of intensive immigration such as the United States, 
Australia and Canada. As discussed in Chapter 3, the views on cultural 
distinctiveness taken by subsequent Dutch governments have undergone 
pronounced changes in the last few decades. Although the socio-cultural 
emancipation of immigrants was one goal of the integration policies which were 
developed in the Netherlands in the 1980s, this goal was abandoned in the 
beginning of the 1990s, and since 2003 cultural differences in society have begun 
to be considered to be problematic.1  
Scientific and political debates on citizenship and cultural distinctiveness have 
addressed various topics, ranging from national belonging, loyalty to the nation-
state and immigrant integration to equality, all of which have been examined in 
previous chapters. In the present chapter, the recognition of cultural distinctiveness 
in the Netherlands will be explored more directly, by addressing Dutch regulations, 
debates and views on (immigrants’) distinctive cultural practices, norms and values. 
As has been stressed in previous chapters, the current political debates on cultural 
distinctiveness are primarily concentrated on the religious practices, norms and 
values of Muslim immigrants and their descendants (cf. Beck 2013). One very 
prominent example is the debate on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf. Indeed, 
with some perspicuity Maliepaard and Phalet (2012: 131) write that, ‘Muslims 
represent the prototypical “other” in today’s Dutch society, as in other Western 
European societies’ (see also Ogan, Willnat, Pennington & Bashir 2014). 
Therefore, the discussion of the regulations, debates and views on this subject in 
Dutch society here will focus on interpretations of church-state relations and the 
perceived incompatibility between Dutch norms and values and the norms and 
values embraced by Muslim immigrants (cf. Gozdecka, Ercan & Kmak 2014: 54; 
Shadid 2009: 17). The brief discussion of regulations and debates is based on the 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Tweede Kamer (2003-2004: 8); see also Chapter 3. 
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current relevant literature, and the views in Dutch society will be explored by 
analysing empirical data collected in the quantitative and qualitative questionnaires 
conducted for this research. To set the scene, first of all scientific debates about the 
formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness will be discussed.  
6.2 Perspectives on the formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness 
Policies of the formal recognition of cultural and religious distinctions, often 
labelled multiculturalism, have been the subject of some heated exchanges (Wright 
& Bloemraad 2012: 78). Various strands of arguments can be distinguished in 
these debates, especially those about whether this formal recognition is compatible 
with the neutrality of the state. Other arguments have to do with the effects of the 
formal recognition of cultural distinctiveness on various aspects of immigrant 
integration, including concerns about social cohesion, the possible incompatibility 
of certain norms and values, immigrants’ social and political participation, their 
sense of national belonging and their loyalty to the nation-state. A concise review 
of these arguments will be presented in this section. 
Some opponents of multiculturalism assert that the formal recognition of 
cultural distinctiveness engenders relatively weak incentives to learn the language of 
the host country and to develop interethnic contacts. They say that the upshot of 
the policy is that it leads to the segregation and socio-economic inequality of 
immigrants (e.g. Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005, but see Demant 
2005). Others state that recognizing cultural pluralism weakens the immigrants’ 
affective commitment to the country, and thereby endangers social cohesion, or the 
development of a common sense of national belonging (e.g. Miller 1995; Barry 
2002; see also Chapter 3). One argument closely related to this is that formal 
recognition of cultural and religious distinctiveness implies a recognition of the fact 
that immigrants are then free to maintain multiple loyalties, not just to their ethnic 
groups but to their countries of origin as well, which can undermine their loyalty 
to the nation-state (see Chapter 4). In the same vein, it is argued that 
multiculturalism can lead to an emphasis of differences and even to a reification of 
cultural groups, which again can result in segregation, conflicts and discrimination 
(e.g. Barry 2002). Last but by no means least, it is said that multiculturalism can 
lead to the preservation of certain immigrants’ norms and values which encourage 
the unequal treatment of women (e.g. Chesler 2010).  
The great weakness in the arguments of these opponents is that they are often 
quick to criticize policies which they label ‘multicultural’, without bothering to 
explain how they define multiculturalism and why they label these policies as such 
(Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 7). Some opponents have criticized policies which 
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they label ‘multicultural’, even though these policies clearly did not fit the 
qualification (Duyvendak & Scholten 2012). Referring to this, Duyvendak and 
Scholten (2011: 338) argue that some politicians and scholars in the Netherlands 
use the label ‘multicultural’ pejoratively: to ‘disqualify certain [integration] policies 
that allegedly have been a failure’. This conclusion agrees with Kymlicka’s 
statement that in many debates the criticism is not directed at the reality of 
multicultural policies, but at a caricaturish model of multiculturalism. Kymlicka 
calls this model ‘the celebratory model of multiculturalism’, as it describes 
multiculturalism as a policy which takes ‘familiar cultural markers of ethnic groups 
– clothing, cuisine, and music – and treats them as authentic practices to be 
preserved by their members and safely consumed by others’ (2012: 4; see for 
similar criticism also Pakulski & Markowski 2014: 6). Kymlicka has presented in a 
nutshell the various ways in which this caricaturish model has been used as a straw 
man to criticize multiculturalism. First of all, he states that this model ignores the 
issue of the economic and political inequality of immigrants in society, because 
these issues ‘cannot be solved simply by celebrating cultural differences’. Secondly, 
the celebration of cultural differences runs the very real risk of ignoring the 
inevitable fact that certain customs, such as forced marriage, conflict with laws, 
norms and values in society. More generally, this celebration risks trivializing 
cultural differences: ‘Ignoring the real challenges that differences in cultural and 
religious values can raise’. Thirdly, this model of multiculturalism can lead to a 
reification of cultural groups, and this would ignore the processes of cultural 
adaptation, ‘thereby potentially reinforcing perceptions of minorities as eternally 
“other”’. Once this category has become established it ‘can lead to the 
strengthening of prejudice and stereotyping, and more generally to the polarization 
of ethnic relations’. Finally, Kymlicka states that this model can ‘end up reinforcing 
power inequalities and cultural restrictions within minority groups’, as: 
 
the state generally consults the traditional elites within the group – typically 
older males – while ignoring the way these traditional practices (and traditional 
elites) are often challenged by internal reformers, who have difference views 
about how, say, a “good Muslim” should act (Kymlicka 2012: 4-5). 
 
This caricaturish model bears some similarities to what is called illiberal 
multiculturalism, a concept which implies the preservation of cultural identities, a 
goal which appears unrealistic given the dynamic character of social identities 
(Appiah 1997; see also Chapter 3).  
This having been said, most multicultural policies can be characterized as 
liberal, implying the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, which does not preclude 
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cultural change (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003: 11-12; 134). Several scholars have 
remarked that the central aspects or dimensions of liberal multiculturalism include 
the recognition of national belonging, cultural distinctiveness and the principle 
non-discrimination, the latter principle embracing both the equality of ethnic 
minorities and equality on other grounds such as gender and sexual orientation 
(e.g. Shadid 2009; Vermeulen & Slijper 2003; see also Chapter 1). 
It is this combination of valuing of equality and the recognition of cultural 
difference at which the most criticism is levelled and which is described as 
seemingly ambivalent or paradoxical (e.g. Joppke 1996, see also Prins 2000). This 
designation is unfair, however, as the combination is only ambivalent when it is 
assumed that achieving equality always requires ignoring difference. The latter is 
not the case, as a simple example such as the right to maternity leave for women 
shows (see also Chapter 5). More generally, the multiculturalists’ view is that the 
recognition of (certain) differences is a necessary precondition for equality, because, 
as already said in the introduction of this chapter, ‘the purported neutrality of 
difference-blind institutions often belies an implicit bias towards the needs, 
interests and identities of the majority group’ (Leydet 2011, see also Bloemraad, 
Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). 
Furthermore, in most multicultural policies recognition of cultural 
distinctiveness is mainly symbolic, inserted to strengthen the sense of national 
belonging of ethnic minorities and to facilitate their integration (Vermeulen & 
Slijper 2003: 134; see also WRR 1979 and Chapters 3 and 5). Giving his view on 
the matter, Kymlicka (2012: 5-10) argues that liberal multicultural policies do 
much more than celebrate cultural difference. Instead, these policies have always 
combined cultural recognition with addressing social issues, economic 
redistribution and political participation. This certainly was the case Netherlands 
in the 1980s, as the discussion in Chapter 5 in the present study illustrates. 
Cogently, liberal multicultural policies have not ignored universal human rights 
either by neglecting customs which violate human rights or by overlooking the real 
challenges posed by cultural and religious difference. On the contrary, Kymlicka 
says that: ‘multiculturalism is itself a human-rights-based movement’, and a 
fundamental characteristic of multiculturalism is that it is founded on principles of 
non-discrimination. This same development in the Netherlands is also illustrated 
in Chapter 5, and will be elaborated on in the present chapter. Kymlicka pursues 
his argument and states that the focus on universal human rights shows that 
(liberal) multiculturalism does not reify cultural groups or deny cultural change. 
Instead, Kymlicka argues that: 
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multiculturalism-as-citizenization is a deeply (and intentionally) transformative 
project, both for minorities and majorities. It requires both dominant and 
historically subordinated groups to engage in new practices, to enter new 
relationships, and to embrace new concepts and discourses – all of which 
profoundly transform people’s identities. […] It has created political space for 
ethnocultural groups to contest inherited hierarchies. But it also requires 
groups to advance their claims in a very specific language — namely, the 
language of human rights, civil-rights liberalism, and democratic 
constitutionalism (Kymlicka 2012: 9). 
 
Indeed, proponents of a liberal conception of multiculturalism argue that it is 
important to emphasize a civic conception of national belonging, that is, the view 
that membership of a nation is first and foremost juridical and political, requiring a 
citizen’s respect for institutions and laws (including treating women and men 
equally), and a sense of national belonging (e.g. Shadid 2009). It is argued that 
only by granting minority rights through multicultural policies, will these ‘bonds of 
civic solidarity’ be strengthened (Kymlicka 2001: 36; Kymlicka 1995). In short, 
those who favour this policy are asserting that an ethnic conception of national 
belonging – membership of a nation defined by specific ethnic or cultural criteria – 
should be rejected (cf. Habermas 1998; see also Chapter 3).2  
Many debates concentrating on the relationship between multiculturalism and 
the problem of immigrant integration, social cohesion, the strength of national 
belonging and loyalty to the nation-state are theoretical and hypothetical 
(Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008: 160; see also Chapter 4). So far there 
seems to be no strong empirical evidence for the hypothesis that multicultural 
policies hinder the process of social and political inclusion and political 
engagement of immigrants. By and large it has to be said that any empirical 
evidence of the effects of such policies is actually pretty thin on the ground (Wright 
& Bloemraad 2012: 79; see also Kymlicka 2012: 10-14). This is not surprising as 
the processes of immigrant integration are exposed to a wide range of factors, 
government policies being just one element among many. This situation 
                                                     
2 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, loyalty to the country is not the only nor necessarily the 
strongest motivation for citizens to take their country’s side. After all, individuals can be strongly 
motivated to take the side of their country because of a commitment to protect their family, friends 
or certain principles, and not so much out of undiluted loyalty to their country. There is no empirical 
evidence to support the hypothesis that citizens’ loyalty to their country is a better guarantee for 
furthering or protecting its interests than the other commitments of these citizens. Authors who argue 
that loyalty to a country is essential to protect its interests are either speculating or they are confusing 
matters by conflating the structure with the strength of political commitments (Keller 2009: 13-15). 
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complicates empirical comparisons between the effects of policies which are 
multicultural and policies which are not (see also Chapter 5). Certainly there are 
some authors who assume that government policies exert heavy pressure on 
immigrant integration (e.g. Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2010), but they 
have plenty of opponents who dispute this view (e.g. Demant 2005). Moreover, as 
mentioned above, views on what exactly constitutes a ‘multicultural policy’ differ, 
which complicates the interpretation of empirical studies (Duyvendak, Van 
Reekum, El-Hajjari & Bertossi 2013). Nevertheless, in view of the need for social 
recognition, research does indicate that the recognition of cultural distinctiveness is 
important (see Chapter 3). Such an acknowledgement can strengthen the sense of 
national belonging and prevent identity conflicts (cf. WRR 1979). In contrast, a 
policy of assimilation, defined as the opposite of the recognition of cultural 
distinctiveness, can lead to polarization of ethnic differences (Vermeulen & Slijper 
2003: 139).3 
Some opponents of multiculturalism do not restrict their remarks to the 
possible effects of such policies on aspects of immigrant integration, they go on to 
say that the recognition of cultural and religious distinctions is incompatible with 
the neutrality of the state (e.g. Cliteur 2004). But what is the ‘neutrality of the 
state’? There are many interpretations of and frameworks constructed for state 
neutrality in religious affairs. This is no surprise considering the various historically 
developed church-state relations in such countries as the Netherlands and France.4 
In Europe, church-state relations are certainly not monolithic and a number of 
variations can be distinguished (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 1995: 20-22). In 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, there is an official state religion and laws have 
been implemented to guarantee the equal treatment of other religious confessions. 
In several other countries, among them Belgium and Germany, religious 
communities are recognized by the state, which implies that religious communities 
have certain privileges. In France and the Netherlands, there is a separation 
between church and state.5 In both countries the goal of this separation is state 
neutrality, but this is interpreted and implemented differently.  
The French system of laïcité is an example of exclusive neutrality (Van der 
Burg 2009; 2011). It means that the state does not support any group on the basis 
of culture, religion or belief and therefore, theoretically at least, the public sphere 
                                                     
3 A more extensive discussion of criticism of multiculturalism can be found in Vermeulen & Slijper 
(2003). 
4 State neutrality is related to, but not synonymous with, the separation between church and state. An 
example of state neutrality in matters which are not religious is the recognition by the Dutch state of 
conscientious objections to compulsory military service (Van der Burg 2009). 
5 A more extensive typology can be found in Shadid & Van Koningsveld (1995). 
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should be free of religious expressions. The Dutch interpretation of church-state 
relations reflects a system of inclusive neutrality.6 State neutrality in this system 
implies that anyone is allowed to express his or her religious identity in the public 
sphere, and any person enjoys equal entitlement to state support for religious and 
cultural activities. In short, this system implies formal recognition of cultural and 
religious distinctiveness, that is, multiculturalism. 
What therefore does the Dutch system of state neutrality mean and what do 
Dutch political debates about multiculturalism imply? These matters will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
6.3 Cultural distinctiveness in the Netherlands: regulations, policies and 
debates 
In the course of the past few decades debates on immigrant integration in the 
Netherlands have become highly politicized. One section of these political debates 
has concentrated on cultural and religious practices, highlighting the norms and 
values of immigrants and their descendants, particularly those of Muslims. This 
section consists of a concise review of the main arguments in the Dutch political 
debates about the formal recognition and accommodation of cultural and religious 
distinctiveness of Muslim immigrants and their descendants. First of all, some light 
will have to be shed on the legal context in which these debates have taken place. 
6.3.1 Legal context 
In the Netherlands, the observance of religious practices and expressions of 
religious convictions are protected by law. Article 6 of the Dutch Constitution on 
protecting the freedom of religion and belief stipulates that, ‘Everyone shall have 
the right to profess freely his religion or belief, either individually or in community 
with others, without prejudice to his responsibility under the law’.7 Quite apart 
from this specific article on religion, the principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination are established in Article 1 of the Constitution. In 1994, the 
principles laid down in this article were elaborated in the Equal Treatment Act 
(ETA), which explicitly prohibits both direct and indirect forms of discrimination 
(see Chapter 5).8 Nor does it stop here. A clear example of the Dutch system of 
                                                     
6 Van der Burg goes further and distinguishes two sub-types of inclusive neutrality: proportional and 
compensatory neutrality. For a discussion see Van der Burg (2009; 2011). 
7  See “Nederlandse Grondwet” (in Dutch), accessed December 12, 2012, 
http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl. 
8  For a discussion of rulings of the Equal Treatment Commission regarding (perceived) 
discrimination of Muslims, see Rodrigues (2008). 
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inclusive neutrality (see Section 6.2) can be found in Article 23 of the Constitution 
which guarantees the freedom of education and guarantees denominational schools 
the same funding conditions, rights and duties as public secular schools. Quite 
apart from these domestic regulations, international treaties guaranteeing 
fundamental rights such as the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms also apply in the Netherlands and even take precedence 
over national laws and regulation (as is outlined in Article 94 of the Constitution). 
The debates on whether or not a religious manifestation can be prohibited are 
held, indeed must be contained, within this legal context, and centre on two 
central questions: (1) whether the practice or manifestation concerned can be 
considered the result of an ‘accepted’ religious prescription and, if yes, (2) whether 
it is desirable indeed possible to infringe on the freedom of religion and belief by 
specifically prohibiting it (cf. Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2005: 49; Saharso 2003: 
13). 
Over the years, those customs of Muslim immigrants which can be considered 
to emanate from religious prescriptions, have been hotly debated. Among the 
controversial points which elicit a flood of discussions are religious symbols and 
dress, notably the Islamic headscarf, the refusal of some Muslims to shake hands 
with persons of the opposite gender, ritual slaughter and the observance of religious 
holidays (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 1995; 2008). On the material level, the right 
to build mosques and houses of prayer is also an aspect of religious freedom 
(Shadid & Van Koningsveld 1995: 32) and the right to found Muslim schools falls 
under the aegis of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution which guarantees freedom 
of education. At this point, it is important to note that a certain manifestation or 
practice considered to be obedience to religious obligations and prescriptions is not 
necessarily shared by all adherents of the religion concerned or agreed upon by all 
denominations in that religion. After all, religion and culture are contingent on 
interpretation, and therefore diverse and dynamic. Examples are Islamic dressing 
rules for women. The term hijab, usually used to describe a headscarf which covers 
the head but not the face, also refers to an Islamic principle which prescribes 
dressing modestly. This principle applies in public places, more specifically to 
situations in which members of the opposite sex are present who are not close 
family. Shadid and Van Koningsveld (2005) distinguish three different views on 
this principle among Muslim scholars. The majority advocate the full covering of 
the female body, with the exception of the face and hands. A smaller group of 
scholars believes that modesty also requires women to cover their hands and faces, 
except the eyes. A third group of scholars say that Islamic prescriptions on modest 
dress do not apply ‘in the current era’ (2005: 35). In practice, the majority of 
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Muslim women does not wear a headscarf or face-covering veil in daily life, except 
during prayer or when visiting mosques (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2005: 38). 
Once it is established that a certain practice or manifestation is the result of a 
religious prescription, logically the next question is whether it is desirable or legally 
possible to infringe the right of freedom of religion. Legally, it is possible to 
infringe the right of freedom of religion in exceptional cases, primarily when it is 
essential to protect the freedoms of others and in the interests of public safety. This 
infringement is made quite clear in Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This paragraph reads: ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion 
or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.’ In other words, it is possible that (fundamental) rights, such as the 
freedom of religion and freedom of expression, might collide. As neither ECHR 
nor the Dutch Constitution prioritizes one fundamental right over the other, when 
fundamental rights do collide and the parties concerned demand a solution, a 
judge is obliged to take the specific context and interests into account.  
Obvious examples of how freedom of religion can be limited in this legal 
context concern face-covering veils which are worn as religious expressions, such as 
the Islamic niqab (often confused with the burqa). In 2003 the Equal Treatment 
Commission (ETC – see Chapter 5)9 ruled in a specific case that wearing face-
covering veils at school could be prohibited by the school because it can hinder 
communication between students and between teachers and students.10 However, 
another ruling in a case in 2000 shows that ETC does not assume that wearing a 
face-covering veil is always a hindrance to communication.11 The school has to 
present plausible arguments that communication is indeed hindered before ETC 
can reach a decision about whether or not a school can prohibit the wearing of face 
covering veils (also see Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2005: 53). However, in other 
instances ETC has argued that face-covering veils can also be prohibited in schools 
in the interest of public safety, as these veils hinder identification which makes it 
difficult to prevent unauthorized persons from entering school buildings (CGB 
2003). 
Different problems have arisen when some public schools have argued that, in 
order not to impinge on state neutrality, their employees should be prohibited 
from expressing their religion in their appearance or dress. An example is a case in 
                                                     
9 ETC was incorporated into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) in 2012. 
10 ETC ruling 2003-40. 
11 ETC ruling 2000-63. 
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1999 in which ETC considered the argument put forward by a public school that, 
to uphold the neutrality of the school, a trainee teacher should be prohibited from 
wearing an Islamic headscarf. On this occasion, ETC decided that this ban was in 
conflict with the principles of non-discrimination. ETC expatiated on its decision, 
saying that because the trainee teacher ‘professes a certain religion and expresses 
this by wearing a headscarf does not preclude that she has an open attitude and is 
capable to teach in accordance with the character of the school, being a public 
educational institution’ (see also Saharso & Lettinga 2008: 459).12 
That said, inevitably interpretations of state neutrality differ (as discussed in 
Section 6.2), and some interpretations do entail infringements on the freedom of 
religion in certain institutional contexts, for example, the police force. In political 
and public debates other arguments on such infringements have also been 
discussed. Among these is the one asserting that certain religious expressions 
adhered to by immigrants should be prohibited in order to encourage their 
integration. The time has now come to give a brief review of these arguments. 
6.3.2 Policies and debates concerning cultural distinctiveness 
Several phases can be distinguished which are closely related to the course of 
immigrant integration policies discussed in Chapter 5, in political debates on the 
cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands. 
These include the phases of laissez-faire prior to the 1980s, recognition in the 1980s, 
laissez-faire once again in the 1990s, cultural adaptation from 2000 until 2011, and 
the most recent phase of political populism which commenced in 2011 and is still 
current. The overriding characteristic of this last phase is the struggle of both the 
populist right and ultra-orthodox Christian politicians to limit the freedom of 
religion of Muslim citizens (cf. Lettinga & Saharso 2012; Saharso & Lettinga 
2008; Shadid 2006; Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008; Breemer & Maussen 
2012).13 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, prior to the 1980s the Dutch government had 
taken no steps, however tentative, to develop any structural policies which would 
have encouraged immigrant integration. It would have amounted to wasted effort, 
it was felt, as the presence of the labour migrants who had been coming to the 
Netherlands since the 1950s was considered temporary (Penninx 2005). Hence in 
this phase a laissez-faire approach prevailed, and little attention was paid to the 
cultural and religious distinctiveness of immigrants. If immigrants retained 
                                                     
12 ETC ruling 1999-18. 
13 Chapters 3, 4 and 5 also contain reviews of the development of political debates and government 
policies. While some overlap is unavoidable, this section will focus on the issue of the recognition of 
cultural distinctiveness of immigrant groups. 
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elements of their cultural identities, such a preservation was mainly seen with 
approbation as facilitating their return to their countries of origin (WRR 1979). 
Most scientific and policy debates about immigrants centred on such socio-
economic issues as their housing and the advantages and disadvantages of certain 
forms of labour migration (Shadid 2006).  
Once the government had woke up to the fact that most labour migrants 
intended to settle in the Netherlands permanently, in the 1980s it realized that 
steps to control their settlement were inevitable and structural integration policies, 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, were devised. The importance of these new 
policies was stressed in a report called Ethnic Minorities, published by the Scientific 
Council for Government Policy in 1979 (WRR 1979). Following the 
recommendations in this report, the new integration policies were devised with a 
view towards the goal of immigrants achieving equality and their participation in 
society (Penninx 2005). In later criticism of Dutch integration policies, it has been 
asserted that the policies of the 1980s mostly emphasized the necessity to preserve 
the cultural identities of immigrants (Duyvendak & Scholten 2011). At this point, 
it must be unequivocably stressed that this crticism is not correct (Duyvendak & 
Scholten 2012; Vink 2007). In fact, the WRR report of 1979 explicitly states that 
the preservation of cultural identities should not be a goal of integration policies, as 
such encouragement could lead to the ‘cultural isolation of ethnic groups’, which 
in the long run could hinder the participation of immigrants in society. 
Nevertheless, in its report WRR did recommend that it was important to recognize 
the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants. It was thought that this goal could be 
reached by extending the existing guarantees safeguarding cultural diversity (such 
as the constitutional right of freedom of religion) to (new) cultural and religious 
immigrant groups, not only legally but also in practice (1979: XIX; XX-XXII). The 
expected goal of government policies should be the socio-cultural emancipation of 
immigrants which, in turn, was seen as a precondition for the improvement of 
their socio-economic position and hence could prevent putative future identity 
conflicts (see also Chapter 3). Such recommendations imply a plea for 
multicultural government policies. However, several studies indicate that the 
resultant integration policies were mainly affected by the institutional legacy of 
Dutch pillarization,14 for example, by extending existing rights to build prayer 
houses and establish denominational schools to all religious groups. The ideology 
                                                     
14 Pillarization refers to the development in the Netherlands, between the 1900s and the 1970s, in 
which religious and secular groups established their own separate institutions with the (financial) 
support of the government. Among them were political parties, (denominational) schools and labour 
unions (Maussen 2012). 
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of multiculturalism seems to have been very much an also-ran (Duyvendak & 
Scholten 2011; 2012).  
In this context, various legal, political and general public debates started about 
the formal and public recognition of the cultural practices and expressions of 
religious convictions by Muslim and Hindu immigrants and their descendants. 
These debates have led, inter alia, to the inclusion of provisions in collective labour 
agreements of civil servants and in some collective labour agreements in the private 
sector to do with the observance of religious holidays. These accords gave Muslim 
civil servants the right to ask and receive permission for paid leave to observe the 
two generally recognized Islamic holidays – Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha, but only 
when their duties would permit such leave. Several collective labour agreements in 
the private sector, enshrined the same conditions which likewise allowed Muslim 
employees to be entitled to paid leave for one, two or three day(s). Such provisions 
are similar to more general provisions which allow Dutch employees to be granted 
permission for paid or unpaid leave on religious holidays (Shadid & Van 
Koningsveld 2008: 162-164). In the same period, proponents of the recognition of 
cultural identities were arguing that mosques could be built in an ‘ethnic 
architecture to express diversity’ (Breemer & Maussen 2012: 292).15 In a similar 
vein it was also said that Muslim schools could contribute to the integration and 
emancipation of Muslim groups (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2006: 84).  
Opponents attacked this focus on socio-cultural emancipation, claiming that it 
could hinder integration (also see Chapter 5). They were convinced that Muslim 
schools would reduce the social contact of Muslim children with non-Muslim 
children, and that lack of experience with ethnically mixed groups would hinder 
the educational careers of these Muslim students (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 
2006: 84; see also Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 247-258).  
The focus, in integration policies, on socio-cultural emancipation of 
immigrants came increasingly under attack during the 1990s. As mentioned in 
Chapters 3 and 5, in a new report WRR recommended that the focus in these 
policies should shift more to the improvement of the immigrants’ position in the 
fields of education and the labour market, and that socio-cultural emancipation 
was the responsibility of the immigrant groups themselves – implying a 
governmental attitude of laissez-faire towards the cultural distinctiveness of 
immigrants (WRR 1989: 19-24). Following these new WRR recommendations, 
the government changed its integration policies and in 1994 presented these 
                                                     
15 Many discussions concerning mosques in this period had to do with such practical issues as the 
need for housing, the lack of parking space for mosque-goers , etcetera (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 
2008: 58-61). 
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changes in a new policy document, the Contourennota (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken 1994; see also Chapter 5). 
 In the following years, various reports about the quality of education in 
Muslim schools were published. In 1999, the Inspectorate of Education concluded 
that Muslim schools had not managed to realize their central goal of raising the 
performance of their students to match the average level of Dutch students.16 
Nevertheless, the Inspectorate also concluded that the performance of students in 
Muslim schools was no lower than that of students in schools with a comparable 
number of students of non-Dutch origin.17 The disappointing performance of their 
students was attributed to the handicaps with which they entered primary school 
(Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 253-258).  
Around the year 2000, political debates entered a new phase in which the 
cultural adaptation of immigrants emerged as a central issue. As discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 5, several authors claimed that government integration policies had 
failed. They stated that social cohesion was being threatened because these policies 
had focused too much on immigrants’ socio-cultural emancipation and too little 
on the importance of protecting Dutch norms and values. 18  These authors 
hammered on the point that certain norms and values embraced by immigrants 
and their descendants, especially those of Muslims, are incompatible with Dutch 
norms and values. The politician Pim Fortuyn combined these ideas into one 
political discourse, of which important parts were copied by other political parties 
(Penninx 2005; see also Hoving 2011). 
With this change in climate, the political debates on the functioning of 
mosques and Muslim schools shifted. The debates on mosques became increasingly 
concerned with ideas about how mosques should play a role in a development 
towards a more ‘modern’ Islam which would be compatible with Dutch norms and 
values (Breemer & Maussen 2012: 292).19 The focus on Muslim schools altered to 
deterring the possible influence of ‘political Islam’ and the consequences of this 
infiltration for the integration of children attending these schools (for an extensive 
discussion see Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 258-266). In reports in 2002 and 
2003 the Inspectorate of Education concluded that the education in Muslim 
schools was not in contradiction of the ‘basic values of a democratic legal state’, 
                                                     
16 Onderwijsinspectie (1999). 
17 Schools with a relatively high proportion of pupils of non-Dutch origin are often referred to as 
‘black schools’ in the Netherlands. See Vedder (2006). 
18 Among these authors were Scheffer, Bolkestein and Fortuyn. See Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
19 As of 2012, there are around 450 mosques in the Netherlands (FORUM 2012). 
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and moreover that it encouraged the integration of the students.20 So far so good, 
the fly in the ointment was that the teaching quality of the religious education in 
Muslim schools was found to be lacking.21 On the basis of these reports, in April 
2004 the government presented a policy document, in which it stated that there 
was no need to stand in the way of the establishment of Muslim schools as the 
contribution of these schools to the problem of segregation was negligible and that 
the establishment of Muslim schools was in accordance with the constitutional 
freedom of education. The government also announced that a new teaching 
method was being developed to improve religious education.22 The goal of this 
method, published in 2007, is to help Muslim children gain the required 
knowledge to be able to develop the attitudes and behaviour necessary to be able to 
function as a citizen in Dutch society.23 
The individual religious expressions of Muslim immigrants and their 
descendants were also more frequently debated in Dutch Parliament. Among the 
topics broached were religious symbols and dress (notably the Islamic headscarf), 
the refusal of some Muslims to shake hands with persons of the opposite gender, 
and ritual slaughter.24 The religious dress of public officials was a regular topic of 
debate between 2004 and 2006. A majority of Parliament members agreed that the 
neutrality of the state did not warrant the prohibition of wearing an Islamic 
headscarf by employees (and pupils) in public educational institutions (see also 
Section 6.3.1). Despite this liberal attitude, some members of Parliament still 
                                                     
20 Onderwijsinspectie (2002; 2003). In these reports, the Inspectorate also concluded that the 
performance of students in Muslim schools did not differ from that of students in schools with a 
comparable number of students of non-Dutch origin (in line with the results of the study published 
in 1999). 
21 Moreover, the Inspectorate of Education noted that only 0.5% of all primary school students 
attended Muslim primary schools, and that whether ‘the contribution of Islamic schools to the 
integration [of their students] is negative or positive, 96% of the students of non-Dutch origin in the 
Netherlands attend other schools’ (Onderwijsinspectie 2003, cited in Shadid & Van Koningsveld 
2008: 264). 
22 The functioning of the boards of the Muslim schools was also discussed in this policy document. 
Since then, the centre of attention in the political and public debate has shifted to the 
(administrative) problems in specific Muslim schools (Shadid & Van Koningsveld 2008: 265). 
Recent examples are the closure of the Islamitisch College Amsterdam in 2010 because of the poor 
quality of the education, and the exam fraud by students of the Ibn Ghaldoun school in Rotterdam, 
both schools offering secondary education. 
23 ISBO & SLO (2007). 
24 There are also discussions of cases which involve only one or a few incidents but do not seem to be 
exemplary of a larger group. One of these cases involves the Dutch lawyer Mohammed Enait who, in 
2008, refused to rise when the judges entered the courtroom. Enait said he did not rise before the 
judges because of his faith – Islam – which taught him that everyone is equal. See: NRC Handelsblad 
(December 11, 2009), Advocaat hoeft niet te staan voor rechters.  
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argued that the principle of public neutrality necessitates that public officials in 
certain functions, for instance, police officers and court personnel, should not 
openly display their religious affiliation (Lettinga & Saharso 2012: 324). In the 
wake of these debates, in 2007 the Parliament decided that openly displaying 
religious affiliation should be prohibited in the police force.25 
In 2005 the time was ripe for the member of Parliament Wilders, who would 
later found the PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom), to propose that 
burqas should be banned from public spaces.26 Wilders waged a fierce opposition 
declaring that wearing a burqa is incompatible with Dutch norms and values, the 
norm of gender equality being that most sinned against. His motion was accepted 
by Parliament, not because of conflicting norms and values but because such an 
infringement on the freedom of religion was deemed necessary in the interests of 
public safety (Lettinga & Saharso 2012). Not unsurprisingly, the right wing and 
left wing political parties approached the burqa in clearly different ways. Whereas 
Wilders and the VVD (the right-wing liberal People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy) framed the burqa as a symbol of the oppression of Muslim women 
and argued that a ban would be in the interests of gender equality, left wing parties 
shrugged this off and stated that not a ban on religious dress but emancipation is 
the key to gender equality (Lettinga & Saharso 2012).27  
Although it cannot be denied that a majority of parliamentarians interpreted 
most issues of religious symbols and dress in the context of church-state relations 
and the ideal of the freedom of religion, the perception of conflicting norms and 
values also indubitably played an important role in debates on Muslims who refuse, 
on religious grounds, to shake hands with persons of the opposite gender. Matters 
rose to a head in the political discussion in 2006. The discussion was sparked by a 
ruling handed down by the Equal Treatment Commission (ETC)28 on the case of a 
Muslim female teacher who was suspended from her job for such a refusal.29 The 
ETC ruling stated that the demand of the school that employees have to be willing 
to shake hands when greeting others, irrespective of their gender, results in 
(indirect) discrimination on the grounds of religion.30 The Minister of Alien Affairs 
and Integration at the time, Verdonk, criticized this ruling in the media and even 
                                                     
25 Tweede Kamer (2007-2008). 
26 Tweede Kamer (2005-2006). 
27 In 2012, the government proposed to introduce a ban on face coverings, including the burqa. 
However, as of January 2014, the Parliament has not yet voted on this motion. 
28 ETC was incorporated into the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (NIHR) in 2012. 
29 Only very few such cases have so far come before the ETC: no more than 20 cases between 1998 
and the end of 2013. Around half of these cases have led to a ruling (discrimination or not). See 
“Oordelen”, accessed February 27, 2014, http://www.mensenrechten.nl. 
30 ETC Ruling 2006-221. 
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declared that ETC should be abolished. PvdA (Labour Party), D66 (liberal 
Democrats 66) and Green Left (all left-wing opposition parties), on this occasion 
joined by the right-wing government party CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal), 
immediately stated that in their opinion abolition of ETC was just not on the 
cards, although they added that they did not agree with this particular ETC 
ruling.31 Similar cases in later years have also elicited disapproving reactions from 
politicians.32 Some, including parliamentarians of the PVV, have taken the line 
that the refusal of some Muslims to shake hands with persons of the opposite 
gender is a denial of gender equality. 33  This, however, is based on a 
misunderstanding. The refusal to shake hands is not directed specifically against 
either women or men for that matter: this norm implies that men should not shake 
hands with women, and vice-versa. Therefore, this norm does not transgress gender 
equality. Instead, the refusal of these Muslims is meant as an expression of respect 
(Beck & Wiegers 2008). Other politicians, prominent among them the mayor of 
Amsterdam, a prominent member of the PvdA, have argued that shaking hands is 
an important and generally accepted Dutch cultural norm, and that public officials 
have to abide by that norm.34 This view is a clear example of an ethnic and 
exclusive conception of national belonging (see Chapter 3). So far no legislation 
has been proposed in Parliament to enforce this cultural norm.35  
These changes in the political debate since 2000 appear to have been mirrored 
by similar changes in the public debate. In an investigation of the public debate 
about the Islamic headscarf between 1999 and 2007, Saharso and Lettinga (2008: 
469) concluded that, while the headscarf was initially mainly discussed in the 
context of church-state relations, in 2005 the public debate had taken a different 
tack and subsequently the headscarf has been discussed mainly in terms of 
conflicting norms and values and the emancipation of women. Opponents of the 
Islamic headscarf constantly denounce it as a symbol of the unequal treatment of 
women, an idea which is often accompanied by the assumption that Muslim 
women do not have a free choice in whether or not to wear the headdress (see also 
Chesler 2010: 31). It has also been argued that the Islamic headscarf and burqa are 
undesirable deviations from, or even threats to, Dutch norms and values. Adopting 
a different stance, others have argued that a prohibition of the Islamic headscarf 
would imply discrimination on the grounds of religion and impede the 
participation of Islamic women in society (Saharso & Lettinga 2008: 468-469).  
                                                     
31 NRC Handelsblad (November 9, 2006), Verdonk wil commissie kwijt na uitspraak. 
32 See, for example, Tillie (2011). 
33 Tillie (2011).  
34 Tillie (2011).  
35 But see Verhaar (2011). 
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Although the religious practices, norms and values of Muslim immigrants and 
their descendants could be said to have emerged as a central issue in political 
debates after 2000, the actual attention paid by Dutch politicians to this issue 
appears to have peaked in the years 2004 to 2006. The neglect of the issue by 
politicians since 2007 is clearly reflected in recent government policy documents 
on immigrant integration and in the electoral programmes of Dutch political 
parties. In the policy document Integration, Belonging and Citizenship published in 
2011, the government stated that Dutch society is based on a ‘fundamental 
continuity of values, views, institutions and customs which shape the predominant 
culture in Dutch society’.36 The government continues by saying that these values 
and customs cannot simply be abandoned, and immigrants must adjust to the fact 
that: ‘Dutch society, in all its diversity, is the society in which those who settle have 
to learn to live, to which they have to adjust and fit into.’ 37 Tellingly, it chose to 
lay its stress on freedom of religion, which it hastened to add also applies to 
Muslim citizens. Certainly the government was aware of the fact that some Dutch 
citizens do worry about Islam, because it introduces other, alien-seeming traditions 
and views, and has of course recently been associated with ‘violence and 
radicalism’. Opting to go on the defensive, the government considered it to be 
important to dispel these concerns, but without denying Muslim citizens their 
freedom of religion and without expressing a principled distrust of Islam 
(Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011). 
The only concrete policy measure actually announced in this document has to 
do with the ban on face covers, including the burqa. This infringement on the 
freedom of religion was justified by proposing a ban on all face coverings in the 
interests of public safety, and not by making any potentially disruptive remarks 
about the deviant norms and values of others. Parliament has come thus far, but of 
January 2014, it had still not yet voted on this motion. The views in Parliament on 
this issue are still divided. PVV is in favour of a full burqa ban, holding fast to its 
tenet that Islam is a threat to Dutch society and all its expressions or manifestations 
have to be banned. VVD is in favour of a full ban on face coverings because it 
thinks it is essential for people to be ‘recognizable’ in social interactions. PvdA and 
Green Left oppose a full ban. PvdA argues that a full ban violates freedom of 
religion, and that face coverings should only be banned in specific circumstances, 
for instance, in schools when they might hinder communication and compromise 
security. However, as PvdA pointed out in its 2012 election manifesto, such a ban 
                                                     
36 In the document the government speaks of, in Dutch, the leidende cultuur, possibly referring to the 
German term Leitkultur. This can be translated as ‘guiding culture’, ‘leading culture’ or ‘predominant 
culture’. See Pautz (2005). 
37 Author’s translation. 
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is already possible under current legislation (as is explained in Section 6.3.1 
above).38  
Apart from the debate on the burqa, there has also been a broad political 
debate in recent years on the Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter of animals without 
prior stunning.39 These debates have concerned a possible collision between the 
right to freedom of religion and the protection of animal rights. In June 2012, the 
Dutch Senate voted against a parliamentary motion to ban this type of slaughter. 
Senate members stated that the arguments presented to support the ban were not 
strong enough to warrant an infringement on the freedom of religion.40 
Judging from the election programmes of 2012, only two political parties 
which still argue that the religious manifestations and expressions of Muslim 
citizens are undesirable in Dutch society and that the religious freedom of Muslim 
citizens has to be curtailed are left. PVV considers Islam to be a threat to society 
and proposes banning various expressions and manifestations related to it, 
including the Quran, mosques and minarets. On the religious front, the SGP 
(ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party) is calling for a limitation on 
manifestations of ‘cultures and religions that do not belong in Dutch society’. The 
party most certainly does not consider Islam an enrichment for Dutch society, and 
in its protests stresses the ‘fanatical and extremely violent aspects’ of Islam. It has 
called for the construction of mosques to be stopped, and has demanded that the 
public call to prayer from minarets be banned. 41 The proposals of these two parties 
not only violate freedom of religion, they also run counter to the principles of non-
discrimination, as what they are asking for does not contain demands for any 
similar bans on manifestations and expressions of other religions (see Section 6.3.1 
above and Chapter 5). 
This discussion has clearly revealed that the Dutch Constitution, especially the 
articles guaranteeing non-discrimination and freedom of religion, provides the legal 
context for the formal recognition of cultural and religious distinctiveness in the 
Netherlands. Whether and how to limit the freedom of religion of Muslim citizens 
in the Netherlands has been debated from every conceivable angle, especially 
between 2000 and 2006. After that point, in recent years only the populist right 
and the ultra-orthodox Christian politicians have been left still battling the tide 
and trying to limit this right. It is now time to move on to explore the views 
current in society about the recognition of the religious distinctiveness of Muslims. 
                                                     
38 GroenLinks (2012); PvdA (2012); PVV (2012); VVD (2012). 
39 For more information on this practice see Shadid & Van Koningsveld (2008: 151-154). 
40 Questions were asked about whether ritually slaughtered animals suffer more than animals which 
are stunned prior to slaughter. 
41 PVV (2012); SGP (2012). 
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6.4 Views in society on cultural distinctiveness 
In this section, the views prevalent in Dutch society to do with (immigrants’) 
distinctive cultural practices, norms and values will be examined by analysing 
empirical data collected in the two questionnaires conducted for this research. As 
these questionnaires were conducted in 2012 and 2013, the answers reflect the 
situation as it was several years after the political debates on this issue peaked (see 
Section 6.3). The analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, the views in 
society on the value of cultural diversity will be examined, and in the second part 
the ideas about the recognition of religious distinctiveness will be explored. 
6.4.1 Views in society on the value of cultural diversity 
To explore general views on the value of cultural diversity, respondents were asked 
whether they considered the cultural diversity resulting from immigration to be an 
enrichment or an impoverishment of Dutch society. The analysis indicates that 
around 42% do consider the cultural diversity resulting from immigration to be an 
enrichment of society. Nevertheless, almost one-fifth (19%) thinks that it has 
caused an impoverishment, and one-third (32%) have no opinion about whether it 
results in either an enrichment or impoverishment.  
Those who consider cultural diversity to be an enrichment for society referred 
to its value as a resource for learning and mentioned the value of such well-known 
cultural markers as cuisine, music and dance. The general theme reflected in what 
was said was that living in a culturally diverse society improves reflective, critical 
and creative thinking: ‘It is easier to find solutions to problems when you are 
confronted by and acquainted with the various points of views resulting from 
cultural difference’, as one respondent said. Ely and Thomas (2001: 240) call this 
kind of enrichment an ‘integration-and-learning perspective’, when cultural 
diversity is considered to be a ‘resource for learning and adaptive change’. 
Those who considered cultural diversity to be an impoverishment of society 
referred above all to the religious practices, norms and values of Muslim 
immigrants, which they consider to be incompatible with Dutch culture. They 
referred to Muslims’ unequal treatment of women, their negative attitude towards 
homosexuality and their intolerance of non-Muslims. These arguments will be 
discussed more extensively in the next section. 
To explore the relationships between the appreciation of cultural diversity and 
variables such as gender, age, educational level and political preference, a Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.42 These relationships can be seen 
in the following ‘joint plot of category points’ where the strength is indicated by 
                                                     
42 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA. 
 Multicultural citizenship and cultural distinctiveness 161 
the distance between the categories in the plot: the smaller the distance, the 
stronger the relationship. 
 
Figure 6.1: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of appreciation of 
cultural diversity and other factors. All respondents (n=710). (Variable principal normalization.) 
 
As the ellipses in the plot indicate, three clusters can be distinguished. Each cluster 
is represented by the categories of the items measuring the appreciation of cultural 
diversity: ‘Enrichment’, ‘Impoverishment’ and ‘Neither’. As the two items 
measuring this appreciation appear to be strongly correlated, these items were used 
to construct a summated scale describing the level of this appreciation of cultural 
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diversity.43 A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to assess more closely 
to what extent this appreciation is related to the above mentioned variables.44 
This analysis and the plot presented above indicate that respondents in the first 
cluster, on the left in the plot, can be characterized as rejecters of cultural diversity. 
The majority of them voted for the political parties PVV or SGP (political 
preference: β = .28, p < .001).45 In contrast, respondents in the second cluster, to 
the right in the plot, can be characterized as appreciatives, the majority of whom 
have voted for the left-wing political parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left or for the 
Christian CDA. The third cluster includes those who think cultural diversity 
neither enriches nor impoverishes society. Many of them voted for the left-wing SP 
(Socialist Party) or did not vote at all. The voters for the VVD and CU (Christian 
Union) are clearly divided on the issue. Furthermore, cultural diversity appears to 
be more appreciated by those with a higher level of education (β = .33, p < .001) 
and by women (β = .10, p < .05). Not surprisingly, the analysis also indicates that 
immigrants of both non-Western and Western origin are more appreciative of 
cultural diversity than are the native Dutch (β = .18, p < .001).  
As mentioned already, respondents who do not appreciate cultural diversity 
tend to refer to the norms and values of Muslim immigrants, which are perceived 
to be incompatible with Dutch norms and values. To explore views on the 
preservation of Dutch norms and values, respondents were asked whether and why 
this preservation is important. A large majority (88%) indicated that the 
preservation of Dutch norms and values is important, and 10% did not have an 
opinion on the issue. The former applies to more than 95% of voters for Christian 
and right wing parties (CDA, SGP, CU, VVD, PVV) as opposed to around 82% 
of the non-voters and voters for left-wing parties (PvdA, D66, SP, Green Left) (β = 
.28, p < .001).46 In expressing their views on this preservation in concrete terms, 
they mentioned such cultural items as the equal treatment of women and 
homosexuals, freedom of speech and tolerance of cultural diversity. Those who do 
not consider the preservation of Dutch norms and values to be important and 
those who do not have an opinion on the issue argued that it is far from obvious 
which norms and values are typically Dutch and that culture changes over time. 
                                                     
43 Cronbach’s Alpha for these two items is .81.  
44 This analysis included the variables age, gender, educational level, income, descent and political 
preference. In the CATREG procedure, the summated scale was specified as ordinal and discretized 
by ranking, as the scale was derived from ordinal items. 
45 All mentioned βs in this Chapter are standardized. 
46 A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to explore the relationship between political 
preference and the importance attached to the preservation of Dutch norms and values, in which was 
controlled for age, gender, educational level and descent. 
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However, they did agree that human rights, including equal treatment of women 
and homosexuals, should be protected. 
6.4.2 Views in society on the recognition of religious distinctiveness 
In the previous section, it was made clear that respondents who are of the opinion 
that cultural diversity is an impoverishment for the Netherlands tended to harp on 
the incompatibility of Dutch and Muslim norms and values. This is not surprising, 
considering the fact that the political debates on cultural distinctiveness in the last 
two decades have primarily pivoted around the religious practices and the norms 
and values of Muslim immigrants and their descendants (see Section 6.3). To 
examine this finding in more depth, this section will explore the views held on the 
recognition of religious distinctiveness. 
A fifth (21%) of respondents considers Islamic and Dutch norms and values to 
be compatible. They explained that individuals interpret their religion, including 
Islam, in various ways and that only the specific norms and values of a small 
majority of Muslim, Christian and other religious citizens are unacceptable to the 
majority of Dutch citizens. In contrast, the majority (61%) considers Islamic 
norms and values to be incompatible with Dutch norms and values. This idea is 
reflected in respondents’ views about wearing religious symbols and specific items 
of dress. Although a small minority (9%) disapproves of the wearing of any 
religious symbols and dress in public space, a considerably larger proportion of 
respondents (21%) disapproves of Muslim women wearing a headscarf in public 
space. 
The opposition to certain aspects of the formal recognition of religious 
distinctiveness is even larger, as can be seen in Table 6.1 below. To explore views 
on these aspects, respondents were asked whether certain expressions and 
manifestations of religion of ‘new’ religious groups in the Netherlands should be 
allowed.  
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Table 6.1 
Opinions on formal recognition of religious distinctiveness of ‘new’ religious groups (all respondents).  
Expression or manifestation Yes (%) No (%) 
Right of public officials (including teachers) to wear Islamic headscarf 41 47 
Right to build prayer houses 56 34 
Right to establish denominational schools 22 69 
Right to observe religious holidays 58 31 
Right to ritual slaughter (without prior stunning) 20 69 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
 
The table shows that more than two-thirds (69%) opposes both the legal right to 
ritual slaughter and granting new religious groups the right to establish their own 
denominational schools. There is much less opposition to granting new religious 
groups the right to build prayer houses (34%) and to observe their religious 
holidays (31%). Respondents tend to be more divided on the issue of public 
officials, including teachers, wearing the Islamic headscarf, with almost half (47%) 
opposed. 
Those who oppose a formal recognition of the expressions mentioned in the 
table above argued that manifestations of Islamic culture, such as the Islamic 
headscarf, mosques, Muslim schools and Islamic holidays, do not belong in the 
Netherlands. ‘Dutch employers should not take Islamic holidays into account, after 
all, we are in the Netherlands,’ one respondent said. They also mentioned the 
incompatibility of Islamic and Dutch norms and values. They argued that Islamic 
norms and values are contrary to the principles of the equal treatment of women 
and homosexuals, and that Muslims are intolerant of non-Muslims. However, 
although these respondents were of the opinion that the Islamic headscarf does not 
belong in the Netherlands, only a few considered it to be a symbol of the unequal 
treatment of women. 
Another argument brought forward is that Muslim citizens who observe their 
religion tend to force their culture and religion on non-Muslims. This can be 
considered a prejudice against Muslims, especially as those respondents could not 
substantiate their opinion. Some said that wearing the Islamic headscarf is 
‘provocative’ or ‘intentionally conspicuous’ in order to force Islam upon non-
Muslims. In the same vein, it was argued that there should not be too many 
manifestations of Islam, because this would force Islam upon non-Muslims. 
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‘Muslims could take over,’ respondents said, and ‘They have to adapt to our 
culture, we should not adapt to theirs’. Likewise, some respondents argued that 
teachers in public schools should not wear an Islamic headscarf because it is too 
conspicuous and forces the religion of the teacher upon the children. Strikingly, 
the religious expressions of Christian and Jewish teachers were not considered to be 
a problem because they are ‘less conspicuous’ and because ‘wearing a cross or 
yarmulke is typically Dutch, unlike the Islamic headscarf’. 
These findings tie in with results of studies discussed by Maliepaard and Phalet 
(2012: 131-132), who conclude that the ‘religious identity, values and ways of life 
[of Muslims] are devalued by large parts of the majority’ of Dutch citizens, and 
that more than half of the Dutch ‘hold unfavorable views of Muslims’ and view 
Dutch and Muslims values as incompatible (see also Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). 
Some respondents mentioned arguments which voiced concern about the 
effects on integration. They were insistent that Muslim schools should be 
prohibited because they will hinder integration, but Christian and Jewish schools 
do not. Others worried about problems with the financial and organizational 
administration of Muslim schools. These arguments about integration seem to be 
similar to claims made by critics of multiculturalism discussed in Section 6.2, 
among them Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (2005). Nevertheless, 
respondents palpably consider Muslim schools, and not the formal recognition of 
religious distinctiveness as such, to be an obstacle to integration. Only a few 
respondents argued that all denominational schools, including Christian and 
Jewish schools, should be banned in order to prevent segregation and facilitate 
integration. In short, it appears that respondents who oppose the aspects 
mentioned in the table above do not oppose the formal recognition of religious 
distinctiveness in itself, but reject the presence of certain manifestations of Islam in 
the Netherlands.  
These respondents did not believe that the formal recognition of cultural 
distinctiveness – for example, allowing police officers to wear an Islamic headscarf 
– would conflict with the neutrality of the state, in contrast to the ideas of such 
opponents as Cliteur (2004), mentioned in Section 6.2. Likewise, the formal 
recognition of religious distinctiveness, such as the freedom of religion, was not 
associated with the risk of multiple loyalties or decreasing loyalty to the nation-
state by respondents, in contrast to the arguments espoused by several Dutch right-
wing politicians and scholars, such as Huntington (2004) (see Chapter 4). 
Respondents who are in favour of the formal recognition of the religious 
manifestations mentioned in the table above stress the importance of equal 
treatment and the freedom of religion. They were also convinced that it is 
important for children to be able to become acquainted with cultural and religious 
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diversity at school. In their view, the Islamic headscarf should be allowed in school 
to show children that tolerance of cultural and religious diversity is an important 
cultural aspect, and that the headscarf is no more and no less than a religious 
expression of individuals. However, both the opponents and proponents of the 
formal recognition of Islamic expressions agreed that the burqa should be banned 
because it hinders communication. 
The arguments mentioned in relation to ritual slaughter were clearly different. 
Opponents did not argue that Islamic and Dutch norms and values are 
incompatible, but referred to animal rights. They were concerned that ritual 
slaughter (without prior stunning) causes animals suffering. In contrast, those who 
did not oppose this doubted whether ritual slaughter causes more suffering for 
animals than conventional ways of slaughtering. 
To explore the relationships between views on the formal recognition of 
religious distinctiveness and such variables as gender, age, educational level and 
political preference, a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was carried out.47 
This analysis included 4 of the above-mentioned items to do with the freedom of 
religion, and 2 items measuring whether employers and healthcare providers 
should take the cultural and religious distinctiveness of employees and clients into 
account. 48 The relationships can be seen in the following ‘joint plot of category 
points’ in which relationships between the categories are displayed. The closer the 
categories in the plot are to each other, the stronger their relationship. 
                                                     
47 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of exploring data using MCA. 
48 This analysis includes the religious manifestations mentioned in Table 6.1 above, with the 
exception of the item on ritual slaughter, because the discussion on ritual slaughter appears to be 
more about animal rights than about the perceived incompatibility between Islamic and Dutch norms 
and values.  
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Figure 6.2: Joint Plot of Category Points. Multiple Correspondence Analysis of aspects of formal 
recognition of religious distinctiveness and other factors. All respondents (n=710). (Variable principal 
normalization.) 
 
The ellipses in the plot indicate two clusters. Each cluster is represented by the 
categories of the items measuring views on the formal recognition of religious 
distinctiveness: ‘Yes’ indicating approval and ‘No’ indicating disapproval.  
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As the items measuring these views appear to be strongly correlated, a 
CATPCA analysis which included these items was carried out. In this analysis, two 
components were extracted.49 The first component includes the items to do with 
religious freedom, and hence represents tolerance of religious distinctiveness. The 
second component represents consideration for cultural distinctiveness, as it includes 
the two items on whether employers and healthcare providers should take the 
cultural and religious distinctiveness of employees and clients into account. These 
items were used to construct summated scales to describe the levels of this tolerance 
and consideration.50 A Categorical Regression analysis was carried out to assess to 
what extent these two scales are related to the above-mentioned variables.51 
This analysis and the plot above indicate that respondents in the cluster to the 
left in the plot can be characterized as tolerant of religious distinctiveness. They are in 
favour of granting (‘new’) religious groups the right to build prayer houses, 
establish denominational schools, observe their religious holidays and the right of 
public officials and teachers to wear the Islamic headscarf. By and large, they are 
considerate of cultural distinctiveness, that is, hold the view that employers and 
healthcare providers should take the cultural or religious distinctiveness of 
employees and patients into account. These respondents generally voted for the 
left-wing parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left and the Christian parties CDA and 
CU. The cluster on the right includes respondents who can be characterized as 
intolerant of religious distinctiveness – those who are not in favour of the aspects 
mentioned above. They generally voted for the PVV and SGP. Voters for the VVD 
and SP, between the two clusters, appear to have an average level of tolerance for 
religious distinctiveness (political preference: β = .31, p < .001). These results are 
similar to those presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40), 
who found that in France, Germany, Spain and the United States, political 
conservatives appear to have a more negative attitude towards Muslims. 
                                                     
49 A CATPCA analysis with option ‘impute missing values with mode’ resulted in 2 components with 
eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 2 components could 
be extracted, which explained 59.63% of the total variance. (A CATPCA analysis with option 
‘exclude missing values’ gave similar results.) The resulting transformed variables were saved and used 
to rotate the components in PCA with oblique rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some 
technical background).  
50 Cronbach’s Alpha for the four items in the scale describing tolerance of religious distinctiveness is 
.73; Cronbach’s Alpha for the two items in the scale describing consideration for cultural 
distinctiveness is .69.  
51 This analysis included the variables age, gender, educational level, income, descent and political 
preference. In the CATREG procedure, the summated scales were specified as ordinal and discretized 
by ranking, as the scales were derived from ordinal items. 
 Multicultural citizenship and cultural distinctiveness 169 
Not surprisingly, non-Western immigrants appear to be more tolerant of 
religious distinctiveness (β = .23, p < .001) and more considerate of cultural 
distinctiveness (β = .16, p < .001) than Western immigrants and native Dutch, in 
line with findings of Verkuyten and Martinovic (2006) and of Van de Vijver, 
Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and Breugelmans (2006: 113). Generally, the higher 
the respondents’ level of education, the more tolerant (β = .38, p < .001) and 
considerate (β = .19, p < .001) they are of religious and cultural distinctiveness. 
The latter finding ties in with results discussed by Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and 
Schalk-Soekar (2008: 98) regarding Dutch natives and immigrant groups, and 
results presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40) who 
analysed survey data from France, Germany, Spain and the United States. 
These levels of tolerance and consideration appear to be relatively strongly and 
negatively related to the importance respondents attach to exclusive (ethnic) 
criteria for Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western 
name and a Christian background discussed the in Chapter 3 (tolerance: β = -.50, 
p < .001; consideration: β = -.22, p < .001). This tolerance and consideration is 
clearly less strongly (but still negatively) related to the importance they attach to 
inclusive (civic) criteria for national belonging, such as feeling Dutch (tolerance: β 
= -.22, p < .001; consideration: β = -.20, p < .001). Similar relationships were 
found to the importance attached to territorial criteria for national belonging, such 
as having been born and living for most of one’s life in the country (tolerance: β = -
.19, p < .001; consideration: β = -.17, p < .001). Furthermore, these levels of 
tolerance and consideration are strongly negatively related to the prejudice that 
immigrants present a cultural and economic threat (discussed in Chapter 5) 
(tolerance: β = -.61, p < .001; consideration: β = -.43, p < .001) (cf. Stupar, Van de 
Vijver, Te Lindert & Fontaine 2014: 33). Unsurprisingly, these levels of tolerance 
and consideration are positively related to support for the principle of equal 
treatment (discussed in Chapter 5) (tolerance: β = .17, p < .001; consideration: β = 
.12, p < .01). Similar relationships were found with support for national anti-
discrimination policies (also discussed in Chapter 5). 
These findings are in line with social identity theory. The analysis in Chapter 3 
indicates that the importance respondents attach to criteria of national belonging is 
positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands, and research in 
the tradition of social identity theory indicates that group members with a strong 
affective commitment to the group tend to defend their group distinctiveness by 
exaggerating the differences between their in-group and out-groups, a practice 
which can result in a high degree of self-stereotyping and discrimination (and 
hence intolerance) of out-group members (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002). In 
this respect, those perceived by the majority group to deviate from the majority’s 
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nominal group characteristics are not fully recognized as group members and can 
be marginalized to protect the in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see 
also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005). On the strength 
of the analysis above, these marginalized group members appear to be Muslim 
immigrants. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, this study is synchronic and does not explore 
changes in public views over time, as the data were collected within a limited time 
frame (2012-2013). Therefore, it is not possible to assess whether the changes in 
the political debates and policies concerning immigrants and their descendants, as 
reviewed in this and the previous chapters, are reflected in changing public views 
on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship. However, Van de Vijver and his 
colleagues have carried out cross-sectional and longitudinal studies to examine 
possible changes in attitudes of Dutch citizens towards multiculturalism (Van de 
Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar 2008; Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & 
Schalk-Soekar 2009). Interestingly, they found that, despite the changes in the 
political debates since the year 2000, the public support for multiculturalism ‘has 
remained remarkably stable’ between 1999 and 2007 (Van de Vijver, Breugelmans 
and Schalk-Soekar 2008: 99). However, the scales these authors used to measure 
attitudes towards multiculturalism do not include specific items to do with aspects 
of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness and consideration for cultural 
distinctiveness, as discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, these authors included a 
wide range of items in their questionnaires, on cultural diversity in general, 




                                                     
52 In various studies, these authors use different terms to describe Dutch natives, including ‘Dutch 
mainstreamers’ (Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar 2008), ‘Dutch majority members’ 
(Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar 2009) and ‘Dutch natives’ (Breugelmans & Van de 
Vijver 2004). 
53 For an overview of these items, see Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar (2009: 659). 
Chapter 7  
Conclusions and theoretical 
considerations 
7.1 Introduction 
This study set out to explore public views on three potentially divisive issues in 
Western societies which are in the process of becoming increasingly multicultural, 
that is, ethnically and culturally diverse: the recognition of national belonging, 
equality and cultural distinctiveness of both native and immigrant citizens. As said 
in Chapter 1, multiculturalism is the term used to refer to forms of recognition 
which can be seen as normative responses to the (cultural) diversity of society 
(Vermeulen & Slijper 2003). These issues of recognition are potentially divisive, as 
they concern processes determining the inclusion and exclusion of groups in the 
nation-state on the basis of their ethnic, cultural and religious distinctiveness (cf. 
Kymlicka 1995). Consequently, these issues engender fundamental debates on 
citizenship and are therefore considered central dimensions of multicultural 
citizenship (Shadid 2009; cf. Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul 2008). Hence, a 
multicultural society is defined as one which is not only ethnically and culturally 
diverse, but in which these dimensions of multicultural citizenship are formally and 
publicly recognized as well (Shadid 2009). 
Chapter 1 mentions that the scientific studies on multiculturalism have been 
many and varied and have included research on policies and regulations which are 
relevant to the context of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, few studies to with the 
goal of exploring public views about the dimensions of multicultural citizenship 
have been conducted (cf. Devos & Banaji 2005; Hjerm 1998; Díez Medrano & 
Koenig 2005). In an effort to step into this breach, this study has focused on 
answering the main research question about the views of Dutch citizens on the 
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three dimensions of multicultural citizenship. (Nota bene: the goal of this study is 
not to examine whether individuals would pass a civic integration test or are eligible 
for citizenship.) 
It must be stressed that because so few studies of these public views exist, the 
scope of this study is necessarily wide and it is exploratory in nature. Quantitative 
and qualitative data have been collected among Dutch citizens, including both 
native Dutch and first- and second-generation immigrants, using a survey (n=710) 
and semi-structured in-depth interviews (n=66). These methodological aspects 
have been extensively discussed in Chapter 2. 
In this concluding chapter, the time has come to make an attempt to answer 
the research question by sifting and discussing the main empirical findings relating 
to public views on the dimensions of multicultural citizenship, which have been 
presented in Chapters 3 to 6. At the same time an assessment will to made to try to 
discover whether the three theoretically distinguished dimensions of multicultural 
citizenship are indeed empirically distinct. The thesis will conclude with a brief 
discussion of recommendations for policy measures. 
7.2 Empirical dimensions of multicultural citizenship 
In this section, a summary of the main empirical findings of this study will be 
presented. The section is divided into three parts, each discussing public views on 
one of the dimensions of multicultural citizenship: national belonging, including 
loyalty and multiple citizenship (the subject of Chapters 3 and 4), equality 
(discussed in Chapter 5) and cultural distinctiveness (the subject of Chapter 6).  
7.2.1 Public views on national belonging 
Respondents disagree about who can be fully included in the Dutch national 
group. In other words, national belonging is not determined only by the status of 
legal citizenship, but is inescapably imbued with social aspects as well (see Chapter 
3). 
The analysis in this study indicates that the respondents have four distinct 
conceptions of national belonging: civic, territorial, ethnic and legal (see Section 
3.4.3.2). On average, they appear to attach most importance to the civic type, 
which refers to such relatively inclusive criteria for belonging to the national group 
as feeling Dutch, feeling more attached to the Netherlands than to other countries 
and having a knowledge of Dutch history and culture. At the other end of the 
scale, least importance is attached to the ethnic type of national belonging, based 
on such exclusive criteria as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a 
Christian background.  
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Interestingly, these two types of national belonging appear to be empirically 
distinct from the territorial type, which includes such criteria as having been born 
in the Netherlands and having grown up and living for most of one’s life in the 
country. By and large, the respondents consider this type to be almost as important 
as the civic one and more important than ethnic national belonging. The 
distinction between the territorial and ethnic types of belonging is explained by the 
analysis of the qualitative data: those who considered the territorial criteria to be 
important, also argued that these are necessary preconditions for being able to feel 
Dutch or having a sense of belonging to the Netherlands. In other words, the 
territorial criteria are seen as preconditions for the civic aspects of national 
belonging. This finding nuances the distinction between ethnic and civic types of 
national belonging indicated in studies by Hjerm (1998) and Kunovich (2009). In 
these studies the territorial criteria – id est, having been born and living for most of 
one’s life in the country – are not distinct from, but part of, the ethnic type. 
Therefore these authors suggest that citizens who attach importance to territorial 
criteria have an ethnic and exclusive conception of national belonging. In the 
Netherlands, these territorial criteria appear to be inclusive for the descendants of 
first-generation immigrants and for those first-generation immigrants who have 
lived most of their lives in the Netherlands as well (see Sections 3.4.3.2 and 3.2.5). 
The fourth type of Dutch national belonging distinguished in the present 
study – the legal type – implies exclusive legal citizenship, namely, not holding 
multiple citizenship. Generally speaking, although respondents consider this type 
almost as important as the civic type of national belonging, as discussed in Section 
4.4.1, they found it difficult to explain the necessity of this exclusiveness. Those 
who did try to elaborate on this issue argued that multiple citizenship can indicate 
a lack of commitment and fewer feelings of loyalty to the Netherlands. They would 
say that therefore immigrants who want to naturalize should renounce their 
original citizenship. This view coincides with theoretical arguments presented by 
such scholars as Renshon (2004) and by right-wing Dutch politicians, especially 
members of the PVV (right-wing populist Party for Freedom) and the SGP (ultra-
orthodox Protestant Reformed Political Party), as discussed in Sections 4.2 and 
4.3. This view implies that exclusive legal citizenship is a precondition for the civic 
aspects of national belonging as well.  
The levels of importance respondents attach to these four types of Dutch 
national belonging are all positively related to their affective commitment to the 
Netherlands (see Section 3.4.3.2). This accords with social identity theory, as 
research in this field indicates that group members with a strong affective group 
commitment tend to defend their group distinctiveness by exaggerating their 
differences with the out-groups (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002). 
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However, it seems that the respondents’ commitment to the Netherlands is 
more strongly related to the civic type than to the other types of national 
belonging. This, and the above-mentioned importance attached to the civic aspects 
of Dutch national belonging, corresponds with the findings of Duyvendak (2011), 
who argues that Dutch citizens are increasingly constructing national group 
boundaries by stressing the importance of expressions and feelings of national 
belonging.  
All four types of Dutch national belonging distinguished are considered to be 
more important by native Dutch than they are by non-Western immigrants and 
their descendants. At the same time, native Dutch consider themselves to be more 
typically Dutch, which is not surprising considering that social identity theory 
indicates that members of majority groups tend to deem their own nominal group 
characteristics to be self-evident (Verkuyten 2005: 59), and hence tend to construct 
clear and distinctive group boundaries (Theiss-Morse 2009).  
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 5.3.3, the more importance the 
respondents attach to criteria for national belonging, the stronger their prejudice 
that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic threat. (Respondents’ 
prejudice will be discussed in more detail in the next part of this section.) It 
therefore comes as no surprise that the more exclusive the type of national 
belonging, the stronger its relationship to this type of prejudice. The strength of 
this prejudice towards immigrant groups is most strongly related to the ethnic type 
of national belonging (β = .56, p < .001), and is clearly less strongly related to 
either the type of exclusive legal citizenship (β = .40, p < .001), the territorial (β = 
.36, p < .001) or the civic type (β = .26, p < .001).1 This relationship ties in with 
social identity theory as well, as research indicates that those who are perceived by 
the majority as deviating from their own nominal group characteristics are not fully 
recognized as group members and can be marginalized to protect the in-group 
stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-Morse 
2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005).2 
Moreover, the importance attached to the most exclusive types of Dutch 
national belonging – the ethnic type and exclusive legal citizenship – appears to be 
negatively related to educational level. These relationships with prejudice and 
educational level have been explained by Kunovich (2009: 585), who argues that 
those with a lower educational level tend to attach more importance to exclusive 
                                                     
1 All values for β mentioned in this chapter are standardized. They are the results of Categorical 
Regression analyses described in Chapters 3 to 6, in which at least the following predictor variables 
were included: descent, religion, age, gender, educational level, income and political preference.  
2 As mentioned in Chapter 3, this relates to the process of re-fencing, described by Allport (1954), 
and the related process of sub-typing (cf. Richards & Hewstone 2001). 
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criteria for national belonging because they perceive an economic threat from 
immigrants and their descendants (who generally share their lower socio-economic 
status) (cf. Kaya & Karakoç 2012: 37). 
Finally, the analysis indicates that the importance respondents attach to the 
types of Dutch national belonging is related to political preference as well. Voters 
for right-wing parties generally attach more importance to criteria for national 
belonging, whether they be inclusive or exclusive. Most importance is attached to 
the types of national belonging by PVV and SGP voters, which corresponds with 
statements made by the members of Parliament representing these parties, who 
have repeatedly stressed the importance of (exclusive) boundaries of the Dutch 
national group during the last decade (as discussed in Sections 3.3, 4.3, 5.2.2 and 
6.3). 
Despite the finding that immigrant respondents consider themselves to be less 
typically Dutch than do native Dutch respondents, no significant differences were 
found in the levels of affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state 
between native Dutch and Western and non-Western immigrants and their 
descendants (similar results regarding national self-identification were found by 
Vroome, Verkuyten and Martinovic 2014: 11-13) (see Sections 3.4.1 and 4.4.2.2). 
Similarly, no differences in commitment and loyalty to the Netherlands were 
found between respondents with single citizenship and those with multiple 
citizenship. Importantly, the affective commitment of immigrants, including those 
with multiple citizenship, to their own ethnic and religious groups, does not seem 
to conflict with their affective commitment and loyalty to the Netherlands. On the 
contrary, their affective commitments to their ethnic and religious groups and to 
the Netherlands are positively related. (However, research by Martinovic and 
Verkuyten (2012) among Muslim Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and 
Germany has indicated that, while national identification and religious group 
identification are not always mutually exclusive, the relationship between these 
identities can depend on conditions such as the extent to which ‘Western and 
Islamic ways of life’ are seen as compatible, and perceived discrimination.) In other 
words, it appears that neither ethnic and religious identity nor indeed multiple 
citizenship undermine immigrants’ attachment and loyalty to the nation-state. 
These findings accord with the insights of the Scientific Council for Government 
Policy (WRR 2007), the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ 2008), 
De Hart (2005b) and Ronkainen (2011), and contradict the theoretical and 
hypothetical arguments put forward by politicians and scholars, as among them 
Barry (2002), Huntington (2004) and Renshon (2004), who argue that cultural 
distinctiveness and multiple citizenship undermine commitment and loyalty to the 
nation-state (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3). 
176 Chapter 7 
Interestingly, it was found that loyalty to the nation-state has several 
empirically distinct expressions, including various types of patriotism (nationalist, 
uncritical and symbolic), national-political pride, national-cultural pride and shame 
arising from negative aspects of Dutch national history (see Section 4.4.2.1). 
Nationalist patriotism refers to an idealization of one’s nation and feelings of 
national superiority (cf. Sumner 1906; Druckman 1994). The finding that this 
expression of loyalty is empirically distinct from the other expressions corresponds 
to the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007) and Blank, Schmidt and Westle 
(2001) discussed in Section 4.2.2 (who label this type of loyalty ‘nationalism’ – see 
also Feshbach 1987, 1990, discussed in Druckman 1994). 
A matter of some importance, uncritical patriotism illustrates that not all 
expressions of loyalty to the country to which a person belongs further its interests, 
as uncritical patriotism refers to abstaining from or opposing any criticism of one’s 
country, which gainsays the principles of democracy (cf. Schatz, Staub & Lavine 
1999 discussed in Section 4.2). According with the findings of Parker (2009), 
uncritical patriotism appears to be distinct from symbolic patriotism, which entails 
attaching emotional importance to ritual practices or symbolic representations of 
the country, among them such customs as playing the national anthem or hoisting 
the national flag (cf. Huddy & Khatib 2007). 
In its turn, symbolic patriotism appears to be distinct from national-political 
pride, which includes pride in Dutch democracy, the economy and the welfare 
state, Dutch political influence in the world and the according of equal rights in 
Dutch society, and national-cultural pride, which refers to pride of Dutch 
achievements in sport, science and technology and the arts and literature. These 
two components of national pride correspond to the dimensions of national pride 
found by Hjerm (1998: 343-344) in his analysis of empirical data from Australia, 
Germany, Britain and Sweden. On the other hand, one expression of national 
shame was measured: shame arising negative aspects in Dutch national history. 
This expression involves the shame aroused by Dutch actions negatively affecting 
‘others’ in the past, including Dutch involvement in colonialism and slavery. These 
expressions of pride and shame relate to what Keller (2007) calls ‘loyalty in 
identification’: a strong tendency to identify with the nation-state which can result 
in feelings of pride and of shame (see Section 4.2.1). 
Finally, the analysis also suggests a distinct constructive type of patriotism, 
expressed by criticizing the country to further its interests (see also Schatz, Staub & 
Lavine 1999). However, the questionnaires included only one item which relates to 
this expression.  
Except for the shame aroused by the negative aspects of Dutch national 
history, all these expressions of loyalty appear to be positively related to, but 
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simultaneously empirically distinct from, the affective component of national self-
identification, corresponding to the findings of Huddy and Khatib (2007). 
Importantly, this means that expressions of loyalty to the nation-state can be 
considered to be expressions of national attachment, but not to be indicators of the 
affective component of national self-identification, as discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
Although these expressions of attachment to the Dutch nation-state do not 
appear to be related to the variables descent, multiple citizenship and strength of 
ethnic or religious identity (mentioned above), it did turn out that some of these 
expressions are related to prejudice, age, educational level and political preference 
(see Sections 4.4.2.2 and 5.3.3). The strength of the prejudice that immigrants are 
a cultural and economic threat appears to be positively, but only slightly, related to 
the affective component of national self-identification (β = .15, p < .05), but more 
strongly related to national-political pride (β = .31, p < .001), uncritical patriotism 
(β = .27, p < .001) and nationalist patriotism (β = .22, p < .001), and negatively 
related to shame arising from the negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = -
.29, p < .001). Nevertheless, no significant relationships were found between this 
type of prejudice and the other expressions of loyalty mentioned above: national-
cultural pride, symbolical patriotism and the item which indicates constructive 
patriotism. This agrees with the study of Spruyt and Vanhoutte (2009: 18) 
discussed in Section 4.2.2. They found that a positive evaluation of one’s national 
in-group (expressed by loyalty) is a necessary precondition for, but does not 
necessarily imply, a negative evaluation of immigrant groups (expressed by 
prejudice) (see also Coenders 2001; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002: 169-170). 
Furthermore, the relationships between loyalty and this type of prejudice do 
not appear to be (fully) mediated by educational level, as the calculations of the 
above mentioned βs were controlled for educational level and other variables (see 
Section 5.3.3). Regardless of their level of prejudice, the educational level of 
respondents is negatively related to symbolical patriotism (β = -.15, p < .001) and 
uncritical patriotism (β = -.17, p < .001) and positively related to national-political 
pride (β = .20, p < .001) and constructive patriotism (β = .20, p < .001). It was also 
found that age is positively related to the affective component of national self-
identification (β = .15, p < .05), symbolic patriotism (β = .25, p < .001) and shame 
felt about the negative aspects of Dutch national history (β = .20, p < .05). 
Finally, political preference is related to some of these above-mentioned 
expressions of loyalty as well. Voters for liberal parties (the right-wing liberal 
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy – VVD, and the left-wing liberal 
Democrats 66 – D66) and the right-wing populist PVV clearly feel less shame 
about the negative aspects of Dutch national history than voters for left wing (the 
Labour Party – PvdA, and the Green Left party) and Christian parties (the right-
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wing Christian Democratic Appeal – CDA, the Christian Union – CU and SGP) 
(β = .31, p < .001). Voters for parties on the right of the political spectrum (VVD, 
CDA and PVV) tend to be more uncritically patriotic than voters for parties on the 
left of the political spectrum (PvdA, the Socialist Party – SP, D66 and Green Left) 
and non-voters (β = .21, p < .001). Similarly, Huddy and Khatib (2007) found 
that those who classified themselves as right-wing conservatives tended to be more 
uncritically patriotic. They explained this by referring to the relationship between 
authoritarianism and uncritical patriotism: authoritarians, like uncritical patriots, 
tend to refrain from or oppose criticism of their own country and authoritarians 
tend to vote for (conservative) parties on the right of the political spectrum (see 
Section 4.4.2.2).  
7.2.2 Public views on citizens’ equality 
A large majority (more than 90%) of respondents supports the principle of the 
equal treatment of citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Those who 
do not support this principle appear to have a specific view about who can be fully 
included in their national group: they attach more importance to the exclusive 
(ethnic) criteria for Dutch national belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors, a 
Western name and a Christian background (β = -.22, p < .001). The support for 
the principle of equal treatment also appears to be negatively related to educational 
level (β = -.14, p < .005) and, not surprisingly, to the strength of the prejudice that 
immigrants are a cultural and economic threat (β = -.19, p < .001). Furthermore, 
PVV and SGP voters are slightly less in favour of the equal treatment principle (β = 
.12, p < .001) (see Section 5.3.3). 
Despite the strong support of respondents for the principle of equal treatment, 
national anti-discrimination policies are supported by a smaller, but still sizeable 
majority of 68%. Almost half (47%) of the respondents thinks that these policies 
should be improved. They are convinced that more effective policies, such as quota 
measures and preferential treatment, are necessary and should be introduced. They 
also stated that such policies will and can only be effective when politicians stop 
making polarizing statements. Around 13% oppose anti-discrimination policies. 
Some of the native Dutch opponents stated that the problem of discrimination is 
exaggerated and that ‘it is the immigrants’ own fault’, because, as one respondent 
said, ‘They want to be different from the Dutch’. However, other opponents, both 
Dutch natives and immigrants, said that such policies are not effective because it is 
impossible to ‘cure’ adults of prejudice and discrimination by introducing such 
measures, and that the only way to prevent discrimination is by teaching children 
about equal treatment from a very young age.  
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Immigrants of non-Western origin and their descendants appear to be more in 
favour of national anti-discrimination policies than the native Dutch (β = .14, p < 
.005). Furthermore, the opponents of anti-discrimination policies attach more 
importance to the exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national belonging, such as having 
Dutch ancestors and a Western name (β = -.23, p < .001), and have a stronger 
prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat (β = -.37, p < .001). 
This concurs with the theories discussed in Section 5.3.1, which postulate that 
opposition to anti-discrimination policies can be explained by an existing bias 
towards other groups caused by social categorization, that is, attaching importance 
to criteria for national belonging, or the perception of group threat (cf. Bobo & 
Fox 2003; Shadid 2007: 209) (see Section 5.3.3).  
Not surprisingly, the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic 
threat is stronger among native Dutch and immigrants of Western origin than 
among those of non-Western origin (β = .22, p < .001). This prejudice appears to 
be strongest among voters for PVV and SGP, followed by voters for VVD, SP and 
CU. Voters for PvdA, D66, Green Left and CDA are the least prejudiced (β = .36, 
p < .001). In more general terms, this type of prejudice is negatively related to 
educational level (β = -.33, p < .001) (see Section 5.3.3). 
Turning to the items included in the prejudice scale,3 more than a third (37%) 
of native Dutch respondents believe that too many immigrants (and their 
descendants) are living in the Netherlands. These findings are similar to those 
presented by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259). (According to these authors, the 
percentage of the Dutch population that is of the opinion that there are too many 
immigrants living in the Netherlands has decreased, from around 50% in the 
1990s and 53% in 2002 to 39% in 2008.) Those who hold this view, argued that 
immigration leads to the growth of such problems as segregation, crime, pressure 
on the job market and are the source of unacceptable economic costs to the 
country. With respect to the job market, native Dutch were more concerned about 
labour migrants from Eastern Europe (55%) than about immigrants who held 
Dutch nationality (36%). A much lower percentage (24%) does not believe there 
are too many immigrants in the Netherlands. Some asserted that the Netherlands is 
historically an immigration country and it has absorbed many immigrants from 
various parts of the world. These views are related to the perception that 
immigrants present a threat to Dutch culture. Of the native Dutch, 44% feel that 
their culture is under threat. They were concerned that the norms and values, 
especially those of Muslim immigrants, might become too influential. A similar 
                                                     
3  As discussed in Section 5.3.3, a prejudice scale was constructed using six items to explore 
relationships between this type of prejudice and other variables including educational level. 
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percentage (40%) was found in 2008 by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 259-260). 
(These authors found that this percentage is on the rise, from 18% in 1995 to 40% 
in 2008, with the strongest increase taking place in the period 2000-2005, when 
the political and public debate on the multicultural society peaked) (see Section 
5.3.3). 
Interestingly, although the strength of the prejudice that immigrants present a 
cultural and economic threat appears to explain the opposition to anti-
discrimination policies (as discussed above) to a substantial extent, it barely 
explains the opposition to the preferential treatment of (naturalized) immigrants 
and their descendants in the context of job applications (β = -.14, p < .05). 
Moreover, the analysis indicates that this type of prejudice accounts only for a 
small part of the difference between respondents’ opposition to preferential 
treatment of immigrants (74% of native Dutch and 53% of non-Western 
immigrants opposed) and their opposition to a similar policy for women (around 
50% of all groups opposed). Likewise, this opposition cannot be explained by 
respondents’ views on who fully belongs to the national group. There are no 
significant relationships between this opposition and the importance they attach to 
such criteria for national belonging as having Dutch ancestors and/or a Western 
name, just expounded above. These findings contradict two theories discussed by 
Bobo and Fox (2003), which postulate that opposition to preferential treatment 
can be explained by a bias towards immigrants, resulting from either the perception 
of an ethnic threat or from the process of social categorization (namely, attaching 
importance to criteria for national belonging). This suggests that opposition to 
such policies in the Netherlands could be explained by a third theory discussed by 
Bobo and Fox, that is, this opposition is rooted in ‘race-neutral values and 
ideologies such as fairness or individualism’ (Bobo & Fox 2003: 323; see Section 
5.2). Indeed, respondents did argue that such policies can cause stigmatization, and 
that gender or ethnicity should never be used as criteria in selection procedures.  
Cogently, results from the qualitative interviews reveal unmistakably that 
preferential treatment is often confused with positive discrimination measures: 
many respondents mentioned that preferential treatment implies ‘reverse 
discrimination’ and is therefore unacceptable. Such a lack of understanding of 
these policies might also explain part of the opposition to them. Nonetheless, the 
substantial difference between the opposition to preferential treatment for 
immigrants and preferential treatment for women remains largely unexplained (see 
Section 5.4.3).  
While the preferential treatment of immigrants in the context of job 
applications appears to be supported by only a small minority, more than two-
thirds of respondents is in favour of national policies devised to encourage their 
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integration. Interestingly, during the in-depth interviews none of the proponents of 
such policies mentioned that specific measures should be implemented to reduce 
the substantive disadvantages of minorities on the labour market – which appears 
to be in line with the opposition to preferential treatment just mentioned. 
However, they did say that the government should create the necessary 
preconditions for and remove the barriers for preventing participation, for 
example, by providing courses teaching Dutch language and culture. Moreover, 
they suggested an anti-discrimination policy because they considered 
discrimination an obstacle to full participation. Respondents also mentioned that 
the government should implement policies to promote tolerance of cultural 
diversity, or, conversely, counter the ‘harmful influences of Islam’. This latter issue 
which is tied up with the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, will be discussed in 
more detail in the next section. 
7.2.3 Public views on cultural distinctiveness 
Respondents’ views on who can be fully included in the Dutch national group 
appear to be related not only to their support of equal treatment and anti-
discrimination policies, but also to their views on the cultural distinctiveness of 
immigrants. At this point, it must be stressed that respondents appear to associate 
the ‘cultural distinctiveness of immigrants’ primarily with such Islamic religious 
manifestations as mosques, Muslim schools and the Islamic headscarf. Importantly, 
the analysis indicates that both respondents’ tolerance of such religious 
distinctiveness and their appreciation of cultural diversity in general are much 
lower than their support for the principle of equal treatment. While over 90% of 
respondents supports the latter principle (as mentioned above), only 42% do 
consider the cultural diversity resulting from immigration to be an enrichment of 
society, and the opposition to certain aspects of the formal recognition of religious 
distinctiveness is substantial. For example, almost half (47%) opposes the right of 
public officials (including teachers) to wear an Islamic headscarf and 34% oppose 
granting new religious groups the right to build prayer houses (see Sections 6.4.1 
and 6.4.2). These findings concerning the different levels of approval of the 
principle of equal treatment and cultural distinctiveness tie in with the results 
presented by Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and Breugelmans (2006: 
113) (see also Van de Vijver, Breugelmans & Schalk-Soekar 2008: 96). 
Not surprisingly, the analysis indicates that respondents’ tolerance of such 
religious distinctiveness is relatively strongly and negatively related to the 
importance they attach to such exclusive (ethnic) criteria for Dutch national 
belonging, as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background 
(β = -.50, p < .001). This tolerance is clearly less strongly (but still negatively) 
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related to the importance respondents attach to more inclusive criteria for national 
belonging, such as feeling Dutch and having been born and living for most of one’s 
life in the country (civic criteria: β = -.22, p < .001; territorial criteria: β = -.19, p < 
.001). Finally, this tolerance of religious distinctiveness is strongly and negatively 
related to the prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic threat (β = -
.61, p < .001), and positively related to support for the principle of equal treatment 
(β = .17, p < .001). 
Similar results were found with regard to respondents’ consideration for 
cultural distinctiveness, namely, to what extent do they think it is important that 
employers and healthcare providers should take the cultural and religious 
distinctiveness of employees and clients into account. The lower respondents’ 
support for such consideration, the more important they deem the criteria for 
national belonging and the stronger their prejudice that immigrants are a threat 
(see Section 6.4.2). 
Bearing in mind that the importance respondents attach to criteria of national 
belonging is positively related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands, 
these findings accord with social identity theory. Research in this tradition 
indicates that group members with a strong affective commitment to the in-group 
tend to defend their group distinctiveness by exaggerating the differences between 
their in-group and out-groups, an exercise which can result in a high degree of self-
stereotyping and discrimination (and thus intolerance) of out-group members 
(Ellemers, Spears & Doosje 2002). In a nutshell, those perceived by the majority 
group as deviating from the majority’s nominal group characteristics are not fully 
recognized as group members and run the risk of being marginalized to protect the 
in-group stereotype (see Sections 3.2 and 5.2.1; see also Bobo & Fox 2003; Theiss-
Morse 2009: 74; Verkuyten 2005). Looking at the analysis of respondents’ views, 
these marginalized group members appear to be the Muslim immigrants. 
Given these findings, it is not surprising that non-Western immigrants appear 
to be more tolerant of religious distinctiveness than are either Western immigrants 
or the native Dutch (β = .23, p < .001), in line with findings of Verkuyten and 
Martinovic (2006) and of Van de Vijver, Schalk-Soekar, Arends-Tóth and 
Breugelmans (2006: 113). Unsurprisingly, tolerance of religious distinctiveness is 
positively related to educational level (β = .38, p < .001). This is in line with 
findings of Van de Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar (2008: 98) regarding 
Dutch natives and immigrant groups, and results presented by Ogan, Willnat, 
Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40) who analysed survey data from France, 
Germany, Spain and the United States. And, considering the public views on 
national belonging and equality discussed above, it is not surprising that voters for 
PVV and SGP are the least tolerant, followed by voters for VVD and SP, whereas 
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voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left are most tolerant of 
religious distinctiveness (β = .31, p < .001). The latter results are similar to those 
presented by Ogan, Willnat, Pennington and Bashir (2014: 40), who found that in 
France, Germany, Spain and the United States, political conservatives appear to 
have a more negative attitude towards Muslims than liberals. 
Generally, respondents who have a strong tendency to construct national group 
boundaries and/or who are prejudiced towards immigrants appear to reject such 
Islamic religious expressions as headscarves and mosques. In other words, they 
oppose the freedom of religion of Muslim citizens. They stated that these 
expressions are inappropriate in the Netherlands. They also said that these outward 
symbols force Islam upon non-Muslims, an assertion which can be considered a 
prejudice against Muslims, especially because these respondents could not 
substantiate their opinion. A majority (61%) are convinced that Islamic norms and 
values are incompatible with Dutch norms and values. Nevertheless, the outward 
religious symbols adopted by Christian and Jewish teachers are not considered a 
problem because they are ‘less conspicuous’ and because ‘wearing a cross or 
yarmulke is typically Dutch, unlike the Islamic headscarf’ (see Section 6.4.2). 
These findings tie in with results of studies discussed by Maliepaard and Phalet 
(2012: 131-132), who conclude that the ‘religious identity, values and ways of life 
[of Muslims] are devalued by large parts of the majority’ of Dutch citizens, and 
that more than half of the Dutch ‘hold unfavorable views of Muslims’, and regard 
Dutch and Muslims values as incompatible (see also Huijnk & Dagevos 2012). 
Some respondents’ arguments against the formal recognition of religious 
distinctiveness appear to be in line with those used by critics of multiculturalism, 
discussed in Section 6.2. Hence, it was argued that Muslim schools are an obstacle 
to the integration of Muslim immigrants, an idea similar to arguments defended by 
Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy (2005). However, it is noteworthy that 
respondents consider Muslim schools, and not the formal recognition of religious 
distinctiveness as such, to be an obstacle to integration. Only a few respondents 
argued that all denominational schools, including Christian and Jewish schools, 
should be banned in order to prevent segregation and facilitate integration. In 
short, it appears that by and large respondents do not oppose the formal 
recognition of religious distinctiveness as such, but reject the presence of Islamic 
manifestations in the Netherlands. 
Interestingly, those respondents who opposed the formal recognition of 
religious distinctiveness did not believe that such recognition – for example, 
allowing police officers to wear an Islamic headscarf – would conflict with the 
neutrality of the state, in contrast with the ideas of such opponents as Cliteur 
(2004), mentioned in Section 6.2. Explicitly, the formal recognition of religious 
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distinctiveness, such as the freedom of religion, was not associated by respondents 
with the risk of the development of multiple loyalties or any decrease in loyalty to 
the nation-state, in contrast with arguments propounded by several Dutch right-
wing politicians and such scholars as Huntington (2004) (discussed in Sections 4.3 
and 4.2 respectively). 
7.3 Multicultural citizenship: a multi-dimensional concept? 
This study was based on the theoretical assumption that the three dimensions of 
multicultural citizenship set out above are distinct (Shadid 2009). To assess this 
assumption empirically, a Categorical Principal Components Analysis was carried 
out including items on the boundaries of the Dutch national group (discussed in 
Chapter 3), the recognition of social and legal equality (discussed in Chapter 5), 
and the recognition of cultural distinctiveness (discussed in Chapter 6). The 
analysis indicates seven distinct components, of which the (rotated) loadings are 
presented in the following table (7.1).4 
Items which cluster on these components indicate that public views on the 
three dimensions of multicultural citizenship, distinguished by Shadid (2009) and 
suggested by other proponents of multiculturalism (Vermeulen & Slijper 2003), 
are indeed empirically distinct. In other words, the normative response of citizens 
to the cultural diversity in their society assumes three distinct aspects.  
Two of these dimensions, recognition of national belonging and recognition of 
cultural distinctiveness, can actually be sub-divided into several components. The 
components of the dimension of national belonging include the territorial (C2), 
civic (C3), ethnic (C4) and legal (C6) conceptions as discussed in Section 3.4.3.2 
(see also 7.2.1 above). Components of the dimension of cultural distinctiveness 
include the tolerance of religious distinctiveness (C1) and consideration for cultural 
distinctiveness (C7), discussed in Section 6.4.2 (see also 7.2.3 above). The 
component representing the dimension of equality (C5) includes only two items 
(on the importance of equal treatment and anti-discrimination policies), as views 
on positive action appeared to be unrelated (see Section 5.4.3). This limitation has 
been discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
                                                     
4 A CATPCA analysis with option ‘impute missing values with mode’ resulted in 7 components with 
eigenvalues over 1. The scree plot and interpretation of the items indicated that 7 components could 
be extracted, which explained 60.15% of the total variance. Variance Accounted For per item was 
higher than 35%. (A CATPCA analysis with option ‘exclude missing values’ gave similar results.) The 
resulting transformed variables were saved and used to rotate the components in PCA with oblique 
rotation (direct oblimin) (see Chapter 2 for some technical background). 
 Conclusions and theoretical considerations 185 
Table 7.1 
Public views on the recognition of (aspects of) multicultural citizenship. Component loadings (Categorical 
Principal Components Analysis, transformed variables rotated with PCA). 
Items C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
Importance of criteria for being perceived as
a ‘true Dutch person’: 
   
Born in the Netherlands .03 .44 -.18 .36 -.11 -.37 .05 
Lived in the Netherlands for most of one’s life .02 .88 .01 .07 .07 .04 .02 
Grown up in the Netherlands -.03 .83 .04 .09 -.04 -.11 .08 
Lived in the Netherlands for part of one’s life -.01 .81 .08 -.07 .14 .15 -.01 
Feel Dutch .04 .07 .77 -.12 .09 -.02 .01 
Have knowledge of Dutch history and culture -.05 .02 .76 .12 -.07 .10 .01 
Feel more attached to the Netherlands and the 
Dutch than to other countries or other ethnic 
groups 
-.04 .03 .69 .13 -.16 -.07 .05 
Speak Dutch .19 .14 .50 -.17 -.07 -.42 -.08 
Proud of the Netherlands .07 -.11 .37 .25 .22 -.26 -.01 
Have a Western name .13 .04 .09 .76 -.03 -.04 -.04 
Have a Christian background .00 -.08 .07 .77 .12 .19 .04 
Have a Western European appearance .08 .18 .00 .66 -.07 -.05 -.01 
Have Dutch ancestors .03 .16 -.05 .62 -.23 -.20 .00 
Having Dutch nationality -.05 .06 .19 -.07 -.04 -.71 .07 
Only have Dutch nationality and no other 
nationalities 
.06 -.10 -.01 .19 .11 -.60 .19 
Importance of equal treatment of cultural 
minorities 
.02 -.10 -.03 .05 -.69 -.14 .01 
Importance of anti-discrimination policies .06 -.06 .16 .00 -.68 .29 .21 
(Table continued on next page)
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(Table 7.1 continued)
Items C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
Acceptability of wearing Islamic headscarf in public .79 -.05 .04 .07 .07 .02 .03 
Acceptability of wearing religious dress or symbols .66 ,02 .10 .02 .10 .10 .11 
Right of public officials (including teachers) to 
wear Islamic headscarf 
.66 -.05 -.01 .14 .14 .12 .21 
Right to observe religious holidays .68 .08 -.00 .02 -.30 .02 -.17 
Right to build prayer houses .65 .01 -.13 .01 -.21 -.19 -.06 
Right to establish denominational schools .38 -.01 -.06 -.09 .04 -.31 .17 
Importance of taking cultural/religious 
distinctiveness into account by healthcare providers
-.05 .02 .05 .02 -.09 -.02 .85 
Importance of taking cultural/religious 
distinctiveness into account by employers 
.11 .07 -.05 -.07 -.06 -.09 .76 
Eigenvalues 5.51 2.57 1.92 1.54 1.26 1.13 1.12 
Variance accounted for (%) 22.02 10.26 7.68 6.15 5.05 4.52 4.47 
Note. n = 710. Weighted disproportionate stratified sample, consisting of 3 sub-samples, including 
native Dutch (n1 = 468), non-Western immigrants (n2 = 202) and Western immigrants (n3 = 33) (see 
Chapter 2). 
Note. The items have been sorted by loadings on each component. Loadings with a value higher than 
.30 are shown in bold. The loadings of the items used as surrogate variables or for constructing scales 
in Chapters 3 to 6 are italicized. 
 
Finally, these components not only appear to be empirically distinct but as the 
analysis presented in Sections 5.3.3 and 6.4.2 indicates, they are inter-related, and 
related to the prejudice that immigrants pose a cultural and economic threat. 
Consequently, as has been discussed in Section 7.2 above, the fact that respondents 
disagree about who can be fully included in the national group implies that they 
also differ in their views on to what extent such citizens’ rights as equal treatment 
and freedom of religion, of certain groups within their nation-state should be 
upheld.  
The finding that support for the principle of equal treatment and national anti-
discrimination policies (items on component C5 in the table above) is positively 
related to tolerance of religious distinctiveness (C1) and consideration for cultural 
distinctiveness (C7) (see Section 6.4.2), seems to tie in with findings of Van de 
Vijver, Breugelmans and Schalk-Soekar (2008: 96). However, the study of the 
latter authors indicates that issues of cultural diversity (including aspects of 
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equality) are perceived by Dutch natives5 on a single dimension, and not on 
distinct dimensions as indicated by the present study. This difference might be due 
to the fact that the scales these authors used to measure attitudes towards 
multiculturalism do not include specific items to do with aspects of the formal 
recognition of religious distinctiveness and consideration for cultural 
distinctiveness (see also Section 6.4.2).6 
7.4 Recommendations for policy measures 
As said in Chapter 1, debates on multicultural citizenship are potentially divisive, 
as they concern the processes determining the inclusion and exclusion of groups in 
the nation-state. In an attempt to contribute to the inclusion of various groups of 
Dutch citizens in Dutch society, this section includes suggestions for a few 
recommendations for policy, devised on the basis of the findings of this study. 
These recommendations relate to the three dimensions of multicultural citizenship: 
national belonging, equality of citizens and groups’ cultural distinctiveness. 
 
National belonging 
Considering that Dutch citizenship entails equal rights and duties and considering 
that the Dutch government is endeavouring to strengthen social cohesion in society 
and improve the ability of citizens to deal with diversity (Ministerie van Sociale 
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2013), 
  
 It is recommended that politicians, other public officials and the media 
should stress the Dutch national belonging of immigrants who possess 
Dutch citizenship, irrespective of their national origin or ethnic, cultural 
or religious background.  
 
The results presented in Section 3.4.3.2 indicate wide public support for this view: 
respondents generally consider such inclusive criteria for national belonging as 
having Dutch citizenship and feeling Dutch, to be more important than such 
exclusive criteria as having Dutch ancestors or a Christian background. A change to 
this type of emphasis on national belonging is highly important because 
respondents who do attach importance to such exclusive criteria for national 
belonging as having Dutch ancestors tend to oppose granting equal rights to and 
                                                     
5 These authors use the term ‘Dutch mainstreamers’. However, they discuss earlier studies in which 
the term ‘Dutch natives’ is used (e.g. Breugelmans & Van de Vijver 2004). 
6 See also Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar (2009: 659). 
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equal treatment of immigrants and their descendants, and especially the right to 
freedom of religion of Muslim citizens (see Sections 5.3.3 and 6.4.2). 
This means that, as a rule, priority should be given to immigrants’ Dutch 
identity and belonging and that their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious 
background should only be mentioned when relevant to the context concerned. 
Stressing the latter aspects of citizens’ identity in situations in which they are not 
relevant can lead to the perception that these aspects conflict with ‘being Dutch’ or 
with ‘Dutch culture’, which implies that these citizens do not fully belong to the 
national group (see also the discussion in Sections 3.2.3 and 5.3.2). The natural 
upshot is that the national government should recognize that immigrant 
integration is being hindered not so much by immigrants’ cultural or religious 
distinctiveness, but principally by their socio-economic disadvantages and by 
discrimination (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).  
More specifically, following the example of the municipalities of The Hague 
and Amsterdam, national and local governments should consider avoiding the term 
allochthon. As discussed in Section 3.3, the use of this term essentially implies 
ethnic labelling (as it refers to descent), which means that describing someone as 
allochthon can lead to the perception that he or she does not fully belong to the 
national group. Indeed, the results of this study indicate that this term is generally 
used by respondents to describe those who do not fully belong to the national 
group or are considered to present a cultural threat to Dutch society (see Section 
3.4.3). 
Furthermore, the national government should consider adapting the national 
canon of Dutch history and supervise the way in which it is used in the curricula of 
primary and secondary schools. First and foremost, the canon should reflect that 
the Netherlands has been a country of immigration since at least the sixteenth 
century (Lucassen & Lucassen 2011), and, by employing proper teaching methods, 
it should be used to help pupils to recognize the contribution made by immigrants 
to Dutch culture and society, and this should include those who have come to the 
Netherlands in the past 50 years. In this respect, religions ‘new’ to Dutch society, 
such as Islam and Hinduism, can be considered Dutch religions specific to the 
‘new’ Dutch, as is the case with the many regional cultures (values and practices) in 
the Netherlands. In a second step, the construction and dynamic character of the 
canon itself should be discussed in schools. Pupils have to learn to recognize the 
various factors (such as immigration, ideology, power relations) which are 
constantly influencing the dynamic process of interpreting and defining important 
aspects of ‘Dutch history’, and learn that this process is part of the social 
construction of ‘who we are’, that is, our national identity. (See also Section 3.3.) 
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On a more general level, politicians and other public officials should be careful 
when making references to an idealized and nostalgic ‘national past’, and stress the 
fact that there should be a shift in the focus to that of a shared future, in which 
migration and cultural diversity are inevitable and not inherently problematic. 
Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the principle of non-discrimination 
and the tolerance of all ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the Netherlands, 
including immigrants, are important aspects of Dutch history and culture. As 
discussed in Section 3.2.3, research by Smeekes, Verkuyten and Poppe (2012) 
shows that those who perceive Dutch national history to have been tolerant tend to 
be more accepting of the cultural and religious distinctiveness of Muslims in the 
Netherlands. In this wave of positiveness, it is important not to dismiss anxieties 
about immigration, as these anxieties reflect the fact that national identities are 
relatively stable and consequently views on national belonging generally change 
slowly (see Section 3.2.5). Because immigration and cultural diversity are 
inevitable, the government should communicate about these changes and anxieties 
regularly and advisedly with the public. Very importantly, politicians should 
refrain from exploiting these anxieties with an eye to the ballot box.  
The national government should also consider amending the Dutch 
Nationality Act, by abolishing the requirement that applicants for Dutch 
citizenship have to renounce their original citizenship. This requirement is 
problematic, as it suggests that those who have multiple citizenship (currently more 
than one million citizens) might be less loyal and hence do not fully belong to the 
Dutch national group. Caution is advised as this requirement requires that the 
government publicly emphasizes, as it did in 2007,7 that multiple citizenship does 
not undermine or hinder immigrants’ loyalty to the nation-state, integration and 
national belonging. This timely emphasis is important, as the results discussed in 
Section 4.4.1 indicate that almost half (49%) of respondents oppose multiple 
citizenship because of these perceptions.  
A large majority of respondents (84%) supports the idea that pupils should 
learn how to deal effectively with cultural diversity in society at school (see Section 
5.2.3.3). On the basis of this support, this recommendation can be introduced into 
the educational system, for example, by extending the existing focus on the 
multicultural character of the Dutch nation-state in school curricula. 
Finally, the national government should consider establishing a Multicultural 
Council, modelled after the Australian Multicultural Council,8 as an official and 
                                                     
7 Ministerie van Justitie (2007: 2). 
8 See Australian Multicultural Council, accessed April 25, 2014, http:// http://www.amc.gov.au. 
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independent advisor to the government on multicultural affairs, that is, the 
intercultural management of Dutch society. 
 
Citizens’ equality 
Considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to equal treatment and that 
discrimination is not permitted, enshrined in Article 1 of the Constitution, and 
considering the fact that the Dutch government recognizes the persistence of 
discrimination, that it should take the proper steps to prevent and combat any 
form of it by authorities, organizations and citizens themselves (Ministerie van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2012; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 2013), 
 
 It is recommended that national and local governments and societal 
organizations should improve the possibilities for reporting discrimination 
and extend and strengthen existing anti-discrimination measures. 
 
This study indicates that almost half (47%) of the respondents is of the opinion 
that national anti-discrimination measures should be improved and that only a 
small minority (13%) holds the view that such measures are not needed. At the 
same time, more than 90% supports the principle of equal treatment (see Section 
5.3.3). 
Respondents in this study frequently referred to the lack of effectiveness of 
anti-discrimination measures. As the discussion in Section 5.3.2 indicates, there are 
several possible reasons for this lack of effectiveness. Among the most prominent 
are a lack of awareness of anti-discrimination legislation, the fact that this 
legislation is only effective when those individuals who are being discriminated 
against take action, for example, by lodging a complaint, and the fact that 
institutional discrimination is not being addressed directly. In order to prevent and 
combat various forms of discrimination more effectively, the national and local 
governments and organizations should pass various measures properly devised to 
raise awareness about and knowledge of what discrimination is about, to improve 
complaint procedures, to combat and prevent negative stereotypes, and to address 
institutional discrimination. 
In order to raise awareness about and knowledge of discrimination, the 
implementation of codes of conduct in organizations should be promoted. Such 
implementation would lower the threshold and facilitate the ability of individuals 
and organizations to recognize and deal with discriminatory behaviour. Such a set-
up can also make provision for complaints procedures. Municipalities should be 
able to provide individuals and organizations with effective knowledge about what 
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discrimination is and advice on (preventive) anti-discrimination measures. The 
national government should regularly run awareness campaigns to inform the 
public about all the possibilities to report discrimination. In 2009 and 2010 these 
sorts of campaigns proved to be very successful. In all these measures to raise 
awareness and knowledge, it should be stressed that discrimination is by no means 
a phenomenon of the past and that combating and preventing discrimination 
effectively depends on the willingness of individuals and organizations to discuss 
the problem openly. This willingness can be encouraged by implementing 
intercultural management in organizations, central to which is the principle that 
every employee, student or pupil belongs there as an equal member, irrespective of 
their national origin or ethnic, cultural or religious background. Intercultural 
management should become the basis for promoting tolerance and the principle of 
non-discrimination. 
To uphold the non-discrimination principle, it is extremely important to 
prevent and combat negative prejudice against all groups in society. At this point, 
it is important to realize that the overwhelming support for the principle of equal 
treatment and anti-discrimination policy alluded to above does not imply that the 
level of negative prejudice is low. As the results discussed in Section 5.3.3 indicate, 
37% of Dutch native respondents believes that there are too many immigrants in 
the Netherlands and that their presence is leading to more crime, rising pressure on 
the job market and unacceptable economic costs to the country. A larger 
percentage (44%) of Dutch native respondents thinks that immigrants, Muslims in 
particular, present a threat to Dutch culture.  
Despite these perceptions, a large majority (90%) of respondents is in favour of 
teaching pupils in schools to treat people of various cultural backgrounds equally 
(see Section 5.3.3). Several measures can be implemented to assure this goal, chief 
among them avoiding textbooks which contain stereotypes and negative prejudice, 
and educating pupils about the diversity within ethnic, cultural and religious 
groups. This requires, however, that the ongoing education curriculum for teachers 
includes learning how to recognize and deal with manifestations of racism and 
discriminatory behaviour. 
Another area in which it is vitally important to prevent and combat negative 
stereotypes is within organizations, especially among managers and employees’ 
councils. The requirement that managers and members of employees’ councils 
should regularly take courses to recognize and deal with negative stereotypes could 
be included in the codes of conduct and in collective labour agreements. 
In order to address institutional discrimination more effectively, employees’ 
councils (in Dutch: medezeggenschapsraden and personeelsvertegenwoordigingen) 
should be allowed sufficient time and be equipped with the knowledge needed to 
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carry out their existing legal task of combating discrimination and promoting equal 
treatment within their organizations. Codes of conduct could and indeed should 
anonymous complaint mechanisms and offer the possibility for positive action 
measures so as to increase the diversity of employees’ councils themselves. Local 
and national governments should not stand idly by but be prepared to address 
institutional discrimination, for example, by conditionally disqualifying employers 
who are found guilty of discrimination from tendering public contracts. On the 
national level, the national government should consider introducing a clause in the 
Criminal Code which will allow courts to consider a racist motivation a specific 
aggravating circumstance, as this could act as a real deterrent. 
As the effectiveness of measures to prevent and combat discrimination seems to 
be limited, the government should also consider combating the effects of 
discrimination, especially in the labour market. The government could reconsider 
its decision in 2011 that integration policies should no longer target specific groups 
(as is clear from the policy document Integration, Belonging and Citizenship, see 
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 2011), and implement 
temporary measures for positive action more widely, following the examples of the 
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization9 of 
Dutch Parliament.10 However, this requires efforts to increase public support for 
such measures, as the findings of this study indicate that a majority of the 
respondents oppose positive action (see Section 5.4.3). This opposition might 
partly be explained by a misunderstanding of the measures concerned: respondents 
said that they oppose positive action because it implies positive discrimination. 
However, positive discrimination is forbidden by law in the Netherlands, whereas 
preferential treatment is perfectly legal. 
Respondents also mentioned that anti-discrimination measures can only be 
effective if and when the government, and more specifically the politicians, set a 
good example. Consequently, politicians, other public officials and the media 
should take a stand against racist discourse and avoid ethnic profiling, for instance, 
by not making empirically ungrounded suggestions that ethnic or religious 
background can explain problematic behaviour. As discussed in Sections 3.2.3 and 
5.3.1, these suggestions can pave the way to the espousal of prejudice, which in its 
turn can lead to intolerance and discrimination. 
  
                                                     
9 In Dutch: ondersteunende/ambtelijke organisatie. 
10 The Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the supporting organization of Dutch 
Parliament implemented preferential treatment measures (in 2010 and 2008 respectively), to increase 
the number of ethnic minority employees (see Section 5.4.2). 
 Conclusions and theoretical considerations 193 
Cultural distinctiveness 
Considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to profess their religion either 
individually or in a community with others, enshrined in Article 6 of the 
Constitution, and considering that Article 23 of the Constitution guarantees the 
freedom of education and considering that all Dutch citizens have the right to 
expect equal treatment, 
 
 It is recommended that politicians, other public officials and the media 
stress that the freedom of religion and freedom of education apply equally 
to all (religious) groups in the Netherlands. 
 
Such an emphasis is of great importance, as the findings discussed in Section 6.4.2 
indicate that there is substantial opposition to the freedom of religion and freedom 
of education for Muslims, although generally speaking respondents do not oppose 
the principles of freedom of religion and freedom of education. Cogently, by and 
large respondents are not of the opinion that the Dutch interpretation of freedom 
of religion – which, for example, allows teachers in public schools to wear an 
Islamic headscarf – conflicts with the neutrality of the state. 
Importantly, politicians should realize that wide support for an inclusive 
conception of national belonging and the principle of equal treatment (discussed 
above) does not imply a high level of tolerance for all (religious) groups in society. 
In the context of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, support 
for the freedom of religion of Muslims can be generated by preventing and 
combating intolerance of Islamic religious manifestations in Dutch society, 
including building mosques, establishing Muslim schools and wearing the Islamic 
headscarf. Despite the substantial intolerance displayed towards these 
manifestations, the findings of this study indicate a wide support for preventing 
and combating intolerance and prejudice in general. More than two-thirds of 
respondents want the government to develop policies to encourage the proper 
functioning of the multicultural society, including measures to promote tolerance 
for cultural diversity (see Section 5.2.3.3). 
Furthermore, the results in 6.4.2 indicate that respondents who are intolerant 
of Islamic manifestations think that allowing these manifestations in the public 
sphere will lead to forcing Islam upon non-Muslims. Therefore it is of the utmost 
importance to dispel such prejudice about Islam, as the national government noted 
in its policy document Integration, Belonging and Citizenship issued in 2011 
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Title of this PhD thesis: Multiculturalism and multicultural citizenship: 
Public views on national belonging, equality and cultural distinctiveness in the 
Netherlands 
 
The growing ethnic and cultural diversity in Western societies since the end of 
World War II has given rise to issues regarding social equality for citizens of 
different ethnic backgrounds, and immigrants’ cultural and ethnic identity. In the 
last two decades, debates on these issues have increasingly tended to focus on 
norms, values and practices of Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands and other 
European countries. 
The debates on these issues have been accompanied by scientific studies 
focusing on whether and to what extent the (policy) responses of Western societies 
to immigration and the resulting diversity can be characterized as ‘multicultural’, 
an adjective which generally means that the cultural distinctiveness of immigrants 
in society is being taken into account. Such normative response, also referred to as 
multiculturalism, has three central aspects, which are closely related to fundamental 
debates on citizenship and are described by Shadid (2009) as the central 
dimensions of multicultural citizenship. The first of these dimensions concerns the 
recognition that individuals of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds who have 
legal citizenship belong to the national group. The second dimension bears upon 
social equality, not only on grounds such as gender and sexual orientation, but on 
grounds of ethnic origin and religion as well. The third dimension is the most 
defining aspect of multiculturalism: the recognition of cultural distinctiveness of 
the various groups in society, which is seen by proponents of multiculturalism as 
necessary to achieve citizen equality. 
However, many scientific studies of these dimensions focus on regulations, 
policies and the political discourse of the societies concerned. In contrast, studies of 
public views on the national belonging of (new) citizens of various ethnic and 
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cultural backgrounds are rare. There has also been little empirical research on the 
relationship between immigrant’s ethnic identity or multiple citizenship status and 
their loyalty to the nation-state, a specific aspect of the recognition of national 
belonging which has been increasingly debated and problematized in the last few 
decades. The purpose of this study is therefore to explore Dutch citizens’ views on 
the three said dimensions of multicultural citizenship, including loyalty to the 
nation-state. By exploring these views, this study hopes to contribute to the 
understanding of how the social construction of national belonging is related to 
various aspects of attitudes towards cultural diversity, including views on equality, 
prejudice and cultural distinctiveness. By assessing these relationships, this study 
will also make an empirical exploration of whether the three dimensions of 
multicultural citizenship are indeed distinct, as theorized by Shadid (2009) (see 
Chapter 1). 
The exploratory character and wide scope of this study led to the choice of a 
mixed-method methodological design, as discussed in Chapter 2. This design 
included a survey (n=710, conducted in November 2012) and semi-structured in-
depth interviews (n=66, carried out between March and August 2013) in which 
both native Dutch and first- and second-generation immigrants – holding Dutch 
citizenship – were interviewed. Most interviewed immigrants are of Turkish, 
Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean descent, and as such belong to the four largest 
non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands (n=202 in the survey and n=25 
in the in-depth interviews). Apart from these groups and native Dutch (n=468), 
the survey included a small group of Western immigrants as well (n=33). 
In Chapters 3 and 4, public views are explored on the first dimension of 
multicultural citizenship: the recognition that individuals of various ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds who have legal citizenship belong to the national group. As 
mentioned above, this dimension includes views on immigrants’ multiple 
citizenship status and their loyalty to the nation-state. The analyses in these 
chapters show that respondents disagree on this issue, indicating that national 
belonging is not determined only by the status of legal citizenship, but is imbued 
with social aspects as well.  
The respondents appear to have four distinct conceptions of national 
belonging: civic, territorial, ethnic and legal. On average, they attach most 
importance to the civic type, that is, they attach most importance to inclusive 
criteria for national belonging such as feeling Dutch and having knowledge of 
Dutch culture. Almost as much importance is attached to the territorial type, 
which includes such criteria as being born and living for most of one’s life in the 
Netherlands, and to the legal type, which implies exclusive legal citizenship, where 
the latter type refers to not holding multiple citizenship. Respondents who 
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considered these territorial criteria and/or the criterion of exclusive legal citizenship 
to be important, argued that these are necessary preconditions for citizens to 
develop a sense of belonging and loyalty to the Netherlands. Least importance is 
attached to the ethnic type of national belonging, which includes exclusive criteria 
such as having Dutch ancestors, a Western name and a Christian background. 
The importance the respondents attach to these criteria for national belonging 
appears to be related to their political preference, their educational level and the 
strength of their prejudice that immigrants are a source of cultural and economic 
threat. With respect to the latter, the more exclusive the type of Dutch national 
belonging, the stronger its relationship is to this type of prejudice. Furthermore, 
the importance attached to the most exclusive types – the ethnic type and exclusive 
legal citizenship – appears to be negatively related to educational level. Finally, 
voters for right-wing parties generally attach more importance to criteria for 
national belonging, whether they be inclusive or exclusive. Most importance is 
attached to the types of national belonging by voters for the right-wing (populist) 
Popular Party for Freedom (PVV) and the ultra-orthodox Protestant Reformed 
Political Party (SGP), which corresponds with statements made by the members of 
Parliament representing these parties, who have repeatedly stressed the importance 
of (exclusive) boundaries of the Dutch national group during the last decade. 
Almost half of the respondents appear to oppose multiple citizenship, the 
analysis indicates. While, as mentioned above, some respondents argued that 
exclusive legal citizenship is an important precondition for developing loyalty to 
the nation-state, most found it difficult to explain the necessity of this 
exclusiveness.  
However, no significant differences in commitment and loyalty to the 
Netherlands were found between respondents with single citizenship and those 
with multiple citizenship. Similarly, no significant differences were found in the 
levels of affective commitment and loyalty to the Dutch nation-state between 
native Dutch and Western and non-Western immigrants and their descendants. 
Moreover, the affective commitment of immigrants, including those with multiple 
citizenship, to their own ethnic and religious groups, appears to be positively 
related to their affective commitment to the Netherlands. Therefore, the results of 
this study indicate that neither ethnic and religious identity nor indeed multiple 
citizenship undermine immigrants’ attachment and loyalty to the nation-state. 
Views in Dutch society on the second dimension of multicultural citizenship, 
that is, social equality, are explored in Chapter 5. More specifically, views are 
explored on policies and regulations to achieve both formal equality (equal 
treatment) and substantive equality of opportunity for those citizens from diverse 
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ethnic and cultural backgrounds who had come to the country primarily as labour 
migrants. 
A large majority of the respondents supports both the principle of the equal 
treatment of citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds and national anti-
discrimination policies. Those who do not support this principle and such policies, 
appear to attach more importance to the exclusive (ethnic) criteria for national 
belonging, such as having Dutch ancestors and a Western name, and, not 
surprisingly, have a stronger prejudice that immigrants are a cultural and economic 
threat. This prejudice, in its turn, is negatively related to educational level, and 
appears to be strongest among voters for PVV and SGP, followed by voters for the 
right-wing liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the left -
wing Socialist Party (SP) and the ChristianUnion (CU). Voters for the left-wing 
Labour Party (PvdA), the left-wing liberal Democrats 66 (D66), the left-wing 
Green Left party and the right-wing Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) are the 
least prejudiced. 
At the same time, almost half of the respondents is of the opinion that anti-
discrimination policies should be improved. They argued that more effective 
policies, such as quota measures and preferential treatment, are necessary and 
should be introduced. They also stated that such policies will and can only be 
effective when politicians stop making polarizing statements. In contrast, among 
those (a small minority) who oppose anti-discrimination policies, some native 
Dutch respondents argued that the problem of discrimination is exaggerated and 
that ‘it is the immigrants’ own fault’, because, as one respondent said, ‘They want 
to be different from the Dutch’. 
Despite the sizeable support for anti-discrimination policies, a majority of the 
respondents opposes the preferential treatment of (naturalized) immigrants and 
their descendants in the context of job applications. Moreover, none of the 
respondents who do support policies for immigrant integration mentioned that 
specific measures should be implemented to reduce the substantive disadvantages 
of minorities on the labour market. Interestingly, the opposition to preferential 
treatment appears to be explained only to a small extent by the prejudice that 
immigrants present a cultural and economic threat and by views on who belongs to 
the national group. This opposition might partly be explained by a 
misunderstanding of the measures concerned: respondents said that they oppose 
positive action because it implies positive discrimination (which is forbidden by 
law in the Netherlands). Still, this study cannot explain the finding that the 
opposition to preferential treatment for immigrants is substantially larger than the 
opposition to preferential treatment for women.  
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Chapter 6 explores public views on the third dimension of multicultural 
citizenship: the recognition of cultural distinctiveness. As current political debates 
on this issue are primarily concentrated on the religious practices, norms and values 
of Muslim immigrants and their descendants, the exploration in Chapter 6 largely 
focuses on interpretations of church-state relations and the perceived 
incompatibility between Dutch norms and values and the norms and values 
embraced by Muslim immigrants. Indeed, the analysis indicates that respondents 
associate the ‘cultural distinctiveness of immigrants’ primarily with such Islamic 
religious manifestations as mosques, Muslim schools and the Islamic headscarf. 
Interestingly, the analysis indicates that both respondents’ tolerance of such 
religious distinctiveness and their appreciation of cultural diversity in general are 
much lower than their support for the principle of equal treatment. Their 
opposition to certain aspects of the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness is 
substantial: almost half opposes the right of public officials (including teachers) to 
wear an Islamic headscarf and a third oppose granting new religious groups the 
right to build prayer houses. Importantly, the analysis indicates that these 
respondents do not oppose the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness as 
such (including manifestations of all religions), but specifically reject the presence 
of Islamic manifestations and expressions in the Netherlands. However, 
respondents who opposed the formal recognition of religious distinctiveness did 
not argue that such recognition would conflict with the neutrality of the state, or 
that it would hinder the development of immigrants’ loyalty to the Netherlands – 
arguments that have played a prominent role in the Dutch political debate since 
the year 2000.  
Finally, the respondents’ tolerance of religious distinctiveness appears to be 
positively related to their educational level, and negatively related to both the 
importance that is attached to relatively exclusive criteria for national belonging 
(such as having Dutch ancestors) and to the prejudice that immigrants present a 
cultural and economic threat. Furthermore, voters for PVV and SGP are the least 
tolerant, followed by voters for VVD and SP. Most tolerant of religious 
distinctiveness are voters for the left-wing parties PvdA, D66 and Green Left. 
While, as mentioned above, the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 clearly indicate 
that public views on national belonging are related to views on social equality and 
the recognition of cultural distinctiveness, the analysis in Chapter 7 indicates that 
these three dimensions of multicultural citizenship are empirically distinct. In other 
words, the normative response of citizens to the cultural diversity in their society 
assumes three distinct aspects. In Dutch society, this is reflected in the 
phenomenon that the wide support for an inclusive conception of national 
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belonging and the principle of equal treatment (discussed above) does not imply a 
high level of tolerance for religious manifestations of all groups in society. 
 
Samenvatting 
Titel van dit proefschrift: Multiculturalisme en multicultureel burgerschap: 
Publieke opvattingen over nationaal toebehoren, gelijkheid en culturele 
eigenheid in Nederland  
 
De sinds het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog groeiende etnische en culturele 
diversiteit in westerse samenlevingen heeft aanleiding gegeven tot discussies over 
sociale ongelijkheid van burgers met verschillende etnische achtergronden, en over 
de culturele en etnische identiteit van immigranten. In de laatste twee decennia 
hebben deze discussies steeds vaker specifiek betrekking op normen, waarden en 
praktijken van islamitische immigranten in Nederland en andere Europese landen. 
De debatten over deze kwesties hebben onder meer geleid tot 
wetenschappelijke studies over of en in hoeverre de (beleids-)reacties van westerse 
samenlevingen op immigratie en de daaruit voortvloeiende diversiteit kunnen 
worden gekarakteriseerd als 'multicultureel', een adjectief dat aanduidt dat de 
culturele eigenheid van de immigranten in de samenleving wordt erkend. Deze 
erkenning, ook wel multiculturalisme genoemd, heeft drie centrale aspecten, die 
nauw verwant zijn aan fundamentele debatten over burgerschap en door Shadid 
(2009) worden aangeduid als de centrale dimensies van multicultureel burgerschap. 
De eerste dimensie betreft de erkenning dat burgers met verschillende etnische en 
culturele achtergronden behoren tot de nationale groep. De tweede dimensie 
betreft sociale gelijkheid, niet alleen op grond van geslacht en seksuele geaardheid, 
maar ook op grond van etnische afkomst en religieuze overtuiging. De derde 
dimensie is het meest definiërende aspect van multiculturalisme: de erkenning van 
de culturele eigenheid van de verschillende groepen in de samenleving. 
Voorstanders van multiculturalisme beschouwen deze erkenning als een 
voorwaarde voor het bereiken van sociale gelijkheid. 
Vele wetenschappelijke studies over deze dimensies richten zich echter op 
regelgeving, beleid en het politieke discours van de bestudeerde samenlevingen. 
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Studies van publieke opvattingen over het nationale toebehoren van (nieuwe) 
burgers met verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden zijn daarentegen 
zeldzaam. Ook is er weinig empirisch onderzoek naar de relatie tussen enerzijds de 
etnische identiteit en de meervoudige nationaliteit van (sommige) immigranten en 
anderzijds hun loyaliteit aan de natiestaat, een specifiek aspect van de erkenning 
van het nationale behoren, dat met name in de laatste twee decennia veel aandacht 
heeft gekregen.  
Het doel van deze studie is dan ook het verkennen van opvattingen van 
Nederlandse burgers over de drie genoemde dimensies van multicultureel 
burgerschap, met inbegrip van loyaliteit aan de natiestaat. De hoop is dat dit 
onderzoek daarmee kan bijdragen aan het begrip van hoe de sociale constructie van 
het nationale behoren is gerelateerd aan opvattingen over specifieke aspecten van 
culturele diversiteit, waaronder sociale gelijkheid, vooroordelen en culturele 
eigenheid. Daarmee is deze studie ook een verkenning van de vraag of de drie 
dimensies van multicultureel burgerschap inderdaad empirisch zijn te 
onderscheiden, zoals getheoretiseerd door Shadid (2009) (zie hoofdstuk 1). 
Het verkennende karakter en de brede vraagstelling van dit onderzoek hebben 
geleid tot de keuze van een mixed-method opzet, zoals toegelicht in hoofdstuk 2. 
Deze opzet omvatte een survey (n = 710, uitgevoerd in november 2012) en 
semigestructureerde diepte-interviews (n = 66, uitgevoerd in de periode maart-
augustus 2013), waarin zowel autochtone Nederlanders en eerste- en tweede-
generatie allochtonen – allen met de Nederlandse nationaliteit – zijn geïnterviewd. 
De meeste geïnterviewde immigranten zijn van Turkse, Marokkaanse, Surinaamse 
of Antilliaanse afkomst, en behoren als zodanig tot de vier grootste niet-westerse 
allochtone groepen in Nederland (n = 202 in de enquête en n = 25 in de diepte-
interviews). Naast deze groepen en autochtone Nederlanders (n = 468), omvatte de 
enquête een kleine groep westerse allochtonen en (n = 33). 
In hoofdstukken 3 en 4 worden publieke opvattingen over de eerste dimensie 
van multicultureel burgerschap verkend: de erkenning dat burgers met 
verschillende etnische en culturele achtergronden tot de nationale groep behoren. 
Deze verkenning betreft mede het eerder genoemde specifieke aspect van deze 
dimensie: de meervoudige nationaliteit van immigranten en hun loyaliteit aan de 
natiestaat. De analyses in deze hoofdstukken laten zien dat respondenten het 
oneens zijn over criteria voor nationaal toebehoren. Nationaal toebehoren wordt 
dus sociaal geconstrueerd, en niet alleen bepaald door de juridische nationaliteit. 
De respondenten blijken vier verschillende typen opvattingen over nationaal 
toebehoren te hebben: civiel, territoriaal, etnisch en juridisch. Ze hechten gemiddeld 
het meeste belang aan het civiele type. Dat wil zeggen dat zij het meeste belang 
hechten aan inclusieve criteria voor nationaal toebehoren, zoals het ‘zich 
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Nederlands voelen’ en het hebben van kennis van de Nederlandse cultuur. Bijna 
net zoveel belang wordt gehecht aan het territoriale type, dat verwijst naar criteria 
zoals geboren zijn in, en langdurig wonen in Nederland, en aan het juridische type, 
dat verwijst naar het niet hebben van meervoudige nationaliteit. Respondenten die 
deze territoriale criteria en/of het criterium van de exclusieve nationaliteit 
belangrijk vinden, beschouwen deze als noodzakelijke voorwaarden voor het 
ontwikkelen van een gevoel van verbondenheid met en loyaliteit aan Nederland. 
Het minste belang wordt door de respondenten gehecht aan het etnische type van 
nationaal toebehoren, dat verwijst naar exclusieve criteria zoals het hebben van 
Nederlandse voorouders, een westerse naam of een christelijke achtergrond. 
Het belang dat de respondenten hechten aan deze criteria voor nationaal 
toebehoren is gerelateerd aan hun politieke voorkeur, opleidingsniveau en de mate 
waarin ze het vooroordeel hebben dat immigranten een culturele en economische 
bedreiging vormen. Dit laatste vooroordeel is sterker bij respondenten die meer 
belang hechten aan exclusieve criteria voor nationaal toebehoren. Daarnaast blijkt 
de mate waarin respondenten de exclusieve criteria belangrijk vinden (zoals het 
hebben van Nederlandse voorouders en het niet hebben van meervoudige 
nationaliteit), negatief gerelateerd te zijn aan hun opleidingsniveau. Tenslotte 
hechten kiezers voor rechtse politieke partijen in het algemeen meer belang aan alle 
criteria voor nationaal toebehoren, of deze criteria nu inclusief of exclusief zijn. 
PVV- en SGP-stemmers hechten het meeste belang aan dergelijke criteria. Dit is 
wellicht niet verrassend, gezien het feit dat PVV- en SGP-parlementariërs in de 
afgelopen 10 jaar herhaaldelijk hebben gewezen op het belang van (exclusieve) 
criteria voor nationaal toebehoren. 
Bijna de helft van de respondenten heeft bezwaar tegen een meervoudige 
nationaliteit, zo blijkt uit de analyse. Hoewel een aantal van deze respondenten, 
zoals hierboven vermeld, stelt dat het hebben van alleen de Nederlandse 
nationaliteit een belangrijke voorwaarde is voor de ontwikkeling van loyaliteit aan 
de natiestaat, vonden de meesten het moeilijk om de noodzaak van deze 
exclusiviteit te onderbouwen. 
De analyse laat echter geen significante verschillen zien in verbondenheid met 
en loyaliteit aan Nederland tussen respondenten met meervoudige nationaliteit en 
respondenten met enkelvoudige nationaliteit. Evenzo zijn geen significante 
verschillen gevonden in de mate van verbondenheid met en loyaliteit aan de 
Nederlandse natiestaat tussen enerzijds autochtone Nederlanders en anderzijds 
westerse en niet-westerse immigranten en hun nakomelingen. Ook blijkt de 
nationale verbondenheid van immigranten, waaronder die met meervoudige 
nationaliteit, positief gerelateerd te zijn aan hun etnische en religieuze 
zelfidentificatie. Daarmee laten de resultaten van deze studie zien dat de nationale 
226 Samenvatting 
verbondenheid en loyaliteit van immigranten niet wordt belemmerd of ondermijnd 
door hun etnische of religieuze identiteit, en ook niet door meervoudige 
nationaliteit. 
Opvattingen in de Nederlandse samenleving over de tweede dimensie van 
multicultureel burgerschap – sociale gelijkheid – vormen het onderwerp van 
hoofdstuk 5. Meer in het bijzonder worden in dit hoofdstuk opvattingen verkend 
over beleid en regelgeving om zowel formele gelijkheid (gelijke behandeling) als 
gelijkheid van kansen te bereiken, voor burgers met verschillende etnische en 
culturele achtergronden die voornamelijk als arbeidsmigranten naar Nederland zijn 
gekomen. 
Een grote meerderheid van de respondenten steunt zowel het beginsel van de 
gelijke behandeling van burgers met verschillende etnische en culturele 
achtergronden als een nationaal antidiscriminatiebeleid. Degenen die dit principe 
en dergelijk beleid niet steunen, hechten meer waarde aan de exclusieve (etnische) 
criteria voor nationaal behoren, zoals het hebben Nederlandse voorouders en een 
westerse naam, en hebben in sterkere mate het vooroordeel dat immigranten een 
culturele en economische bedreiging vormen. Dit vooroordeel is op zijn beurt 
negatief gerelateerd aan opleidingsniveau, en is het sterkst onder PVV- en SGP-
stemmers, gevolgd door VVD-, SP- en CU-stemmers. Stemmers op PvdA-, D66-, 
GroenLinks- en CDA zijn het minst bevooroordeeld. 
Tegelijkertijd is bijna de helft van de respondenten van mening dat 
maatregelen ter bestrijding van discriminatie moeten worden verbeterd. Zij voeren 
aan dat effectiever beleid noodzakelijk is, en noemen daarbij het instellen van quota 
en voorkeursbeleid. Zij stellen ook dat dergelijk beleid alleen effectief kan zijn als 
politici stoppen met het doen van polariserende uitspraken over immigranten. Een 
kleine minderheid onder de respondenten die bezwaar heeft tegen een 
antidiscriminatiebeleid, stelt dat het probleem van discriminatie wordt overdreven 
en dat het “de schuld van immigranten zelf is”, omdat, zoals een van de 
respondenten zei, “Zij anders willen zijn dan de Nederlanders”. 
Ondanks de grote steun voor antidiscriminatiebeleid, is een meerderheid van 
de respondenten tegen voorkeursbeleid bij sollicitaties voor (genaturaliseerde) 
immigranten en hun nakomelingen. Bovendien is men niet van mening dat 
specifieke maatregelen nodig zijn om achterstand van minderheden op de 
arbeidsmarkt te verminderen, ook niet de respondenten die zich voorstander 
betoonden van integratiebeleid voor immigranten. Het is opvallend dat de 
oppositie tegen voorkeursbeleid slechts in geringe mate kan worden verklaard door 
het vooroordeel dat migranten een culturele en economische dreiging vormen, en 
door opvattingen over criteria voor nationaal toebehoren. Deze oppositie kan wel 
gedeeltelijk worden verklaard door een verkeerd begrip van voorkeursbeleid: 
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respondenten zeiden er tegen te zijn omdat het naar hun mening positieve 
discriminatie impliceert, terwijl dit laatste in Nederland niet is toegestaan. Toch 
kan in deze studie de bevinding dat de oppositie tegen voorkeursbeleid voor 
immigranten aanzienlijk groter is dan die tegen voorkeursbeleid voor vrouwen, niet 
worden verklaard. 
In hoofdstuk 6 worden publieke opvattingen over de derde dimensie van 
multicultureel burgerschap onderzocht: de erkenning van culturele eigenheid. 
Aangezien de huidige politieke debatten over deze kwestie voornamelijk de 
religieuze praktijken, normen en waarden van islamitische immigranten en hun 
nakomelingen betreffen, richt een belangrijk deel van de verkenning in dit 
hoofdstuk zich op aspecten van de scheiding tussen kerk en staat, en op de 
vermeende onverenigbaarheid van de Nederlandse normen en waarden met de 
normen en waarden van islamitische immigranten. Uit de analyse blijkt inderdaad 
dat de respondenten de 'culturele eigenheid van immigranten’ in de eerste plaats 
associëren met islamitische religieuze manifestaties zoals moskeeën, islamitische 
scholen en de hoofddoek. 
Het is opvallend dat de tolerantie voor dergelijke religieuze manifestaties en 
ook de waardering voor culturele diversiteit in het algemeen, veel lager is dan de 
steun voor het beginsel van gelijke behandeling. De oppositie tegen bepaalde 
aspecten van de formele erkenning van religieuze eigenheid is aanzienlijk: bijna de 
helft is tegen het recht van ambtenaren (inclusief leerkrachten) om een islamitische 
hoofddoek te dragen en een derde vindt dat nieuwe religieuze groepen niet het 
recht verleend moet worden om gebedshuizen te bouwen. Uit de analyse blijkt 
overigens dat deze respondenten geen bezwaar hebben tegen de formele erkenning 
van religieuze eigenheid als zodanig (met inbegrip van uitingen van alle religies), 
maar wel en specifiek tegen religieuze uitingen en manifestaties van moslims in 
Nederland.  
De respondenten die tegen de formele erkenning van religieuze eigenheid zijn, 
beweren echter niet dat een dergelijke erkenning in strijd is met de neutraliteit van 
de staat, of dat het de loyaliteit van immigranten aan Nederland ondermijnt - 
argumenten die niettemin een prominente rol hebben gespeeld in het Nederlandse 
politieke debat sinds het jaar 2000. 
De tolerantie van de respondenten voor religieuze manifestaties blijkt overigens 
positief gerelateerd te zijn aan hun opleidingsniveau, en negatief gerelateerd aan 
zowel het belang dat ze hechten aan relatief exclusieve criteria voor nationaal 
toebehoren (zoals het hebben van Nederlandse voorouders) als aan het vooroordeel 
dat immigranten een culturele en economische bedreiging vormen. Verder blijken 
PVV- en SGP-stemmers het minst tolerant, gevolgd door VVD- en SP-stemmers. 
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Het meest tolerant jegens religieuze eigenheid zijn kiezers voor linkse partijen – de 
PvdA, D66 en GroenLinks. 
Zoals hierboven vermeld, wijzen de analyses in de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 er op 
dat publieke opvattingen over nationale behoren gerelateerd zijn aan opvattingen 
over sociale gelijkheid en de erkenning van de culturele eigenheid van 
immigranten. Tegelijkertijd wijst de algemene analyse in hoofdstuk 7 uit dat deze 
drie dimensies van multicultureel burgerschap empirisch zijn te onderscheiden. 
Met andere woorden, de normatieve reactie van burgers op de culturele diversiteit 
in hun samenleving heeft drie verschillende aspecten. In de Nederlandse 
samenleving komt dit onder meer tot uitdrukking in het verschijnsel dat de brede 
steun voor zowel een inclusieve opvatting van nationaal toebehoren als het beginsel 
van gelijke behandeling (hierboven besproken), niet samengaat met een hoge mate 
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This study concerns three central aspects of multiculturalism, which are 
closely related to fundamental debates on citizenship and are 
described as the principal dimensions of multicultural citizenship. The 
first of these dimensions relates to national belonging: the recognition 
that citizens of various ethnic and cultural backgrounds belong to the 
national group. The second dimension bears upon social equality, on 
grounds such as ethnic origin, religion, gender and sexual orientation. 
The third dimension is the most defining aspect of multiculturalism: 
the recognition of cultural distinctiveness of the various groups in 
society, which is considered necessary (by proponents of 
multiculturalism) to achieve citizen equality. 
This study explores views in Dutch society on these potentially 
divisive issues. Essentially, this study provides insight into the question 
to which extent society attributes the quality ‘Dutch’ to Dutch citizens 
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